Sections

Introduction

NCW vis-vis Lind’s “Generations of Warfare” Taxonomy

NCW vis-a-vis RMAs

NCW vis-a-vis Asymmetric and Hybrid Wars

NCW vis-a-vis Warfighting Domains

NCW vis-a-vis Cebrowski’s Domains of Conflict

NCW vis-a-vis Information Operations (IO)/ Cyberspace Operations (CO)

References

Introduction

In a two-part write up on “The Changing Nature of Warfare” posted earlier, it was brought out how, over the centuries, warfare has undergone significant transformation due to new discoveries and innovative application of technologies, and that these inventions and discoveries have resulted in dramatic changes in military doctrine as well as operational and organisational concepts, and have altered the character and conduct of military operations. In Part I, an overview was given on Lind’s “Generations of Warfare” taxonomy as well as on the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMAs). In Part II of the write-up, some modern warfighting concepts such as Asymmetric Warfare, Unrestricted Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Information Warfare and Network Centric Warfare, were introduced.

In another post titled “21st Century Warfare: From ‘Battlefield’ to ‘Battlespace’,” the complex nature of the “arena” in which 21st century warfare is conducted, was analysed. It was brought out that the increasing complexity of the modern warfighting arena has prompted the replacement of the traditionally used term “battlefield” by the term “battlespace”, as the former tends to implicitly highlight the pre-dominance of land based operations over others, while “battlespace” as a term has a neutral flavour with respect to the nature of the arena. In this context, the post briefly discussed the popular five-dimensional construct on Warfighting Domains as also Cebrowski’s Domains of Conflict.

In this piece, an attempt is made to analyse the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as it relates to warfighting and battlespace concepts which have been discussed earlier.

NCW vis-à-vis Lind’s “Generations of Warfare” Taxonomy

As per the taxonomy offered by Lind [1,2], the generational shifts from the first through the fourth generation (4GW) of warfare move from lesser to higher manoeuvre, lower to higher technology and higher to lower order on the battlefield [3]. In 4GW as envisaged by Lind, there is a “blurring of the lines between war and politics and between combatants and civilians”.

NCW vis-à-vis Generations of Warfare

Viewed against the above canvas NCW, insofar as its concept of “increase in combat effectiveness resulting from linking of sensors, decision makers and shooters” is concerned, does not fall into place as the next generational shift (beyond 4GW) with regard to greater disorder on the battlefield. As a concept, it manifests itself best in a conventional war scenario without any “blurring of lines between war and politics”. It facilitates a higher degree of synchronisation and order on all battlefield entities through a much higher degree of situational awareness, thus allowing “precision targeting” and “focused logistics”. However, it does allow a much higher degree of manoeuvrability and non-linearity. Similarly, on the technology scale, it is predicated on much more sophisticated technology and also long range vectors (archers – machine guns – artillery – PGMs).

In summary, it may be stated that while there appears to be a generational shift, the point of shift (as per the Lind taxonomy) is from Third Generation War in the conventional domain, and not from the sub-conventional, complex domain of 4GW. However, this does not imply that NCW concepts are irrelevant in the 4GW scenario, as explained below.

NCW, though used largely in a conventional war scenario, can be used as a source of warfighting advantage in 4GW as well. It identifies new sources of power (information sharing, information access, speed), how those sources relate to each other, how they are brought to bear to gain the desired outcome, and how they link to political objectives. As shown during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the capabilities of the forces in the networked environment gave senior civilian leaders a broader array of options not otherwise possible.

NCW vis-à-vis RMAs

A direct co-relationship may be drawn between the three essential components of NCW, ie, sensors, decision-makers and shooters, with the three constituents of Admiral Owen’s “systems of systems” concept of Current RMA, namely, ISR, C4I and PGMs [4]. Information technology advances in these areas are dramatically reshaping the conduct of warfare in the 21st century, as many witnessed during the conduct of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. Indeed, insofar as the shortening of the OODA loop enabling functioning within the decision cycle of the enemy is concerned, the “NCW” and “Current RMA” refer to more or less the same, if not identical, concepts.

NCW vis-à-vis Current “System of Systems” RMA

However, there is much more to the NCW concept than merely the speeding up of the OODA Loop. NCW is principally a command and control theory of warfare, involving concepts such as Self-Synchronisation of forces, Power to the Edge and Agility.

Given the above considerations, NCW does appear to meet all the defining characteristics of an RMA [5,6], as discussed in the earlier post “The Changing Nature of Warfare – Part I.”

NCW vis-à-vis Asymmetric and Hybrid Wars

NCW, to manifest itself effectively, requires heavy investment of resources in terms of sophisticated infostructure and qualified people to manage the same. This characteristic makes NCW suitable for exploitation by the stronger adversary. Since by definition Asymmetric Warfare is of a nature which is amenable to be exploited by a weaker adversary against a stronger one, NCW cannot be said to have an asymmetric character.

