Sections

Introduction

United States

References

Introduction

The intellectual foundation of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a theory of warfighting was laid by Department of Defence (DOD), USA. A series of books were published by the DOD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), which brought out the evolution and development of NCW [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In addition to its basic tenets and governing principles, the theory expounds several concepts including self-synchronisation, power to the edge, agility, and effects-based operations (EBO). The power of NCW was demonstrated dramatically during the Iraq wars, which spurred other major militaries to take note and develop similar concepts in accordance with their own strategic and military thought. The NATO countries, China and Russia are perceived to have been greatly influenced by the theory propounded by the US.

The efficacy of NCW as a theory of war was considerably undermined after initial successes were achieved by the US during the conventional conflict phases in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was because, in the aftermath of these phases, the character of conflict metamorphosed into what is best characterised by William Lind’s Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) [6, 7], when limitations of net-centricity as a predominant battle-winning factor got exposed during urban combat and counter-insurgency operations, raising questions on whether the US was relying too much on technology. As a result, use of the terms NCW/ Network Centric Operations (NCO) is no longer very popular within the US DOD. Nonetheless, the basic theory encapsulated in its tenets and governing principles continues to influence evolving military doctrine as well as the design of military systems not only in the US but also by all major military powers.

The NCW theory developed by the US DOD has been sufficiently dealt with in previous articles [8, 9, 10, 11]. This work, therefore, begins by reviewing the status of development of NCW capabilities in the US. It then discusses the conceptual variations of the net-centric concept adopted by UK, Australia, NATO, China, and Russia and gives some insight into how these advanced militaries have gone about implementing the concepts on ground.

United States

As stated above, most of the NCW concepts explained in the previous chapter are essentially of US origin. This section traces the early development, operational employment, and the continuing impact of NCW theory in US military modernisation efforts.

Early Developments towards Net-Centricity

Over two decades ago when the discussions of NCW were in their infancy, the US took a decision to modernize its Armed Forces for meeting future challenges, in response to the changing character of warfare in the Information Age. Transformation is a vital component of US defence strategy and NCW occupies a central place within the US DOD’s force transformation process. This transformation is based on a high-performance information grid to provide a backplane for dynamic computing and communications.

Information Infrastructure. Some very promising network-centric capabilities had been developed, experimented with, and tested by US forces as early as the late 1990s. Many key elements of the information, sensor, and engagement grids were already in place or readily available by that time. At the planning level, the elements of a US DOD-wide intranet were emerging. Joint interoperability could be achieved in large measure when all elements of the three grids became compliant with the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and the Defence Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE).

US Army. In the 1990s, the US Army tested digitization and network-centric concepts and made very significant investments in the development of new warfighting capabilities as it fielded and began to experiment with the first digitized brigade in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Advanced Warfighting Experiments were conducted at the US National Training Centre at Fort Irwin, California, as well as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to demonstrate and test new concepts and technologies. Eventually, the entire 4th Infantry Division became the US Army’s first digitized division, which presented for the first time an entire division that was truly networked, with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2/BFT) systems providing the core capability. FBCB2/BFT uses the global positioning system and numerous sensors to pinpoint units on the battlefield. This capability provided unprecedented situational awareness to commanders at all levels on the battlefield. It was deployed to Southwest Asia in 2003 for participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath.

US Air Force. Similarly, the US Air Force used a combination of Expeditionary Force Exercises and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to explore the potential of networking and digitization. The power of information sharing to enable increased survivability and lethality in the air-to-air mission was substantiated by the US Air Force in the mid-1990s during the Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) Operational Special Project. US Air Force pilots flying F-15CS with and without data links demonstrated the power of information sharing enabled by data links [12].

