Sections

Introduction

Existing IW Structures

Proposed IW Structures

References

Introduction

The primary focus of this work is to suggest IW structures which are effective enough to match up to the challenges of modern warfare. Part I of this four part series dwelt upon terminologies, concepts and doctrines, and identified CO, EW and Psy W as the three primary components of IW. Part II analysed the areas of convergence as well as differences amongst these components, as also various facets of how these capabilities may be operationally deployed in an integrated manner. With the conceptual underpinnings of IW having thus been established, Part III briefly outlined the IW structures which presently exist in some of the defense forces of the world which are of relevance to us, specifically China, United States, Russia and Pakistan, with a view to analysing our own structures against this backdrop.

In this final part, an overview is first given of the IW organisations which presently exist at the national level as well as in the Indian Armed Forces. Thereafter, drawing upon concepts discussed in the first two parts and gaining useful insights from IW organisations which have been adopted by major world armies, a large number of recommendations are made on how organisational transformation may be effected to address the challenges emerging on the information-intensive battlefield of the 21st Century.

Existing IW Structures

National Level

Cyber Operations. The following governance architecture, which has a bearing on the defence of our national cyberspace, is in place:-

• CERT-In and NCIIPC. Presently, at the national level we have the Computer Emergency Response Team – India (CERT-In, with the National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) under it) and the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) in place for protecting our cyber assets, with the former functioning under the Ministry for Electronics and IT (MEITY) and the latter under the NTRO/ PMO [1].
• Cyber SOC. A Cyber Security Operations Centre (Cyber SOC) under MHA has been established.
• Cyber Warfare. There are certain cyber warfare capabilities which exist with the NTRO and DRDO as well.

EW and Psy W. There are no capabilities in terms of specific organisations which exist at the national level for EW or psychological operations in the military context. However, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is chartered to carry out Strategic Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) activity in the non-military domain.

Public Relations Organisation (PRO). PA is the purview of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its archaic PR machinery, termed PRO Defence. Regional PROs posted at various stations report to the PRO Defence, and are not under the local formation commanders or staff, thus remaining largely out of sync with the needs of our Armed Forces [2].

Tri-Services Level

Doctrine. The first Joint IW Doctrine was issued in 2005. This was revised in 2010, which is the current version [3].

IW Establishments. At the tri-services level, there are two organisations exist: the Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), both functioning under the aegis of HQ Integrated Defence Services (IDS) [4].

• Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). Originally established as the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) and subsequently re-christened to Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA), the DCA has now been established as a tri-services organisation headquartered in Delhi. Approval was accorded in 2017 to upgrade DIARA to the DCA, which is a whittled down form of the Cyber Command proposed by the three Services as early as 2012. The DCA is expected to have a decentralized structure, where the bulk of the Agency will be split into smaller teams embedded within operational forces in the tri-services commands, with the command centre in Delhi. It also aims at putting dedicated officers in major headquarters of the tri-services to deal with emerging cyber warfare issues [5].
• DIA. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) coordinates the intelligence effort of the three Services and provides a common interface with the civil intelligence community. The DG DIA is a member of the Intelligence Coordination Group, which works under the NSA. He is also a member of the National Information Board (NIB) as well as the Apex Committee on Satellite Surveillance Board. He controls strategic assets such as the Defence Imagery and Photo Analysis Centre (DIPAC) and SIGINT [6].

Training. Joint training is being carried out presently on EW, on a rotation basis, by the Army, Air Force and Navy at their respective training establishments at Mhow, Gwalior and Kochi. There is some participation by Air Force and Navy on IW courses being conducted by the Army for officers at the Army War College. Similar courses for joint training on cyber warfare or psychological warfare are yet to reach a stage of maturity.

Individual Service Level

At the Service level, integrated employment of IO is being carried out as a staff function at various HQ. As regards individual IO functions, execution establishments exist for the CO and EW functions, but not for PSYOP or its concomitants (PA, MILDEC). It is pertinent to note here that the Defend function for CO and EW is the combined responsibility of all users of the network end-points and EM spectrum respectively. Also, the specialist task of defence of common user networks (both cyber and EM aspects) is the responsibility of the Corps of Signals (and its equivalents in the sister services).

