RECENT POSTS
Ideation for Defence R&D in India – The US Approach to Defence Innovation
Over the decades, India’s defense science, technology and industrial sector has by and large failed to deliver on the ground, barring a few notable successes. The uninspiring performance by India so far in indigenising defence technology is only expected to worsen in the coming with the advent of highly sophisticated and disruptive military technologies on the 21st century battlespace. Much has been written over the years on bringing about transformative changes to India’s military industrial complex. The current series of articles is another effort in the same direction, but with a difference: this work adopts an introspective approach from the standpoint of the Defence Services, based on the conviction that the main impediments to bringing about the desired transformative change are to be found within the Services. In this first article of the series, the R&D eco-system of the US is reviewed, with the aim of identifying features which may be adapted usefully in the Indian context. Subsequent write-ups will carry out a similar analysis for other countries which lead the race in military technologies, notably China. The series will culminate by suggesting structural changes to the Indian defence R&D set-up, with focus on initiatives to be taken by the Defence Services.
China’s Digital Silk Road: National Security Implications for India
An important element of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), the Digital Silk Road (DSR) is a comprehensive response to the Third Offset Strategy of the US and aims to establish China as a global technological superpower. Although projected by the Chinese Government as a global development project, the real objectives of the BRI and its components such as the DSR are essentially geopolitical in nature. The e-commerce aspect of the DSR strategy aims to increase the economic inter-dependence between China and participating states, and leverage these dependencies for achieving the status of an economic superpower. China’s promotion of cyber-sovereignty as the preferred model of cyber governance facilitates the furtherance of its authoritarian ideology among participating states. Indeed, the DSR is one of the more potent elements of China’s BRI in pursuit of its strategic objective of replacing the United States as the dominant world power. Although India has resisted the BRI and refused to participate in the physical infrastructure projects, it has unwittingly become a participant in the DSR initiative, thus exposing itself to the associated vulnerabilities. This work analysis the various features and pitfalls of China’s DSR and its national security implications for India.
Cyber Skill Development in the Indian Armed Forces: An Exploratory Overview
The emergence of cyberspace as a formidable new domain of warfare in a multi-dimensional battlespace is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In view of this development, major world players have evolved national cyber security strategies and restructured their cyber organisations in order to adequately secure their respective national cyberspaces. This work is based on the author’s conviction that cyber governance in India needs to undergo a transformative restructuring with our Armed Forces at the helm, and that a full-fledged Cyber Command must be raised at the earliest. Assuming that approval for this is granted, a long lead time would be needed for steering the Command to full operational status. This is because, unlike other warfighting skills, training of cyber warriors is a highly complex task which cannot be accomplished in a compressed time-frame. This work gives an exploratory insight into the important issue of cyber skill development in the Indian Armed Forces.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part III
With the raising of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), China has taken a very significant step forward towards operationalising its military doctrine of fighting and winning informationized wars. Creation of the SSF demonstrates China’s firm conviction that the Information domain has emerged as a daunting new arena of military conflict. In the earlier two parts of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, and how its space and IW capabilities have been reorganized. In this concluding part, we discuss how the SSF will fulfil its twin objectives of providing strategic information support and executing strategic information operations, highlight the implications of the creation of SSF on the Indian security scenario and list out the resulting imperatives which need to be urgently addressed by us.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part II
The Strategic Support Forces (SSF) serves to integrate the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under a single organisation. In doing so it also effectively operationalises its two well-known hybrid warfare concepts, namely, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) and Three Warfares (comprising of psychological, media and legal warfare). This work studies the concept underlying the reorganisation of the PLA’s space and IW capabilities under the SSF and its implications for India. In the first part of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been reorganized. In this part, a look is taken at how the IW capabilities have been restructured under the SSF. It also briefly reviews the closely related intelligence and information processing functions, and how the raising of the SSF has affected them.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I
The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created as part of the reforms which were initiated by the PLA in 2015. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century. The creation of the SSF is expected to considerably enhance the combat potential of the PLA as a result of increased synergy amongst its space and Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. This work analyses the concept, organisation and operational capabilities of the SSF. It goes on to compare the IW structures of China, United States and India, leading to some noteworthy conclusions and recommendations. In this first part of a three part series, an insight is given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been re-organized.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part III
This three part series on cyberspace governance in India seeks to analyse whether our existing organisational structures are adequately optimised to address the new challenges emerging in cyberspace, which is fast proving to be a daunting new domain of conflict amongst nations. The first two parts analysed cyber threats and cyber defence strategies, reviewed our existing cyberspace governance architecture and studied global practices adopted by the more agile nations for protecting their respective national cyberspaces. This concluding part proposes several transformative changes to our cyberspace organisational structures as well as to our HRD policies. It is felt that these changes must be implemented on priority if we are to shield ourselves from strategic threats which are imminent in cyberspace in this era of modern warfare.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part II
With cyberspace having emerged as a new arena of conflict between nations, the more agile nations have brought about transformative changes in their cyber defence organisations. This three-part series analyses the important issue of cyber governance in India. The first part identified different types of cyber threats from the perspective of organising for cyberspace defence and discussed several cyber defence strategies which are relevant in the Indian context. This part first takes a look at our existing cyberspace governance architecture and analyses its shortcomings. It then reviews global practices for protecting national cyberspaces with a view to proposing suitable modifications for best addressing the national security challenges which we are being confronted with as a consequence of ever increasing conflicts in cyberspace.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part I
Over the last decade or so, cyberspace has emerged as a new arena of conflict between nations. In order to address this challenge, the more agile nations have brought about transformative changes in their cyber defence organisations. In India, the two main agencies tasked with the defence of our National Cyberspace are the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), and the Computer Emergency Response Team – India (CERT-In). It needs to be analysed whether or not such an arrangement is the right apex structure for the defence of our cyberspace. This three-part series analyses the important issue of cyber governance in India. In this first part, a notional model of our National Cyberspace is first presented. It then identifies the different types of cyber threats from the perspective of organising for cyberspace defence and discusses several cyber defence strategies which are relevant in our context.
Disruptive Military Technologies: An Overview – Part III
Over the last several decades, technology breakthroughs have been occurring at a very fast pace, with transformative effects on the nature of warfighting. The first two parts of this three-part series have reviewed the status of global research on technologies which are likely to have maximum impact on warfare over the coming decades. It has also emerged that, while India has taken some steps towards leveraging these technologies for enhancing our comprehensive military power, these are not commensurate with our geopolitical aspirations. Existing studies on rejuvenating our weak military industrial complex have mainly focused on measures which need to be taken by the Government, the DRDO, the Industry and the Academia. In this concluding part, we explore an introspective approach for the Armed Forces, based on the conviction that the primary hurdles to realising a vibrant defence R&D model exist within the Armed Forces, and can be largely overcome through internal re-structuring.