US Navy. The US Navy began experimenting with NCO during exercises at sea as early as the late 1980s, when the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) “system of systems” was developed and initially tested. CEC, combining a high-performance sensor grid with a high-performance engagement grid, was enabled by a shift to NCO. In 1995, the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, commanded by then Vice Admiral Archie Clemins, employed rudimentary NCO to excellent effect during the dangerous Taiwan Straits crisis. CEC reached Initial Operational Capability in 1996 after a series of tests and experiments during the early 1990s. Testing and operational evaluations continued in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The CEC, combined with the US Marine Corps’ CEC-based Composite Tracking Network, created an effective, common network of sensors and weapons that extended the naval air defence capability over sea and shore. Thus, it became an important capability of the US Navy-Marine Corps’ overall C2 architecture, FORCEnet [13].

Operational Experience

NCW theory and the governing principles of a network-centric force are continuing to guide the development of future warfighting concepts and the development of transformational capabilities within the US Armed Forces.

Great strides were made in refining NCW theory, documenting the benefits and warfighting advantages of NCW, developing network-centric capabilities, and generally implementing NCW throughout the US Armed Forces in the first few years of the 21st Century. The most visible and convincing evidence of the validity of NCW theory and the tremendous potential of networked, joint forces (even partially networked joint forces) has been provided by US and its coalition partners in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Like the force transformation process itself, the development and implementation of NCW capabilities to enable the US Joint Force is a long-term and continuous process. The US DOD has been spending significant resources to pursue NCW capabilities, to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars each year in the realm of military electronics, aircraft avionics and missile guidance, communications, and electro-optics. In future, the core concepts that relate to leveraging the power of information will remain, even though there may be changes in terminology, shifts in policy, and alterations in implementation plans.

Over the years, the US DOD and senior military leaders have been consistent yet cautious in their support of a networked force. Former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld highlighted the importance of a fully networked force: “We must achieve fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the operational environment. Realizing these capabilities will require transforming our people, processes, and military forces.” Admiral Giambastiani, former Commander, US Joint Forces Command emphasized, “A fully collaborative and networked force is an imperative, not a luxury.” The former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General Michael Haggee said, “The capability to connect disparate units spread over the battlefield will help to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to commanders who can then call fire support…It will also be critical to Sea Basing, a key component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 Concept.” On the contrary, General William Wallace, USA (Retired) cautioned that “despite the enormous benefits of using a network, it would be folly to lose sight of the fact that it is still merely a tool to aid the commander in understanding and decision-making” [14].

Impact of NCW Theory on Ongoing Military Modernization Efforts

The last formal treatment of NCW in the US available in the open domain is found in a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report of 2007 vintage [15], which provides a comprehensive review of the NCW theory post the experiences gained in Iraq and Afghanistan. It highlights the advantages which NCO offer (which have been discussed at length in earlier articles), and at the same time raises several questions. These include overconfidence about the effectiveness of NCO, reduced effectiveness in urban combat and counter-insurgency operations, overreliance on information, information overload, increased complexity of military systems, vulnerabilities in software and data, and vulnerabilities to electronic warfare. It identifies a list of key technologies necessary to implement NCO, as follows: C4I, interoperable communications including with organisations outside the DOD such as local and state governments, multinational military commands, space technologies, networked weapons, bandwidth enhancement, unmanned vehicles, and sensor technology.

Some of the key military programs related to NCO which were undertaken at that juncture were: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Air Force Link 16, Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Army Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), Army Warfighter Information Network (WIN-T), Army Future Combat System (FCS) and the Global Information Grid (GIG). A sample review of the status of these projects indicates that all of them are still being pursued, amongst many others, as given out below:-

