RECENT POSTS
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario Based Analysis – Part III
This is the concluding segment of an article structured as a three-part series which analysis how autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are/ should be characterized and defined. The first part resorted to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. The next segment analysed a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios and proposed a fresh set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions. This part concludes by first highlighting the high-risk implications of incorporating the online learning feature in AWS and then briefly analyses how the proposed definitions fare when applied to complex AWS architectures.
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario based Analysis – Part II
This is the second segment of an article structured as a three-part series which analysis how autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are/ should be characterized and defined. The rationale for this work is based on the assessment that extant AWS definitions are either too ambiguous or evolved against different contexts, leading to participants and analysts in the ongoing debate on regulation of AWS talking past each other. The first part resorted to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. This second part analyses a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios and proposes a fresh set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions.
Defining Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Scenario Based Analysis – Part I
There is no internationally accepted definition of autonomous weapon systems (AWS). However, these are popularly described as weapons which, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. With such a characterisation, most states declare that fully autonomous weapons must never be developed. This is because such a characterisation is mostly interpreted to mean that AWS can choose and destroy at will, all without any human intervention, which conjures up scary images of Skynet/Terminators taking over the human race.
On closer analysis, it is evident that the above definition of AWS is very ambiguous, covering within its ambit weapon systems with widely differing levels of autonomy, some of which should be ethically and legally acceptable to most states and militaries as well as other stakeholders.
This article is structured as a three-part series which takes a deeper look at how AWS are/ should be characterized and defined. This first part resorts to the use of short vignettes/ scenarios for bringing out the ambiguity inherent in the present characterization of AWS. The subsequent parts go on to analyse a few well-known formal definitions of AWS against the backdrop of these scenarios; propose a set of definitions for AWS aimed at removing ambiguity in extant definitions; and briefly analyses how the proposed definitions fare when applied to complex AWS architectures.
Cyber Operations Episode IV: Role of the Armed Forces
This is the final episode of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. The first three episodes surveyed existing cyberspace strategies and organizations; brainstormed the important issue of how to strike the right balance among the charters of major actors involved in defence of national cyberspace, namely, MOD/ armed forces, MEA/ external intelligence agencies, MHA and the private sector; and addressed the important facet of capability development for conducting cyber influence operations (CIO). This episode discusses the differences and overlaps between cyber operations as part of grey zone warfare and those carried out in support of military operations (MDO), and brainstorms as well as makes recommendations for the role of the Armed Forces in cyberspace operations (offensive as well as CIO), providing different perspectives from the three Services of the Indian Armed Forces.
Cyber Operations Episode III: Cyber Influence Operations
This is the third of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. The first two episodes surveyed existing cyberspace strategies and organizations and brainstormed the important issue of how to strike the right balance among the charters of major actors involved in defence of national cyberspace, namely, MOD/ armed forces, MEA/ external intelligence agencies, MHA and the private sector. This episode tackles another important facet of cyberspace conflicts, namely, cognitive operations. It discusses the specialized nature of cyber influence operations which may be conducted through social/ broadcast media, and brainstorms/ recommends strategies and structures to be evolved at the national level for developing capabilities to conduct cyber operations in the cognitive realm
Cyberspace Operations Episode II: Governance of India’s National Cyberspace
This is the second of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. This first episode surveyed existing cyberspace strategies and organizations. This episode brainstorms the important issue of how to strike the right balance among the charters of major actors involved in defence of national cyberspace, namely, MOD/ armed forces, MEA/ external intelligence agencies, MHA and the private sector. It deliberates upon a fresh approach wherein the MOD/ Armed Forces are envisaged to play a pivotal role in the defence of national cyberspace, with perhaps exclusive charter for offensive cyber operations, in sync with their role in the traditional domains of land, sea and air. Panelists provide different perspectives on how India’s cyber defence architecture must be structured to optimally defend its cyberspace.
Cyberspace Operations Episode I: Strategies and Structures of Major States
This is the first of a four-part webinar series on capability development for cyberspace operations by the Indian Armed Forces, held under the aegis of Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and moderated by Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar. The overall objective of this series is to review cyberspace strategies and capabilities of major world powers, compare these with the status of these in India, and give suitable recommendations. While the full spectrum of cyber operations is very wide, the series is structured to focus primarily on offensive cyber operations and cyber influence operations.
This first episode aims to survey existing cyberspace strategies and organizations. Subsequent episodes will delve deeper into what India needs to do to improve its posture in cyberspace. A brief overview is first given about the increasingly potent and strategic effects being achieved through cyberspace by various players, the applicability of existing international law of war, specifically jus ad bellum, in cyberspace, and also touch upon global trends in cyberspace strategies and capabilities. Thereafter, the panelists provide greater insights into the strategies and organizations of major global powers on the one hand and of India on the other, and give out views and recommendations on how India might improve its posture in cyberspace.
Regulation of AI-Enabled Military Systems: A Risk-Based Approach – Part II
This is the second part of a two-part article which sketches out the contours of a risk-based approach to regulation of AI-enabled military systems. In the first part the proposed EU AI Act, which adopts a risk-based approach for civilian applications, was first reviewed. Thereafter, a risk-based approach for military systems was introduced, represented by a Risk Hierarchy with a five-level risk architecture. The rationale for arriving at the five levels of risk was also given out. This second part continues with the description of the risk-based approach by first categorizing weapon systems into ten classes, and then assigning them to the higher three levels of the Risk Hierarchy which correspond to weapon systems. An insight is then provided on how a differentiated risk-mitigation mechanism, to be linked to each of the five risk levels, may be worked out, and also how such a risk-based approach could help in reaching international consensus on regulation of AI-enabled military systems.
Regulation of AI-Enabled Military Systems: A Risk Based Approach – Part I
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based applications and systems pose significant risks, arising mainly as a result of the unique characteristics of machine learning technology. AI-enabled military systems, in particular, are of special concern because of the threat they pose to human lives. This has given rise to a host of legal, ethical and moral conundrums. At the same time, it is universally accepted that huge benefits could accrue to humankind, both on and off the battlefield, if the power of AI is leveraged in a responsible manner. This double-edged character of AI technologies points to the need for a carefully thought out mechanism for regulating the development of AI technologies. AI-triggered risks posed by different types of military systems may vary widely, and applying a common set of risk-mitigation strategies across all systems will likely be suboptimal. A risk-based approach has the potential of overcoming these disadvantages. This work attempts to sketch the contours of such an approach which could be adopted for the regulation of military systems. In this first part, the EU proposal for civilian applications, which adopts a risk based approach, is first discussed. Thereafter, a risk-based approach for military systems is introduced, and the rationale for a five-level risk architecture is given out.
Atmanirbharta in Defence Technologies: Armed Forces as Pivot
In this episode of Def Talks on YouTube, Aadi Achint discusses with Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar the all important issue of Atmanirbharta in defence technologies. The central concept proposed here is that the focus needs to shift from current efforts to improve the defence procurement process to optimising the defence R&D process, with the Armed Forces acting as the pivot as opposed to the DRDO. With the changing character of warfare as a backdrop, the conversation first prioritises the critical military technologies which need maximum attention on the modern battlespace. Thereafter, an overview is given of past initiatives taken by India to boost self-reliance in defence, with lack-lustre results. Major highlights of R&D practices followed by world leaders in defence technologies are then given out, with a view to drawing useful lessons. Thereafter, several suggestions are made for carrying out a transformative restructuring of the defence R&D ecosystem, with the Armed Forces at the helm of affairs. Finally, it is contended that if the proposed restructuring is to yield the desired results, the Armed Forces need to undergo an internal transformation aimed at ushering in a culture of specialisation.