Sections

Introduction

IW in 21st Century Battlespace

IW as Command & Control Warfare (C2W)

IW vis-a-vis the DIKW Hierarchy and Coup D’oeil

Role of IW in Multi-Domain Warfare

IW vis-a-vis Network Centric Warfare

IW Doctrines – Major Players

Operations in the Cognitive Realm

References

Introduction

The primary focus of this four part series is to suggest IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces which are effective enough to match up to the challenges of 21st Century warfare. However, this analysis takes cognizance of the fact that there is deep resistance to change within the Indian military hierarchy, despite the radical changes taking place in modern warfare concepts. Thus, in order to move pragmatically from where we are to where we wish to be, this analysis adopts a transformational – as opposed to a (preferred) revolutionary – approach towards achieving the desired capabilities.

IW being a nascent, complex and dynamically evolving field of warfare, developing the conceptual and doctrinal basis for IW structures is an important first step. Equally importantly, in this highly specialist field, identifying the right HR philosophy is at least as important as arriving at optimum organisational structures and should, in fact, be a driving parameter while arriving at the choice of structures.

In the complex 21st Century battlespace, the role of IW is gaining prominence vis-à-vis the other traditional forms of warfare, and there may be many scenarios where ends may be achieved solely as a result of successful waging of IW. Nonetheless, organisational structures for any military capability must necessarily be optimised for a “total conflict” scenario, as this is likely to be the most demanding in terms of resources. Scenarios lower down on the escalatory ladder could then be catered for through suitable modifications to structures and processes.

At the outset, it is also pertinent to highlight that there is no common understanding of the term “Information Warfare”. Indeed, the interpretations of this and other related terms are so diverse that, in order to carry out a coherent discussion on the subject, it is important to clarify the sense in which IW terminologies and associated concepts are used.

In this first part, an attempt is made to dwell upon and clarify the terminologies, concepts and doctrines which are taken as the basis for proposing effective and viable IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces.

IW in 21st Century Battlespace

Until just about a decade ago, it would have been hard to find theorists and practitioners of IW who claimed that IW was more than just a supporting means for conducting a kinetic multi-domain battle in the physical domain. Today, the scenario is profoundly different, with the US having established a Cyber Command in 2010 [1, 2], China working with fervour to achieve dominance in the information domain by building capabilities, notably its Strategic Support Force (SSF) [3], and most significantly, Russia demonstrating an increasing degree of maturity in the IW field, going by the success of its information campaigns in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine [4]. The powerful role of social media in the de-stabilisation/ overthrow of established regimes during the Arab Spring (which, in Russian perception, was the result of “subversive information technologies of the West”), brought in a new dimension to war-waging in and through cyberspace [5, 6].

It is interesting to note that while it is the concept of Information Warfare which took root in the 1990s and matured remarkably well after the turn of the century, it is Cyberspace which has found its place alongside the traditional domains of land, sea and air and then space, in a multi-dimensional battlespace [7, 8]. This anomaly perhaps may be attributed to the unique characteristics of cyberspace, allowing cyber-conflicts of various hues to occur during peace as well, without fear of escalation.

The term Cyber itself eludes a precise definition, with one view stating that it has lost all meaning [9]. In its most generic interpretation, Cyber is in fact a synonym for Information. The most common perception of the term Cyberspace would probably be as follows: information (at rest or in motion) and information systems, inter-connected as a global network (the Internet). But what if the network in question is air-gapped, as was the Iranian nuclear facility intranet which was attacked using the Stuxnet malware? Would an isolated network of combat radios transporting voice, data and even video information in a tactical scenario be considered a segment of Cyberspace?

There is an ongoing debate in the US DoD whether or not a sixth domain, namely the Electro-Magnetic (or EM) Domain, needs to be added to the existing five-dimensional battlespace construct [10]. The motivation for such thinking is the increasing importance being accorded in the US to developing Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities after decades of neglect, perhaps spurred by the rapid advancements made in this field by formidable potential adversaries, particularly China. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that assigning domain status is not merely an academic exercise, and has implications such as designation of a separate jurisdiction together with suitable allocation of resources.

If the EM Domain is indeed designated as the sixth warfighting domain, then the only major sub-component of IW without an associated domain would be Psychological Operations (PSYOP), making it a notable exception. Against this backdrop, rather than designating a separate domain for each IW capability, it is worth considering whether there exists a case for replacing Cyberspace with Infospace as a warfighting domain, covering the three primary IW components of cyber warfare, EW and psychological warfare, and evolving doctrine and structures accordingly.

IW as Command & Control Warfare (C2W)

There are several conceptions of what IW is all about. Prominent amongst these is the view that it is a potent means for conducting Command & Control Warfare (C2W). In line with this view, the figure below depicts how various means of IW attack may be employed to disrupt the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop of the adversary [11].