• JTRS. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) aimed to replace existing radios in the US military with a single set of software-defined radios that could have new frequencies and modes (“waveforms”) added via upload, instead of requiring multiple radio types in ground vehicles. JTRS is widely seen as one of the DoD’s greatest acquisition failures, having spent $6 billion over 15 years up to 2011 without delivering a radio [16]. However, the program was restarted, and many program elements are still alive. For instance, in May 2020, the DOD ordered $2 billion worth of JTRS for the Navy, Air Force and NATO nations [17].
• Link 16. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) are used in combat for machine-to-machine exchange of information messages such as radar tracks, target information, platform status, imagery, and command assignments, allowing the military to share a common understanding of the battlefield. The purpose of this program is to insure the interoperability of Air Force TDLs. TDLs are used by weapons, platforms, and sensors of all services [18]. Till recently, Link 16 technology has only been capable of line-of-sight communications, thus putting a severe limitation on its utility. The U.S. Air Force is planning to put a small satellite in low earth orbit, fitted with a Link 16 Terminal to provide beyond-line-of-sight tactical communications to soldiers on the battlefield. In 2019, Viasat was awarded a $10 million contract through the Space Enterprise Consortium to develop the first Link 16-capable spacecraft under the Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles XVI program. The Link 16 capabilities so provided would be compatible with fielded US Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Link 16-enabled platforms, including ground vehicles, aircraft, maritime vessels, and dismounted users. The satellite launch is expected to take place in 2021 [19].
• US Navy CEC. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is designed to enhance the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) war fighting capability of ships and aircraft by the netting of battle force sensors to provide a single, distributed anti-air warfare (AAW) defense capability. As a key pillar of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability, CEC enables Integrated Fire Control to counter increasingly capable and less detectable cruise missiles and manned aircraft, and in the future, tactical ballistic missiles in a joint environment. Initial operational capability was achieved in 1996, followed by full operational capability in 2005. As on date, 75 CEC systems have been deployed on sea and air platforms [20].
• Blue Force Tracker (BFT)/ FBCB2. BFT is the computer equipment used in the US Army’s main digital system, Army Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) that sends real-time data to forces on the battlefield using a Tactical Internet. In use since 2002, BFT provides friendly force tracking information and is integrated on more than 100,000 platforms across the Army and joint services. The system also displays the location of red forces. Additional capabilities include reporting battlefield locations and conditions such as mine fields or other obstacles. The original BFT-1 was hailed as a massive benefit to situational awareness in the Iraq War [21]. The latest BFT modernization effort, termed BFT 3, will employ several new and enhanced features, including increased network capacity, advanced resiliency to electronic warfare attacks and improved means of moving data from source to destination in different operating environments. The program office is partnering with subject-matter experts from the Army Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, or CERDEC, to help understand BFT 3 modernization needs, the first few systems of which are expected to be fielded by 2025 [22].
• WIN-T. WIN-T provides the communication network (satellite and terrestrial) and services that allow the Warfighter to send and receive information in tactical situations. It is the transformational command and control system that manages tactical information transport at theatre through Company Echelons in support of full spectrum Army operations. WIN-T was preceded by the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system, which was initiated in 1982 to fill communications requirements from division down to the battalion level and was fielded during the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, these operations revealed inadequacies in MSE to support highly mobile and dispersed forces in a digital environment. WIN-T was conceived to solve this problem and to enable mobile mission command on the battlefield. WIN-T Increment 1 provides networking at-the-halt capability down to battalion level. WIN-T Increment 2 provides networking on-the-move (OTM) capability using both terrestrial and satellite links, and extends the network to company level for manoeuvre brigades for the first time. General Dynamics was recently awarded a USD 20 million contract to support the latest version of WIN-T (Increment 2), expected to be completed by 2023. WIN-T Increment 3 provides full network mobility and introduces the air tier creating a three-tiered architecture: traditional line-of-sight (terrestrial), airborne by Unmanned Aerial Systems and other airborne platforms; and beyond-line-of-sight (satellite) [23].
• FCS. Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the United States Army’s principal modernization program from 2003 to early 2009. Formally launched in 2003, FCS was envisioned to create new brigades equipped with new manned and unmanned vehicles linked by an unprecedented fast and flexible battlefield network. In 2009, the program was terminated and absorbed into a new, pan-army program called the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program [24]. This program was meant to leverage mobility, protection, information, and precision fires to conduct effective full spectrum military operations [25]. In 2018, the Army Futures Command was established to coordinate all modernization efforts of the US Army. The primary end state of the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy, nested with the 2018 Army Strategy, is a modernized Army capable of conducting Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as part of an integrated Joint Force in a single theater by 2028, and be ready to conduct MDO across an array of scenarios in multiple theaters by 2035. The modernization framework aimed at achieving this MDO capability comprises six priority areas, namely, long range precision fires, next generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, network, air and missile defence and soldier lethality [26]. Project Convergence is the centerpiece of the transformational change in the Army, aimed at converting the core tenet of MDO into reality. It is how the Army plans to be a part of Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) plan to connect sensors from all the military services, ie, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force, as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF), into a single network [27].
• GIG. The Information Technology (IT) infrastructure of the DoD is the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG is the Department’s globally interconnected end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel [28]. While the information network is a key component of the modernization strategy for achieving MDO, ‘GIG’ as a terminology is no longer in vogue, and has been replaced by the term Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN) [29].

