NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

This is the final piece of a three-part article on Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The intellectual foundation of NCW was laid by US Department of Defence in the 1990s. However, its efficacy as a theory of war was considerably undermined when, after initial conventional successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitations of net-centricity as a predominant battle-winning factor got exposed during urban combat and counter-insurgency operations. Nevertheless, the conceptual foundations of the theory have proved to be of an enduring nature, which is evidenced in the manner it continues to influence evolving military doctrine as well as design of military systems in all the major militaries. The first two parts reviewed the status of development of NCW capabilities in the US, UK, Australia, and NATO. This part concludes the article by carrying out a similar review for China and Russia, followed by concluding remarks.

This is the second piece of a three-part article on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) which reviews the status of development of NCW capabilities in major world armies, covering the US, UK, Australia, NATO, China, and Russia. NCW as a theory of warfighting in the Information Age was first evolved in the US and operationally tested during the Iraq wars. A series of four previous articles have dealt with the basic tenets and governing principles of NCW, as well as several concepts which are at the heart of this theory, including self-synchronization, power to the edge, agility, and effects-based operations. The first part of this work covered the status of implementation of NCW in the US, while here we cover similar ground with respect to the UK, Australia and the NATO.

The intellectual foundation of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a theory of warfighting was laid by US Department of Defence in the 1990s. In addition to its basic tenets and governing principles, the theory enunciated several concepts including self-synchronization, power to the edge, agility, and effects-based operations. The power of NCW was demonstrated dramatically during the Iraq wars, which spurred other major militaries to take note and develop similar concepts in accordance with their own military thought. The efficacy of NCW as a theory of war was considerably undermined when, after initial conventional successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitations of net-centricity as a predominant battle-winning factor got exposed during urban combat and counter-insurgency operations. Nonetheless, the basic tenets of NCW continue to influence evolving military doctrine as well as design of military systems not only in the US but in other military powers as well. This three-part series reviews the status of development of NCW capabilities in the US, UK, Australia, NATO, China, and Russia, beginning with the US in this first part.

While networks and information management are central to the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), it is important to emphasize that NCW is essentially a Command & Control concept. Further, NCW is also related to the notions of Self-Synchronisation of forces, “Power to the Edge”, Effects Based Operations (EBO) and the concept of Agility. All of these are various facets of how command & control is effected on the battlefield. In this write-up, these ideas are stitched together and discussed.

In an earlier two-part write up on “The Changing Nature of Warfare”, it was brought out how, over the centuries, warfare has undergone significant transformation due to new discoveries and innovative application of technologies, and how these inventions and discoveries have resulted in dramatic changes in military doctrine as well as operational and organisational concepts. In another post titled “21st Century Warfare: From ‘Battlefield’ to ‘Battlespace’,” the complex nature of the “arena” in which 21st century warfare is conducted, was examined. In this piece, an attempt is made to analyse the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as it relates to warfighting and battlespace concepts which have been discussed earlier.

In 21st Century warfare literature, the term “Network Centric Warfare/ Operations (NCW/ NCO)” is often used while discussing warfighting doctrines and transformational measures being taken towards modernising present-day militaries. However, there is often an inadequate understanding of this concept. Indeed, more often than not, the term is used synonymously with “networking”, whereas the concept is much deeper, and the connotations of acquiring net-centric capabilities pretty complex and far-reaching in nature. In this article, an attempt is made to throw some light on the core concept of NCW as propounded by its original authors.

Part I of this write-up discussed the changing nature of warfare over the last several centuries, based on Lind’s categorisation of “Generations of Warfare” as well as the concept of “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). This part looks at the fast changing pace at which warfighting concepts are undergoing change in the present century, especially as a result of the ongoing rapid technological advancements. It gives an overview of some new conceptualisations of modern warfare such as “Asymmetric Warfare”, “Unrestricted Warfare” and “Hybrid Warfare”. It also dwells briefly on new Information Age warfighting concepts, such as “Network Centric Warfare”, “Information Warfare” and “Cyber Warfare”.

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. The term “network centric warfare” broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as organizations that a networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage. NCW provides a military the ability to attain a high level of shared battlespace awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. This write-up gives an overview of the origin, development and main characteristics of this 21st Century warfighting concept.