CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES
Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – Targets, Techniques and Stratagems
Cyber Influence Operations (CIO) are proving to be an increasingly potent capability in the armoury of nations for achieving strategic effects in global conflict scenarios. The current series on CIO is an endeavour to bring clarity to the concept and operational aspects of CIO and emphasize its emerging importance in 21st Century conflicts, with special reference to the Indian security scenario. The first article in this series dwelt on conceptual aspects, bringing out that the emerging notion of CIO lies at the confluence of Cyber Operations and Influence Operations, and is essentially a manifestation of Information Operations in cyberspace. This second article takes a step further and dwells on the multiple dimensions along which different flavours of CIO might unfold, the large variety of techniques which are available for conduct of CeSIO and CeTIO, and the manner in which these techniques may be synergistically employed to execute a multitude of creative influence stratagems in cyberspace.
Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – The Cauldron of Concepts and Terminologies
The notion of Cyber Influence Operations (CIO) has invited tremendous attention over the last decade or so, more so after the alleged interference by Russia in the US presidential elections of 2016. A literal understanding of the term CIO would suggest any activity undertaken to influence a target audience through the medium of cyberspace. However, a formal conceptualisation of CIO, together with associated terminology, is still a work in progress, and is closely intertwined with the relatively more mature concepts of Information Operations (IO), Cyberspace Operations (CO) and Influence Operations. The current series on CIO is an endeavour to bring clarity to the concept and operational aspects of CIO and emphasize its emerging importance in 21st Century conflicts, with special reference to the Indian security scenario. In this first article of the series, an attempt is made to achieve a degree of coherence in the cauldron of concepts and terminologies associated with CIO.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Slaves not Masters! Meaningful Human Control, Saving Lives and Non-Feasibility of a Pre-Emptive Ban
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are currently the subject of a global debate, particularly at the UN, over ethical, moral and legal aspects related to their deployment in future wars. Human rights groups are advocating a pre-emptive ban on their development on the grounds that deployment of LAWS would be in violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This is the final article in a three-piece series focusing on issues which are at the heart of this ongoing debate. The previous two write-ups dwelt on the unique characteristics of LAWS, analysed different positions on their purported violation of IHL, and discussed various nuances of Autonomy and Unpredictability. This piece will examine the important notion of Meaningful Human Control (MHC), and also bring out how employment of LAWS may in fact lead to saving of human lives. The pros and cons of a pre-emptive ban on LAWS vis-à-vis a binding regulation on their development will also be discussed.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Slaves not Masters! Conflict Scenarios, Autonomy and Unpredictability
AI-powered weapon systems are soon expected to acquire the capability to “select and kill” targets without human intervention. Such systems are widely referred to as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), sensationally dubbed as “killer robots”. A raging debate is on globally, particularly at the UN, over the ethical, moral and legal aspects of deploying LAWS in future wars, with human rights groups advocating a pre-emptive ban on their development. This is the second of three articles in a series which discusses issues which are at the heart of this ongoing debate. The first article discussed the unique characteristics of LAWS, and why these are viewed as being in violation of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This piece begins with an analysis of whether or not LAWS actually violate IHL principles against the backdrop of three typical warfighting scenarios. It goes on to discuss some noteworthy nuances of Autonomy in LAWS, the intriguing feature of Unpredictability in AI-powered systems, and the need for caution while attempting to make the critical “select and engage” function autonomous.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Slaves not Masters! “Killer Robots” and International Humanitarian Law
Increasing levels of autonomy are being incorporated in AI-powered weapon systems on the modern battlefield, which are soon expected to acquire the capability to “select and kill” targets without human intervention. Such systems are widely referred to as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), sensationally dubbed as “killer robots”. As a reaction to these developments a raging debate is on globally, particularly at the UN, over the ethical, moral and legal aspects of deploying fully autonomous weapon systems in future wars. Human rights groups are advocating a pre-emptive ban on their development on the grounds that employment of LAWS would be in violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This work, comprising of three articles, discusses issues which are at the heart of this ongoing debate. In this first article, a brief tour is given of relevant literature on the subject, the unique characteristics of LAWS, and why these are viewed as being in violation of IHL.
China’s Digital Silk Road: National Security Implications for India
An important element of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), the Digital Silk Road (DSR) is a comprehensive response to the Third Offset Strategy of the US and aims to establish China as a global technological superpower. Although projected by the Chinese Government as a global development project, the real objectives of the BRI and its components such as the DSR are essentially geopolitical in nature. The e-commerce aspect of the DSR strategy aims to increase the economic inter-dependence between China and participating states, and leverage these dependencies for achieving the status of an economic superpower. China’s promotion of cyber-sovereignty as the preferred model of cyber governance facilitates the furtherance of its authoritarian ideology among participating states. Indeed, the DSR is one of the more potent elements of China’s BRI in pursuit of its strategic objective of replacing the United States as the dominant world power. Although India has resisted the BRI and refused to participate in the physical infrastructure projects, it has unwittingly become a participant in the DSR initiative, thus exposing itself to the associated vulnerabilities. This work analysis the various features and pitfalls of China’s DSR and its national security implications for India.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part III
With the raising of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), China has taken a very significant step forward towards operationalising its military doctrine of fighting and winning informationized wars. Creation of the SSF demonstrates China’s firm conviction that the Information domain has emerged as a daunting new arena of military conflict. In the earlier two parts of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, and how its space and IW capabilities have been reorganized. In this concluding part, we discuss how the SSF will fulfil its twin objectives of providing strategic information support and executing strategic information operations, highlight the implications of the creation of SSF on the Indian security scenario and list out the resulting imperatives which need to be urgently addressed by us.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part II
The Strategic Support Forces (SSF) serves to integrate the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under a single organisation. In doing so it also effectively operationalises its two well-known hybrid warfare concepts, namely, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) and Three Warfares (comprising of psychological, media and legal warfare). This work studies the concept underlying the reorganisation of the PLA’s space and IW capabilities under the SSF and its implications for India. In the first part of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been reorganized. In this part, a look is taken at how the IW capabilities have been restructured under the SSF. It also briefly reviews the closely related intelligence and information processing functions, and how the raising of the SSF has affected them.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I
The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created as part of the reforms which were initiated by the PLA in 2015. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century. The creation of the SSF is expected to considerably enhance the combat potential of the PLA as a result of increased synergy amongst its space and Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. This work analyses the concept, organisation and operational capabilities of the SSF. It goes on to compare the IW structures of China, United States and India, leading to some noteworthy conclusions and recommendations. In this first part of a three part series, an insight is given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been re-organized.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part III
This three part series on cyberspace governance in India seeks to analyse whether our existing organisational structures are adequately optimised to address the new challenges emerging in cyberspace, which is fast proving to be a daunting new domain of conflict amongst nations. The first two parts analysed cyber threats and cyber defence strategies, reviewed our existing cyberspace governance architecture and studied global practices adopted by the more agile nations for protecting their respective national cyberspaces. This concluding part proposes several transformative changes to our cyberspace organisational structures as well as to our HRD policies. It is felt that these changes must be implemented on priority if we are to shield ourselves from strategic threats which are imminent in cyberspace in this era of modern warfare.