Targeting the OODA Loop

An elaboration of this IW model can be found at Information Warfare: Origins and Fundamentals – Part I.

IW vis-à-vis the DIKW Hierarchy and Coup D’oeil

The ability to quickly make sense of battlefield activity by a commander based on his experience and intuition has been termed as coup d’oeil by Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War [12]. Further, while Wisdom may lead to the right decision, it is the Will/ Determination of the commander which would ultimately result in Action. Information systems play a key role in transforming Data through Information to Knowledge, while it is the human element which translates Knowledge into Wisdom and then Action.

IW vis-à-vis the DIKW Hierarchy and Coup D’oeil

In the context of IW, cyber, EW and kinetic weapons may be used to attack Information within the adversary’s Infospace. Psychological operations, on the other hand, target the Will of the adversary commander and his team.

Role of IW in Multi-Domain Warfare

As per some of the original work on IW carried out by US based theorists, the aim of carrying out IW is to achieve information superiority/ dominance. In a military context, such superiority facilitates operational concepts such as dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, focussed logistics and full dimensional protection, which in turn yield massed effects, as opposed to massing of forces. This IW process is depicted in the figure below.

Achieving Information Superiority

As per the concept depicted here diagrammatically, IW comprises of the IW Exploit, Defend and Attack functions. The IW Exploit function is to do with acquisition of information, either through information/ EM weapons, or physical means such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In other words, this is the Intelligence function, termed here as Information Based Warfare (IBW). The IW Attack and Defend functions, on the other hand, together constitute a fight for information, resulting in a state of information superiority. This part is termed here as Information Operations (IO).

As per the above conception, IO is IW less the IW Exploit function. In another outlook, depicted in the figure below, IO is defined as IW applied in the military context. This would be the preferred usage in this work, if the context so permits. Another relationship between these two terms is captured in the phrase, “IO are the means to conduct IW,” implying IW to be theory and IO as its practical manifestation. There are other variations to the definition and usage of the terms IW and IO. More often than not, however, these terms are used synonymously. This brings out the importance of disambiguation of these and other IW terminologies in doctrinal literature.

Components of Information Warfare

It is also pertinent to point out here that, in the IW model presented above, IW results in massed effects in the physical domain through operational concepts contingent upon Information Superiority being achieved. As military systems become ever more dependent on unhindered information flows, IW can result in direct effects in the physical domain, eg, rendering Air Defence (AD) systems ineffective through a cyber-attack or downing of military drones through electronic jamming of control signals. Such effects, generically termed as cyber-physical effects, may deserve a more accurate terminology such as information-physical effects. Such use of IW for effects in the physical domain further demonstrate the increasing importance of IO in multi-domain conflict scenarios.

IW vis-a-vis Network Centric Warfare (NCW)

Perhaps there is also a need to highlight the distinction between IW and the other major Information Age warfighting concept, namely, NCW, since these two terms are also often used synonymously in the literature. Simply put, NCW is a command & control concept, which makes use of acquired information (adversary and own) to make effective decisions, leading to an increase in combat effectiveness. IW, on the other hand, implies a fight for information in order to achieve information dominance, or use of information weapons for targeting physical military systems. Therefore, while IW supports NCW, the two concepts are fundamentally quite distinct from each other [13].

IW Doctrines – Major Players

A comprehensive analysis of the IW doctrines of major military powers is beyond the scope of this work, and the reader may consult the references indicated. However, a brief insight into these doctrines, insofar as they relate to the current discussion, is given out in succeeding paragraphs.

US IO Doctrine

The US DoD IO Doctrine of 2006 designated EW, PSYOP, Computer Network Operations (CNO), Military Deception (MILDEC) and Operational Security (OPSEC) as Core Capabilities, and several others, including Physical Destruction, Public Affairs (PA) and Defence Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) as Supporting and Related Capabilities [14]. The US DoD IO Doctrine of 2012/14 enunciates the concept of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs), encompassing all Core/ Supporting/ Related capabilities into this single category, and adding a few more, notably Strategic Communication (SC) and Special Technical Operations (STO) [15]. There is also a RAND study which recommends that IO as a integrating concept has anomalies, and better conceptual clarity and functional effectiveness may be achieved if IO is split into two functional areas, namely, Information Technical Operations (ITO) and Inform and Influence Operations (IIO), with the former focussing on the information domain with machines as targets (EW, CNO), and the latter on the psychological domain with people as targets (Military Information Support Operations (MISO, erstwhile PSYOP), PA and MILDEC) [16]. In addition to its IO doctrine, US DoD has also promulgated doctrines on individual IO functions such as Cyberspace Operations (CO), EW, MISO, MILDEC, PA, etc [17, 18, 19, 20, 21].