Doctrine. The first IA IW Doctrine was issued in 2004. A revised doctrine was subsequently promulgated in 2010, which is the current version.

Staff Organisations.

• At Army HQ level, the ADG MO (IW) is designated as the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for the IA and is responsible for all aspects of cyber, EW and psychological warfare. Similarly, the IAF has the Directorate of IW.
• The ADG Public Information (PI) is chartered to carry out the public/ media affairs function.
• Approval of the Ministry of Defence has been granted for the creation of a new DG (IW) under a third DCOAS (Strategic Planning). The DG (IW) would have under him the existing ADG (IW) and the ADG (PI). The DGMI and DGMO would also report to the DCOAS (Strategic Planning). This re-structuring is currently under implementation [7].
• As regards field formations, specific IW related staff appointments exist at some higher HQ, while at others this function is carried out by the operations staff officers in addition to their normal duties.

IW Establishments. IW establishments which are presently in existence are as under:-

• CO. The Army Cyber Group (ACG) is mandated to carry out all aspects of CO for the IA, less the implementation of defensive measures. It also functions as CERT-Army. Some of its primary functions include cyber audit, cyber forensics, cyber evaluation of new systems, etc. Policy formulation and cyber audit in the field formations is carried out under the aegis of IW staff, with the primary manpower resource for the audit teams being provided by Signals.
• EW. Army EW resource being scarce, EW groups/ sub-groups are presently placed directly under Command HQ from considerations of efficient utilisation. Notwithstanding this, their employment is entirely at tactical levels in close support to the fighting formations. The application of this resource is primarily for execution of the “Attack” and “Exploit” sub-functions. In the IAF and the Indian Navy (IN), EW effort mostly focuses on platform based non-communication (anti-radar) capability.
• Psy W. As of now, the requisite Psy W units/ establishments are not in place.

HRD. Some of the main highlights of the HRD philosophy being followed by individual Services are as given out below:-

• Cadre Management. In the case of officers, postings to IW assignments (CO, EW, IW) are on tenure basis. For other ranks a special trade, common for SIGINT and EW tasks, exists in the Corps of Signals.
• Training. IW training for officers is conducted by the Army War College, with some participation from the IAF and the IN. EW and Cyber Security training for Army officers is conducted by the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE), Mhow which is the declared Centre of Excellence for these disciplines. For the IAF, IW training is being conducted by their Information Warfare School at Bangalore. For lower ranks, structured training for EW/ SI is being conducted by the Signal Training Centres. Limited PA exposure is being given to officers as part of command oriented courses at various levels, or capsule courses at civilian institutions mostly on a volunteer basis. Requisite specialist training within the Services is not being conducted for PSYOP/ MISO/ PM, MILDEC or SC [8].

Proposed IW Structures

Having discussed the conceptual underpinnings of the major IW functions and the interplay amongst them, and to some extent the IW organizational structures in the Indian Armed Forces, this section attempts to suggest how one might move towards more effective structures in a manner which is feasible.

IW Doctrine

There is a need to substantially update existing IW doctrines at the Joint Services as well as individual Service levels. In view of the ambiguity in the definition of IW terminologies worldwide, these doctrines must make a deliberate effort to rigorously define terms as applicable in the Indian context. The doctrines must be based on the model of a five-dimensional battlespace, with Infospace rather than Cyberspace as the fifth dimension. They must emphatically endorse the operational imperative that conflict in this artificial and virtual dimension is at par with the traditional notion of conflict in the physical realm, and not merely in support of it.

The doctrines should characterise and classify the following major streams of IW as being distinctly different: Information-Technical Operations (ITO), comprising of CO and EW functions, and Information-Psychological Operations (IPO), covering PSYOP, MILDEC, PA and SC. Also, mechanisms to achieve inter-stream integrative and intra-stream synergistic effects should be spelt out.