In a similar vein, Hybrid War [7] by definition is one in which a mix of different types of warfare may be employed between any two adversaries to achieve the desired political ends. NCW is not really a different “type of warfare” but rather a method of warfighting which enhances combat effectiveness. Hence, while NCW concepts may be employed in a hybrid war, it may not be counted as one of the components of a multi-faceted hybrid war.

NCW vis-à-vis Warfighting Domains

Although distinctions may be made from a definitional point of view between the “information domain” and the “cyber domain” by different authors, in many contexts these two terminologies may be treated synonymously [8].

The relationship of NCW with the five warfighting domains is as follows: Four of the five warfighting domains, ie, land, sea, air and space, lie in the physical domain. NCW definitely has linkages to the physical domain, which is where the impact of increase in combat effectiveness achieved through NCW is primarily felt. On the other hand, successful implementation of NCW is heavily dependent on the “cyber” warfighting domain.

NCW vis-à-vis Cebrowski’s Domains of Conflict

NCW lies in the overlap region of the different domains of conflict as conceptualised by Cebrowski. It converts information advantage (in the information domain) into military advantage (in the physical domain) by fast decision-making (in the cognitive domain) and information sharing (in the social domain) [9].

To successfully implement Network Centric Operations (NCO), there is a need to first understand the four domains of warfare, ie, physical, information, cognitive, and social, as well as the areas of overlap between the domains.

As illustrated in the figure below, the domain intersections represent important, dynamic areas and their relationship to the NCW concept. The precision force so vital to the conduct of NCO is created at the intersection of the information and physical domains. Shared awareness and tactical innovation occur at the intersection between the information and cognitive domains. Since many battles and campaigns are actually won or lost in the cognitive domain, this intersection is enormously important. The intersection between the physical and cognitive domains is where the time compression and “lock-out” phenomenon occur, where tactics achieve operational and even strategic effects, and where high rates of change are developed. NCW exists at the very centre where all four domains intersect.

NCW vis-à-vis Domains of Conflict

The following figure brings out in a self-explanatory manner the relationship between the NCW tenets and the four domains. An understanding of this relationship leads us to an understanding of the core principles of NCW and how these lead to mission accomplishment.

NCW Tenets vis-à-vis Domains of Conflict

NCW vis-à-vis Information Operations (IO)/ Cyberspace Operations (CO)

The term NCW is sometimes used in a synonymous sense with the terms IO and CO [10]. This, however, is an incorrect understanding of these Information Age concepts. The following may be stated on the relationship between NCW on the one hand and IO/ CO on the other:-

• Both IO/CO and NCW are Information Age concepts. However, the commonality ends there.
• While IO/CO are forms of warfare and involve a struggle in the information/ cognitive domains to achieve information dominance (attack/ defend functions), NCW leverages the information domain to achieve increased combat effectiveness primarily in the physical domain.
• IO/CO play out in the adversary (attack) as well as own (defend) infosphere. However, in the case of NCW, except for the sensor element which integrates to the adversary battlespace (mostly to the physical domain and partially to the information domain) the balance of the play of NCW is in one’s own infosphere.

The full application of the NCW principles is predicated on a robust and reliable linking of sensors, decision makers and weapons systems via an interconnected grid. The reliability and availability of the network can only be ensured through strong IO and CO capabilities. In this sense, IO and CO complement NCW.

Conclusion

In this write-up, an endeavour has been made to identify how NCW, as a war-fighting methodology, relates to the taxonomies of warfare, specifically Lind’s “Generations of Warfare” and the RMA concepts. An effort is also made to understand its relationship with modern warfighting concepts such as Asymmetric Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, IO and CO. Finally, the manner in which NCW plays out on the 21st Century battlespace has also been discussed.

References

(1)   Lind, William S et al, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 1989, pp. 22-26.

(2)   Lind, William S, Understanding Fourth Generation War, Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004, pp. 12-16.

(3)   Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, Fourth Generation War, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-A, 12 Aug 2008, pp. 29-30.

(4)   Owens, Admiral W, Emerging System of Systems, Military Review, Vol 75 No 3, May-June 1995.

(5)   Chapman, Gary, An Introduction to the Revolution in Military Affairs, Proc. XV Amaldi Conference on Problems in Global Security, Helsinki, Finland, Sept. 2003, pp. 2, 10-14.

(6)   Hundley R O, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, RAND publishers, Santa Monica, CA and Washington, D C,1999, pp. xiii-xv, 8.

(7)   Hunter, Eve and Pernik, Piret, The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare, International Centre for Defence and Security, Talinn, Estonia, April 2015.

(8)   Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David, Cyberwar is Coming! Comparative Strategy, Vol 12, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 141-165.

(9)   Cebrowski A K, The Implementation of Network Centric Warfare, Office of Force Transformation, US DoD, Washington, D C, 05 Jan 2005, pp. 15-21.

(10) Network Centric Warfare – Concept, Status and Way Forward for the Indian Army, Flash Perspectives, Military College of Telecommunication Engineering, Dec 2015, pp. 25 [Restricted].