Russian IW Doctrine

Russian IW doctrine focusses on Information as the central theme, and does not have Cyberspace specifically in its IW lexicon. Its IW philosophy includes the concept of Reflexive Control, which is a term used to describe the practice of predetermining an adversary’s decision in Russia’s favour, by altering key factors in the adversary’s perception of the world. Russian IW doctrine too shows a preference for classifying IW disciplines under the two major subdivisions of Information-Technical Warfare and Information-Psychological Warfare, concepts which are similar to US ITO and IIO referred to above.

Chinese IW Doctrine

The Chinese version of IW is captured in their concepts of Informationisation, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) and Three Warfares [22, 23, 24]. The INEW concept is based on the convergence between CNO/ CO and EW, disciplines which are now chartered to the SSF. The Three Warfares theory covers PSYOP, PA and Legal Warfare, and its conduct is the operational responsibility shared by the SSF as well as the Political Work Department (erstwhile General Political Department), which functions directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC). The Informationisation concept, however, may have more to do with Network Centric Warfare (NCW), while including aspects of IW as well [25].

It merits mention here, however, that as compared to the US and other NATO countries, very limited open domain literature is available on the IW approaches of Russia and China, mostly from a study of these by western authors, which inhibits a thorough understanding of their concepts.

Indian IW Doctrine

The Indian Army (IA) IW Doctrine of 2004 and the Joint Services IW Doctrine of 2005 (both since superseded) based their IW concept and components on Martin Libicki’s IW taxonomy, which had elements such as Economic IW, to which were added some unwarranted elements, most notably NCW, making the doctrines unsuited for IW in a military context.

The Indian Army IW Doctrine

The current Army IW Doctrine of 2010 focuses on the three primary sub-disciplines of IW, namely, EW, Cyber Warfare and Psychological Warfare. However, it overlooks the nuances of IW capabilities such as PA, MILDEC and SC, as well as the inter-play amongst its three main components [26]. A detailed analysis of this Doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper.

Operations in the Cognitive Realm

The concepts of cyber warfare/ CO and EW are generally well understood. The same, however, cannot be said for the IW cognitive disciplines, which together may generically be referred to as psychological warfare. Thus, it is felt necessary here to discuss the distinctions amongst different IW operations which play out in the Cognitive Realm.

Several terminologies are currently in vogue in the military literature and military doctrines to describe operations in the cognitive domain. These include PSYOP, MISO, Perception Management (PM), MILDEC, PA and SC, amongst others. These are briefly discussed below:-

• PSYOP target the adversary’s combat forces with the objective of inducing fear and reluctance or refusal to fight [27]. A more generic understanding of this term is equally popular, which is captured in its US DoD definition, as follows: planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviour of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
• In US doctrine, PSYOP has now been replaced by MISO, defined more or less on the same lines as PSYOP, except for specifically stating that foreign audiences include not just potential and actual adversaries, but also friendly and neutral populations.
• Erstwhile US military terminology defines PM as actions to convey and/ or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning ultimately resulting in behaviours favourable to the originator’s objectives. It combines truth projection, deception and psychological operations [28]. Although its usage is still prevalent in literature elsewhere, including in Indian IW doctrine, this term appears to have been dropped by the US DoD [29].

Operations in the Cognitive Realm

• MILDEC can be characterized as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. In another view, camouflage, deception and subterfuge are the means to create a false understanding on the part of an adversary of the physical, electronic or cognitive environments.
• PA target the adversary population and third party opinion, increasingly world opinion, with the objective of diminishing support for the adversary regime. PA mostly executes its missions through media of all types.
• The Strategic Communication (SC) process is a whole of government approach focused upon effectively communicating national strategy, by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs and themes, synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. The term Public Diplomacy, used at places in military literature, conveys the same sense, perhaps without the “whole of government” connotation.

The following observations on the terminologies as defined above help to highlight some of the commonalities as well as distinctions amongst these functions:-