In addition to its traditional orientation towards foreign audiences, SC should be defined and characterised so as to be responsive to the prevailing CI scenario in terms of the desired perception management, without resorting to the term PM. An overview of other aspects brought out in succeeding paragraphs with respect to individual doctrines (CO, EW, IPO), as also the manner in which the Intelligence function relates to IW capabilities, must also be spelt out in these doctrines.

An unequivocal stress must be laid on the critical importance of achieving specialisation in each of the IW functions, and a viable HR philosophy spelt out to meet this end.

The logical relationship amongst IW streams and functions is depicted below.

Information Warfare: Functional Hierarchy

Organizational Convergence for IW Capabilities

With respect to the IA, the decision to create a separate DG (IW), comprising of ADG (IW) and ADG (PI), under the DCOAS (Strategy and Planning), is a step in the right direction. However, further re-structuring is necessary for achieving optimum synergy amongst the cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities, as under[9]:-

• The existing ADG (PI) should be upgraded to cover the full ambit of IPO, as indicated above, and re-designated as ADG (IPO). The existing ADG (IW) should be re-structured to be responsible for ITO, essentially covering cyber and EW missions, and re-designated as ADG (ITO). Convergence at the Army apex level amongst the three IW capabilities would thus occur at DG (IW).
• Most importantly, both the ADG (ITO) and ADG (IPO) verticals must essentially be specialist in character, at the staff as well as unit levels.

ITO, as a separate major sub-stream of IW, signifies the strong synergetic relationship which exists between the cyber operations and EW functions (also referred to as cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA)). It is recommended that organizational convergence across these two functions should be achieved by having a common line directorate for them in each Service. However, purity of the individual functions should be maintained at the functional unit level. Synergy in their operational deployment is recommended to be achieved through either staff coordination or, in specific scenarios, through task-based grouping of teams from both these domains of expertise. Intra-ITO staff coordination at each HQ must be carried out by the specialist line directorate component at that HQ. However, overall staff coordination between the ITO and IPO functions should be carried out by the IW/ Operations staff at each HQ. Since EW manifests itself primarily at the tactical level, an important underlying assumption here is that employment of cyber operations at the tactical level is considered to be an operational imperative.

The desired level of organizational convergence for IW missions at the tri-services level can be achieved after the creation of the CDS and theatre commands. Notwithstanding this, certain recommendations are given out in the following sections for addressing the IW capability gaps presently existing vis-à-vis our adversaries.

CO: Way Forward

National Policy, Strategy and Governance. [10]

