CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario Based Analysis – Part III
This is the concluding segment of an article structured as a three-part series which analysis how autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are/ should be characterized and defined. The first part resorted to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. The next segment analysed a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios and proposed a fresh set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions. This part concludes by first highlighting the high-risk implications of incorporating the online learning feature in AWS and then briefly analyses how the proposed definitions fare when applied to complex AWS architectures.
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario based Analysis – Part II
This is the second segment of an article structured as a three-part series which analysis how autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are/ should be characterized and defined. The rationale for this work is based on the assessment that extant AWS definitions are either too ambiguous or evolved against different contexts, leading to participants and analysts in the ongoing debate on regulation of AWS talking past each other. The first part resorted to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. This second part analyses a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios and proposes a fresh set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions.
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario Based Analysis – Part I
There is no internationally accepted definition of autonomous weapon systems (AWS). However, these are popularly described as weapons which, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. With such a characterisation, most states declare that fully autonomous weapons must never be developed. This is because such a characterisation is mostly interpreted to mean that AWS can choose and destroy at will, all without any human intervention, which conjures up scary images of Skynet/Terminators taking over the human race.
On closer analysis, it is evident that the above definition of AWS is very ambiguous, covering within its ambit weapon systems with widely differing levels of autonomy, some of which should be ethically and legally acceptable to most states and militaries as well as other stakeholders.
This article is structured as a three-part series which takes a deeper look at how AWS are/ should be characterized and defined. This first part resorts to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. The subsequent parts go on to analyse a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios; propose a set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions; and briefly analyses how the proposed definitions fare when applied to complex AWS architectures.
Cyber Operations Episode III: Cyber Influence Operations
This is the third of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. The first two episodes surveyed existing cyberspace strategies and organizations and brainstormed the important issue of how to strike the right balance among the charters of major actors involved in defence of national cyberspace, namely, MOD/ armed forces, MEA/ external intelligence agencies, MHA and the private sector. This episode tackles another important facet of cyberspace conflicts, namely, cognitive operations. It discusses the specialized nature of cyber influence operations which may be conducted through social/ broadcast media, and brainstorms/ recommends strategies and structures to be evolved at the national level for developing capabilities to conduct cyber operations in the cognitive realm
Cyberspace Operations Episode II: Governance of India’s National Cyberspace
This is the second of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. This first episode surveyed existing cyberspace strategies and organizations. This episode brainstorms the important issue of how to strike the right balance among the charters of major actors involved in defence of national cyberspace, namely, MOD/ armed forces, MEA/ external intelligence agencies, MHA and the private sector. It deliberates upon a fresh approach wherein the MOD/ Armed Forces are envisaged to play a pivotal role in the defence of national cyberspace, with perhaps exclusive charter for offensive cyber operations, in sync with their role in the traditional domains of land, sea and air. Panelists provide different perspectives on how India’s cyber defence architecture must be structured to optimally defend its cyberspace.
Cyberspace Operations Episode I: Strategies and Structures of Major States
This is the first of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. The overall objective of this series is to review cyberspace strategies and capabilities of major world powers, compare these with the status of these in India, and give suitable recommendations. While the full spectrum of cyber operations is very wide, the series is structured to focus primarily on offensive cyber operations and cyber influence operations.
This first episode aims to survey existing cyberspace strategies and organizations. Subsequent episodes will delve deeper into what India needs to do to improve its posture in cyberspace. A brief overview is first given about the increasingly potent and strategic effects being achieved through cyberspace by various players, the applicability of existing international law of war, specifically jus ad bellum, in cyberspace, and also touch upon global trends in cyberspace strategies and capabilities. Thereafter, the panelists provide greater insights into the strategies and organizations of major global powers on the one hand and of India on the other, and give out views and recommendations on how India might improve its posture in cyberspace.
Warfighting in Cyberspace: Concepts, Global Trends and the Indian Perspective
This keynote address was given at the virtual ‘National Summit on Cyber Security 2021’ conducted by Institute of Technology and Science, Ghaziabad, India. The audience comprised of faculty, students and industry participants from India and abroad. The talk covers a wide range of issues as follows: importance of cyberspace as a warfighting domain; modelling of national cyberspace; strategic cyber threats and targets; cyber defence strategies; existing cyberspace governance set-up and current strategy for protection of national cyberspace in India; global practices in national cyberspace protection covering US, UK, China and Russia; and finally, recommended transformative restructuring for cyberspace governance in India.
Network Centric Warfare: An Enduring Theory of Warfighting (Part III) – Implementation in China and Russia
This is the final piece of a three-part article on Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The intellectual foundation of NCW was laid by US Department of Defence in the 1990s. However, its efficacy as a theory of war was considerably undermined when, after initial conventional successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitations of net-centricity as a predominant battle-winning factor got exposed during urban combat and counter-insurgency operations. Nevertheless, the conceptual foundations of the theory have proved to be of an enduring nature, which is evidenced in the manner it continues to influence evolving military doctrine as well as design of military systems in all the major militaries. The first two parts reviewed the status of development of NCW capabilities in the US, UK, Australia, and NATO. This part concludes the article by carrying out a similar review for China and Russia, followed by concluding remarks.
Network Centric Warfare: An Enduring Theory of Warfighting (Part II) – Implementation in the UK, Australia and NATO
This is the second piece of a three-part article on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) which reviews the status of development of NCW capabilities in major world armies, covering the US, UK, Australia, NATO, China, and Russia. NCW as a theory of warfighting in the Information Age was first evolved in the US and operationally tested during the Iraq wars. A series of four previous articles have dealt with the basic tenets and governing principles of NCW, as well as several concepts which are at the heart of this theory, including self-synchronization, power to the edge, agility, and effects-based operations. The first part of this work covered the status of implementation of NCW in the US, while here we cover similar ground with respect to the UK, Australia and the NATO.
Network Centric Warfare: An Enduring Theory of Warfighting (Part I) – Implementation in the United States
The intellectual foundation of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a theory of warfighting was laid by US Department of Defence in the 1990s. In addition to its basic tenets and governing principles, the theory enunciated several concepts including self-synchronization, power to the edge, agility, and effects-based operations. The power of NCW was demonstrated dramatically during the Iraq wars, which spurred other major militaries to take note and develop similar concepts in accordance with their own military thought. The efficacy of NCW as a theory of war was considerably undermined when, after initial conventional successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitations of net-centricity as a predominant battle-winning factor got exposed during urban combat and counter-insurgency operations. Nonetheless, the basic tenets of NCW continue to influence evolving military doctrine as well as design of military systems not only in the US but in other military powers as well. This three-part series reviews the status of development of NCW capabilities in the US, UK, Australia, NATO, China, and Russia, beginning with the US in this first part.