• The term Psychological Operations, in its generic sense, is often used to imply the entire gamut of IW operations in the perceptual/ cognitive realm. However, in its narrow definition, PSYOP is restricted to targeting the adversary’s combat troops in order to achieve mission success. In this work, PSYOP would be used in this restricted sense.
• The commonality amongst the IO functions listed above arises from the fact that all of these play out in the perceptual/ cognitive domain and are theoretically grounded in the social sciences. However, it is important to understand and suitably address the distinctions amongst these functions.
• Amongst these, PSYOP, SC and PA are more closely aligned with each other, since all of these are designed to influence target audiences (civil and military) primarily by playing on their psyches and beliefs in order to alter their behaviour. MILDEC, on the other hand, attempts to trick adversary combatants into taking wrong operational decisions by presenting false information.
• A distinction may be drawn between PSYOP/ PM & MILDEC on the one hand and PA/ SC on the other, in that the latter disciplines do not involve falsehood and deception, which may very well characterize the former.
• Although PSYOP/ PM is meant to be limited to foreign audiences, critics note that governments often engage in domestic perception management. Thus, there is a view that PSYOP/ PM should be organizationally separated from the SC and PA functions because of the “black content” (untruths/ deceit element) involved in the former16. The counterview is that separating out the functions carries the risk of losing “consistency” of messaging and thus reduce their synergistic effect.
• Finally, as compared to SC and PA, PSYOP and MILDEC are required to be dovetailed more closely with operational plans, and may entail, in addition to operations in the cognitive realm, military maneuver as well.

Conclusion

In this part, the increasing role of IW in the multi-domain battlespace of the 21st Century is first highlighted. Thereafter, an overview of the IW doctrines of the United States, Russia, China and India is given out. It is evident from the above analysis that cyber warfare, EW and psychological warfare form the three primary sub-disciplines of IW. Of particular note is the need for close integration between cyber warfare and EW, as captured in the US concept of Information Technical Operations (also referred to as Cyber Electro-Magnetic Operations (CEMA)), the Russian concept of Information-Technical Warfare and the Chinese concept of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW). Finally, operations in the cognitive domain are discussed in some detail, mainly with the aim of disambiguating the multiple terminologies in use in the literature.

The next part in this series will focus upon the areas of convergence and divergence among the various IW sub-disciplines, as also the considerations for their integrated employment for maximum effectiveness.

References

(1)      The Department of Defence Cyber Strategy, Office of US Secretary of Defence, Washington, Apr 2015, pp. 5.

(2)      Cyberspace Operations, US DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), 05 Feb 2013.

(3)      The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview in China Brief, Volume 16 Issue 9, The Jamestown Foundation, Dec 2016.

(4)      Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare, CNA’s Occasional Paper, March 2017.

(5)      Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian IW, Fellowship Monograph No 9, NATO Defence College, Nov 2016, pp. 9, 36.

(6)      Keir Giles, Countering Russian IO in the Age of Social Media, Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Nov 2017.

(7)      Cyberspace Operations, US DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), 05 Feb 2013, pp. I-2.

(8)      Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyberspace: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare, Future Wars, Jan 2018, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/cyberspace-the-fifth-dimension-of-warfare-part-i/.

(9)      James Shires and Max Smeets, The Word Cyber Now Means Everything—and Nothing At All, Dec 2017, http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/12/01/ the_word_cyber_has_ lost_all_meaning.html.

(10)   Sydney Freedberg, Spectrum (EW) Should be a Domain of Warfare: Rep. Bacon, Breaking Defence, 29 Nov 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/spectrum-ew-should-be-a-warfighting-domain-rep-bacon/

(11)   Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations, Artech House, Inc., Norwood, 1998, p. 6, 27, 51, 108-110, 173-74.

(12)   Clausewitz, General Carl von, On War, Translated by Colonel J J Graham, Project Gutenburg Ebook, released Feb 2006.

(13)   Network Centric Warfare – Concept, Status and Way Forward for the Indian Army (Cl), Flash Perspectives, Military College of Telecommunication Engineering, Dec 2015, pp. 25.

(14)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Feb 2006, pp. II-1.

(15)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Nov 2014.

(16)   Isaac R. Porche III et al, Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World, Pub. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 42, 59.

(17)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, Feb 2013.

(18)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-12, Electronic Warfare, Feb 2012.

(19)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13.12, Military Information Support Operations, Jan 2010.

(20)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13.2, Military Deception, Jan 2012.

(21)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs, Aug 2016.

(22)   Gurmeet Kanwal, China’s Emerging Cyber War Doctrine, Journal of Defence Studies Vol 3 No 3, IDSA, July 2009.

(23)   Deepak Sharma, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare: China’s New Concept of Information Warfare, Journal of Defence Studies Vol 4 No 2, IDSA, Apr 2010.

(24)   Elsa B Kania, The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares, China Brief Vol XVI Issue 13, Aug 2016, pp. 10-14.

(25)   John Costello, The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview, China Brief, Vol 16 Issue 19, The Jamestown Foundation, Dec 2016, pp. 11-12.

(26)   Information Warfare Doctrine for Indian Army, 2010.

(27)   Peter Nicholson, Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain, Security Challenges Vol 2 No 1, 2006, pp. 140.

(28)   US Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Aug 2006.

(29)   US Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Feb 2017.