• Cyberspace Capabilities – Need for Urgency. The Information Technology Act was promulgated in 2000, the IT Amendment Act in 2008, and the National Cyber Security Policy in 2013. CERT-In was established in 2004, and based on Sec 70A of the IT Act (Amendment) 2008, NCIIPC came into existence in 2014, while the NCCC (first phase) was established in 2017. Only Phase 1 of a limited Defence Cyber Agency, instead of a full-fledged Cyber Command proposed in 2012, has just been established. These cyber security milestones do not appear to reflect the urgency which is dictated by the emergence of cyberspace as an active domain of conflict in the global warfighting arena.
• National Cyber Security Strategy. Unlike the US, UK, Australia, Japan, even Estonia, and almost certainly China and Russia, we do not yet have a National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). It is time to move beyond policy, guidelines and advisories and come up with such a strategy, which clearly lays down the approach, objectives and a time-bound plan for adequately securing our national cyberspace. It is recently been announced by the National Security Council Secretariat that a National Cyber Security Strategy is expected to be issued in the first quarter of 2020 [11].
• Cyberspace Governance Architecture. Presently, we have the CERT-In and the NCIIPC in place for protecting our cyber assets, with the former functioning under MEITY and the latter under the NTRO/ PMO. This current organizational architecture for cyber governance needs a review. Specifically, there appears to be a case for an apex authority which coordinates, and better still subsumes, the functioning of CERT-In as well as NPIIC, similar perhaps to the recently established National Cyber Security Centre of the UK.
• Military vis-à-vis Civilian Control of Cyberspace. Countries like the United States (as also China and the UK) perceive cyber threats from the lens of national security, and thus their cyber threat management strategy is military-centric, handled by the US Cyber Command under the US STRATCOM/ DoD. The European Union and some other countries, on the other hand, view vulnerabilities in cyberspace primarily as a threat for commerce and data integrity, leaving their management to mostly civilian authorities. In India, it needs to be deliberated upon whether or not the CERT-In/ NCIIPC combination functioning under the coordination of the National Security Advisor (NSA) is the right apex structure to tackle state-on-state cyber conflict as part of multi-domain war, which should logically be the charter of the Ministry of Defence. Further, given our national security landscape, the division of authority/ responsibility between military and civil authorities as regards protection of our national cyberspace needs to be spelt out in unambiguous terms.
• Cyber Deterrence. It is often said that, in defence strategies, deterrence precedes protection, resilience and response. Given the ‘non-attributable’ as well as ‘asymmetric’ characteristics of cyber-attacks, the concept of deterrence in the cyber domain takes on a different flavour. It is evident that there can be no effective cyber defence strategy based purely on a protection/ resilience/ response paradigm. Therefore, India too needs to incorporate cyber deterrence in its national cyber security strategy and develop capabilities accordingly.
• Offensive Defence. Both “Deterrence” as well as “Active Defence” need offensive capabilities, with the difference that the former implies a “force in being” while the latter involves the actual employment of offensive capabilities. Both involve the possession and employment of offensive cyber capabilities, which therefore need to be developed for protecting our national cyberspace.
• Centralized Management of CII Protection. The NCIIPC has been designated as the national nodal agency for all measures to protect nation’s critical information infrastructure (CII). However, its charter states that the basic responsibility for protecting the CII system lies with the agency running that CII. Given the large number of government and private agencies involved in the management of CII, there appears to be a case for a more centralized control/ authority/ responsibility for protecting our national critical cyberspace.

Military Doctrine. A Joint Cyber Operations Doctrine needs to be promulgated at the earliest. Guiding principles for such a doctrine should include the following: resources for Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO, to include CNA & CNE) must be deployed down to tactical levels; in any scenario involving state-to-state conflict (which may not necessarily imply declared hostilities), the primary authority/ responsibility for CO should rest with the MoD/ Armed Forces, including authority over cyber resources available with other ministries; and, a completely fresh HR philosophy should be evolved to meet the unique needs of CO.

Organisation. A full-fledged tri-Services Cyber Command should be raised for carrying out OCO (CNA/ CNE), with the same urgency and determination as was the case for the Mountain Strike Corps; as part of this Command, in addition to a Command HQ, cyber units should be raised and deployed down to tactical levels, along with intermediate subordinate HQ as felt necessary; while HQ may be inter-Services in structure, Service purity should be maintained at unit level, similar to the model which has been adopted by the Signal Intelligence Directorate (SI Directorate); cyber units should be of two broad flavours: cyber execution units and cyber R&D units, with each of R&D units focusing in a different area of expertise in support of the execution units; command & control structures should be put in place in line with the philosophy of ‘centralized control, decentralized execution’, in order to address the disadvantages of deploying offensive cyber resources at multiple echelons; suitable linkages should be established with EW organisations at all levels for achieving the desired synergy between these two capabilities.

HQ Cyber Command: Suggested Organizational Structure

HR Philosophy. HR philosophy is recommended to be modified based on the following guidelines:-

• Line Directorate. One of the following three options are available for consideration: raise a separate Inter-Services Cyber Corps; raise service-specific Cyber Corps; or, raise sub-cadres within existing Service Line Directorates. It is recommended that, to begin with, the last option be adopted. In the case of the IA, the only suitable candidate line directorate is the Corps of Signals, which is already mandated to carry out Defensive CO (DCO/CND); similar solutions be identified in the IAF and IN.
• Cadre Management. A permanent cadre for OCO be put together through selections, based on aptitude, from within existing uniformed cadre already available and trained for DCO, as well as by means of direct recruitment from expertise available within the country. The Territorial Army (TA) option be considered only to meet surge capacity, once permanent sanctioned cadre has been fully made up. In the case of officers, to begin with a profile based on repeated tenures (‘concentrations’) should be considered as a career progression model, whereas for other ranks, induction into the cyber cadre should be on a permanent basis.
• Training. Structured training for DCO is already being carried out by the three Services. Extensive training for OCO, right up to post-graduate level, should be carried out at respective premier training institutions within the three Services (eg, Military College of Telecommunication Engineering for the Army). Efforts should be made to sponsor specialist post-graduate courses in CO, including ethical hacking, to be conducted at leading educational institutions within the Country.