From the above discussion, it emerges that while use of the terminology ‘NCO’ is no longer popular within the US DoD, the concept of network centric operations is deeply ingrained into the warfighting philosophy of the US armed forces and is being continuously refined and upgraded by leveraging emerging disruptive technologies.

[Continued in “Network Centric Warfare: An Enduring Theory of Warfighting (Part II)”]

 

References

(1)         Cebrowski A K, The Implementation of Network Centric Warfare, Office of Force Transformation, US DoD, 05 Jan 05, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(2)         Alberts DS, Garstka JJ, and Stein FP, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition (revised). Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, Feb 2000, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(3)         Alberts DS, Garstka JJ, Hayes RE, and Signori DA, Understanding Information Age Warfare, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2001, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(4)         David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military, Washington DC, DoD CCRP, June 2002, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(5)         Edward A Smith Jr, Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War, Washington, DC, DoD CCRP, 2002, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(6)         William S Lind et al, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 1989, pp. 22-26, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(7)         Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, Fourth Generation War, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-A, 12 Aug 2008, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(8)         Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Network Centric Warfare: Origins and Main Characteristics, Future Wars, 08 Sep 2017, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(9)         Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Network Centric Warfare: Understanding the Concept, Future Wars, 22 Sep 2017, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(10)        Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Network Centric Warfare vis-a-vis Modern Warfighting Concepts, Future Wars, 01 Jan 2018, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(11)        Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Network Centric Warfare: A Command & Control Concept, Future Wars, 17 Jan 2018, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(12)        Cebrowski A K, The Implementation of Network Centric Warfare,  … , pp 5, 50-57, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(13)        Bartholomees, J Boone Jr, The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, 4th Edition, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College publication, Jul 2010, pp 330-333, 352-353.

(14)        Ibid, pp. 329.

(15)        Clay Wilson, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 15 Mar 2007, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(16)        Joint Tactical Radio System, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(17)        Nathan Strout, Pentagon orders $2B worth of Jam-Resistant Radios, 20 May 2020, C4ISRNET, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(18)        Clay Wilson, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, … , Accessed 03 May 2021.

(19)        Nathan Strout, Air Force Wants to Expand Tactical Data Network to Space, 29 May 2019, C4ISRNET, Accessed 03 May 2019.

(20)        Cooperative Engagement Capability, Asst Secretary of the Navy for RD&A, DoD, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(21)        Developments in Blue Force Tracking, Global Military Communications Magazine, Jan-Feb 2017, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(22)        Dan Lafontaine, Army Set to Modernize Blue Force Tracking Network, US Army, 13 Jul 2018, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(23)        WIN-T, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(24)        Future Combat Systems, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(25)        BCT Modernization, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(26)        Army Modernisation Strategy: Investing in the Future, 2019, US Army, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(27)        Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Project Convergence, Congressional Research Service, 08 Oct 2020, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(28)        Global Information Grid, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 May 2021.

(29)        Global Information Grid, Computer Security Resource Centre, NIST, US Dept of Commerce, Accessed 03 May 2021.