EW: Way Forward

Doctrine. A Joint Doctrine on EW, followed by separate EW Doctrines by each of the three Services, needs to be promulgated. The doctrines should emphasize the critical role of EW in 21st Century battlespace, as well as the degree and manner of coordination with cyber resources, in order to achieve the desired synergy in military Infospace.

Organisation. The quantum of Army EW units/ formations needs to be significantly increased (EW Group per Corps HQ) in order to provide the requisite EW support to fighting formations. Once additional EW formations are raised, these should be placed under Corps HQ for integrated functioning, with EW Sub-Groups in support of Divisional HQ. The model of Integrated CC Blocks (Communication plus Non-Communication) is recommended to be adopted for optimal utilization of EW resources. ELINT resources should ideally be merged with the EW Groups (please see section on the Intelligence function below). Strike Corps EW elements should be equipped to have matching mobility and be deployed well forward (within combat groups) for achieving a tangible force-multiplier effect.

HR Philosophy. HR philosophy for EW is recommended to be modified based on the following considerations:-

• Cadre Management. In general, a much higher degree of specialization than what is presently existing is considered essential. In the case of officers, the postings policy must be modified to ensure repeated tenures in EW establishments. For instance, criteria for command of an Army EW Sub-Group/ Group must require at least one/ two prior EW tenures respectively. For other ranks, EW specific trades (operators/ mechanics) must be created and rotated strictly amongst EW units/ establishments (and not in SI units).
• Training. The quality and quantum of structured training at all levels, including through conduct of joint services courses, needs to be significantly upgraded. Also, specialist components of IW courses should be conducted by designated centres of excellence in the respective disciplines.

R&D and Project Management. On the one hand, skill development for execution of EW tasks is not as challenging as for cyber skill development. On the other, project management for EW systems requires highly specialised expertise, especially as Indian R&D in this area is far below global standards. Although efforts should be made to give a fillip to domestic R&D, including by private players, in the interim special endeavours must be to obtain the best technology existing in the world market, especially as this may not be freely available. The first step in this direction is to improve the quality of our project management organisations (PMOs) in all three Services. In order to make this happen, giving project based long tenures to EW specialists in PMOs is an essential prerequisite.

Information-Psychological Operations (IPO)

This work has focused briefly on the PSYOP, PA, MILDEC and SC functions. As stated above, an overall alignment and synergy is desirable amongst these four functions, which are recommended to be grouped under a separate stream of IW, termed as IPO. In order to develop IPO to the desired degree of maturity, stiff resistance to modifying organisational charters as they exist today would first need to be overcome. Thereafter, considerable efforts will need to be devoted to developing expertise in all the IPO disciplines, most of which happen to be in very nascent stages, especially in the context of the complex 21st Century battlespace [12].

Concepts and Doctrine. A formal study of the IPO disciplines under discussion here has never been undertaken by the Armed Forces with any degree of seriousness. Limited exposure by way of short capsules on media management (PA) is being provided in some of the command oriented courses at different levels of service. Commanders and staff entrusted with IPO tasks, by virtue of their tenure-based assignments, carry them out mostly on the basis of their general military experience, as also on the strength of short-term institutional knowledge which might exist within their establishments. This ad hoc approach to IPO disciplines leaves much to be desired, especially in today’s information intensive world. It is vital, therefore, that suitable steps be initiated for developing these disciplines to a degree of professional maturity, duly adapted to our strategic environment. A joint doctrine for IPO, covering concepts and employment modalities for individual functions as well as the interplay amongst them, needs to be promulgated. In addition, it is desirable to issue a similar doctrine separately for the Army which, in the context of our national security, has the most significant role to play in this area.

Cadre Management. Although trained manpower for the IPO disciplines is required by all the three Services, the numbers required are small. Also, presently there is no specialist manpower available with any of the Services. In view of this, it would be prudent to establish a new tri-Service line directorate for managing all the IPO disciplines. A suitably structured tri-Service training institute should also be established as a centre of excellence for the IPO disciplines. As a first step in this direction, a separate wing could be set-up at the Army War College. Broad recommendations for individual IPO disciplines are given out in succeeding paragraphs.

PSYOP. PSYOP demands staff as well as ground resources for executing operational tasks. Specialist training needs to be imparted for all personnel involved in PSYOP tasks. To begin with, cadre management at officer level could be based on providing repeated tenures, after suitable specialist structured training has been imparted. For lower ranks, creation of a specialist cadre is desirable. The strength of the cadre, the structure of execution elements and the nature of training to be imparted will emerge once concepts and doctrine in this important area have been developed. Due to its “black” content, this function is recommended to be kept firewalled from PA.

PA. The Defence PRO needs to be recast is such a manner as to rise up to the challenges of the Information Age, and in conformity with the operational needs of the Armed Forces. For this to happen, this resource should be placed under command the Armed Forces for all purposes, or at the very least for operational deployment and training. Additional cadre may be recruited if needed. With respect to the IA, the ADG PI as an organisation should be formally sanctioned, and should carry out its tasks through PA Cells (re-cast PRO) at each formation HQ, down to the Corps HQ in the initial phase. The activities of these cells should be coordinated by the Operations staff at all levels. From considerations of credibility, these cells must carry out only ‘truth projection’, and be sufficiently shielding from the PSYOP function, as stated above.

MILDEC. MILDEC must necessarily be a function of the Operations staff at any HQ, since planning for military deception is inextricably linked to actual operational plans. Officers specially trained in this discipline need to be posted to various HQ. However, raising of specialist units is not felt necessary for carrying out MILDEC tasks.

SC. Existing literature on SC in the military context is based on deployment scenarios for expeditionary forces, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, etc. In the Indian context, SC of this flavour may not be so applicable. However, the basic principles of SC are relevant to CI scenarios prevalent in the Valley as well as the North-East. Such an umbrella concept would comprise of, in addition to PSYOP and PA, activities such as interaction with political/ civil functionaries, Sadbhavna and Aid to Civil Authorities in the affected areas, sometimes referred to as Civil Affairs (CA). An important point to note is that, since PM as a term is perceived to have “black” connotations, it is felt that perception management of own populations as a function would be better covered under this umbrella terminology. Being a whole of government approach, close coordination with the MHA as well as MEA is needed for effective execution of SC tasks. In addition to its relevance to CI operations, since our Armed Forces have a role in foreign countries as well by way of defence attaches, maritime diplomacy, participation in UN missions, etc, SC needs to evolve with a tri-Services perspective. At this juncture, the only viable recommendation that may be made is to develop a formal joint services doctrine on SC. In the interim, the endeavour must be to continue making progress on development of the SC related IPO functions (PSYOP, PA).

IO vis-à-vis the Intelligence Function

It has been brought out earlier that the IW Exploit function is essentially the acquisition of intelligence using information weapons, specifically the ES and CNE sub-functions of EW and CO respectively. At the same time, acquisition of intelligence through Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of Intelligence organisations also play out in the EM domain. SIGINT is the combination of Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic (or Non-Communication) Intelligence (ELINT) functions, which are essentially ES manifestations at the strategic level. Traditionally, it is HUMINT which has been the primary source of intelligence acquisition at the strategic level. In the wireless, networked world, however, HUMINT is gradually yielding ground to SIGINT and CNE for strategic intelligence collection [13].

In the Indian context, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the tri-Services level, using the considerable SI Directorate resources at its disposal, is mandated to carry out SIGINT activities. It is but natural for the SI Directorate to attempt to develop CNE capabilities for acquiring strategic intelligence. However, in the scenario of a Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) and subsequently a Cyber Command being established, for the DIA to carry out CNE activities in parallel would amount to wasteful duplication of effort, and is hence not recommended.

The EW organisations are best structured to acquire tactical SIGINT through its ES function. However, in CI scenarios within the country, SI units too, under the direct control of the tri-Services SI Directorate, are deeply involved in this activity. Existing command & control structures are not conducive for achieving the requisite synergy between these two capabilities. This needs to be corrected by suitably modifying the existing command & control hierarchy.

In a similar vein, ELINT resources are currently placed under the Military Intelligence (MI) Directorate, whereas radar signatures collected by ELINT units are primarily meant to be exploited for EA by EW units on outbreak of hostilities. Here too, suitable organisational re-structuring appears to be warranted. While merging ELINT resources with the EW Groups would be an optimal solution, placing ELINT units directly under the Theatre Commands could be a good interim step in this direction. Further study in this area is recommended.

Conclusion

This work has endeavoured to analyse the intangible and multi-disciplinary arena of IW against the backdrop of a complex 21st Century battlespace, with the specific intention of suggesting effective and viable IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces. A conceptual understanding of the large number of disciplines involved and, more importantly, the interplay amongst them, is key to evolving optimum organisational structures. A large number of recommendations have been made, both in terms of doctrinal improvements as well as organisational re-structuring.

It is felt, however, that the key driver for bringing about the requisite transformation would be the conviction that the nature of warfare in this Information Age is changing in fundamental ways, which demands, even more than organisational changes, radically new models of HR philosophy, covering recruitment, training and career progression aspects. For this to happen, a change in existing mind-sets is essential, which by far is the greatest challenge. This work is primarily an effort to contribute towards addressing this challenge.

References

(1)    Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Strategic Thinking for Cyber Security: Defending the National Cyberspace – Part I, Data Security Council of India Blog, 24 Jan 2018, Accessed 20 Dec 2019, https://www.dsci.in/blogs/strategic-thinking-for-cyberspace-security-part-i/.

(2)    Lt Gen S A Hasnain, Image Challenge for The Indian Armed Forces, Vivekanand International Foundation Blog, Mar 2016, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2016/march/14/image-challenge-for-the-indian-armed-forces-take-it-by-the-horns.

(3)    Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Towards an Effective and Viable Information Warfare Structure for the Indian Armed Forces, USI Journal, Vol CXLVIII, Apr-Jun 2018, pp. 134.

(4)    Brig Vinod Anand, Integrating the Indian Military: Retrospect and Prospect, Journal of Defence Studies Vol 2 No 2, Winter 2008, IDSA, pp. 36-37.

(5)    Nidhi Singh, India’s new Defence Cyber Agency, Centre for Communication Governance at NLU Delhi Blog, https://ccgdelhi.org/2019/05/10/indias-new-defence-cyber-agency/, Accessed 20 Dec 2019.

(6)    Defence Intelligence Agency, Wikipedia, Accessed 03 Apr 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Defence_Intelligence_Agency_(India).

(7)    Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, Defence Ministry Approves Information Warfare Branch for Indian Army, The Economic Times, 09 Mar 2019, Accessed 02 Apr 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ defence-ministry-approves -information-warfare-branch-for-indian-army/articleshow/68329797.cms?from=mdr.

(8)    Lt Gen R S Panwar, Towards an Effective and Viable Information Warfare Structure for the Indian Armed Forces, USI Journal, Apr-Jun 2018, Accessed 29 Jan 2020, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/towards-an-effective-and-viable-information-warfare-structure-for-the-indian-armed-forces/.

(9)    Ibid.

(10)  Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Strategic Thinking for Cyber Security: Defending the National Cyberspace – Part I, Data Security Council of India Blog, 24 Jan 2018, Accessed 20 Dec 2019, https://www.dsci.in/blogs/strategic-thinking-for-cyberspace-security-part-i/.

(11)  National Cyber Security Strategy 2020, National Informatics Centre, Accessed 28 Jan 2020, https://ncss2020.nic.in/.

(12)  Lt Gen R S Panwar, Towards an Effective and Viable Information Warfare Structure for the Indian Armed Forces…

(13)  Ibid.