Sections

Introduction

Convergence amongst IO Components

Differences amongst IO Components

Academic Nature and Complexity of IO Disciplines

Human Resource (HR) Management Models

Level of Operational Deployment

Considerations for Integrated Deployment

References

Introduction

The primary focus of this work is to suggest Information Warfare (IW) structures which are effective enough to match up to the challenges of 21st Century warfare. Part I of this four part series dwelt upon and clarified the terminologies, concepts and doctrines which this work uses as a basis for proposing effective and viable IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces.

There are several aspects which emerged as a result of the analysis carried out in Part I. Firstly, the three primary components of IW, as reflected in the doctrines of major players such as the United States, Russia, China and also India, are cyber operations (CO), EW and psychological warfare (Psy W). Secondly, while the former two are well defined components, the same is not the case with Psy W, which comprises of several related but distinct capabilities which play out in the cognitive domain, including Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Public Affairs (PA) and Strategic Communication (SC). These sub-disciplines of Psy W are elaborated upon in Part I of this series. Lastly, there being a greater convergence between the former two, mainly because of their inherent technical character, these may be clubbed together and referred to as Information Technical Operations (or as the Chinese term it, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare), while operations in the cognitive domain may be generically referred to as Information Psychological Operations (or Cognitive Operations).

The importance of rigour in the use of terminologies was also emphasized in the previous part. Further, several ways in which two terms often used synonymously, namely, IW and Information Operations (IO), are defined in the literature, were spelt out. As per one of these definitions, IO are IW applied in the military context. Since the current work focuses on IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces, it is this interpretation which is implied; also, usage of the term IO (rather than IW) is preferred for the most part.

In this second part, the areas of convergence as well as differences amongst CO, EW and Psy W components of IO will first be brought out. Thereafter, some considerations which determine the manner in which these capabilities are operationally deployed in an integrated manner will be discussed.

Convergence amongst IO Components

Amongst the three primary functional components of IO, namely CO, EW and Psy W, several areas of convergence may be envisaged. Since there may be multiple interpretations of the term CO, it is clarified here that in this work this term would be used in the sense of Computer Network Operations as defined in US DoD Joint Publication 3-13 of 2006 [1], which comprises of three sub-functions, namely, Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploit (CNE) and Computer Network Defence (CND). Similarly, the EW function comprises of three components, namely, Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Support (ES) and Electronic Protect (EP) [2]. In the EW-CO-Psy W triangular relationship, convergence may be discussed in terms of all the three linkages which make up this relationship.

EW and CO

Both EW and CO comprise of Attack (EA/ CNA), Defend (EP/ CND) and Exploit (ES/ CNE) sub-functions. Fundamentally, EA (essentially jamming) and CNA (implemented through computer code) are quite different from each other. Convergence between the two functions is governed by how closely the two capabilities can work together to produce a synergistic effect. As a good example of convergence, for carrying out CNA on an air-gapped data network, intrusion into the adversary network through the EM medium (ES) may be needed before malware can be injected (CNA). On the other hand, if malware merely travels across an EM communication link (ie, without resorting to EM intrusive techniques), it would not amount to an instance of EW-CO convergence. This line of thinking may similarly be extended to the Exploit and Defend sub-functions as well. The Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities (CEMA) doctrine of the US Army [3, 4], the INEW theory of China [5] and the Russian conception of ITO all aim to achieve optimum synergistic effects through the integrated employment of CO and EW.

Convergence amongst IO Components

CO and Psy W

The concept of hacktivism can be considered to be a combination of CO and Psy W, as follows: Activism may be seen as a form of Psy W, and hactivism combines it with CO concepts. Therefore, website defacement by hacktivists can be described as CO enabled Psy W. Reports of Israel hacking into phone voicemail systems to leave messages is another an example of CO-delivered Psy W. Psy W campaigns conducted over social media platforms targeting specific user accounts is an example of integrated employment of CO and Psy W, as CNE capabilities would be employed to gain access to the accounts targeted in such operations [6]. Social media may be used on a large-scale in Psy W campaigns, allowing groups to protest online with global support and also by organising physical protests. The Arab Spring demonstrations are dramatic examples of such usage.

EW and Psy W

Integrated employment of EW and Psy W is also feasible. For instance, radio or television broadcasts could be jammed to prevent them from being used to incite violence (an example of defensive Psy W), as witnessed in Rwanda [7]. However, amongst the three linkages being discussed here, this appears to be the weakest one.

Differences amongst IO Components

It is equally important to identify the conceptual differences between the three primary IO functions. At the conceptual level, it may be stated that the weapons used and/ or immediate targets in the conduct of EW, CO and Psy W respectively lie in the physical (ie, EM), information and perceptual/ cognitive domains. Within these realms, EW targets machines, the target of CO is information, while Psy W targets minds. The “weapon” used by EW is EM energy, CO uses computer code as a weapon while message is the weapon used by Psy W.

In terms of the OSI reference model, the following differentiations may be made: As EW weapons and targets primarily reside in the EM domain, this function correlates to the physical layer of the OSI model, although some forms of EW may play at the data link and network layers as well. The realm of CO would extend from the data-link layer right up to the application layer, while Psy W would mostly be executed through the application layer, when cyberspace is exploited as its messaging medium.

IO Components vis-a-vis the ISO Reference Model

Academic Nature and Complexity of IO Disciplines

CO and EW

Two of the three IO capabilities under discussion, namely CO and EW, have their theoretical foundations in the ICT disciplines. The Defend sub-function in both cases (CND and EP) requires the least expertise, followed by the Exploit and Attack sub-functions, in that order, which demand increasingly higher levels of expertise. In general, the CO function is an order of magnitude more complex than EW from the point of view of training. On the other hand, equipment sophistication in EW is much higher. Although both CO and EW entail knowledge of foundation ICT disciplines as a starting point, subsequent expertise development in these functions follow distinctly divergent paths. The degree of specialisation needed in both cases is very high, with Offensive CO occupying the highest rung on the specialisation ladder.

Psy W: PSYOP, SC, PA and MILDEC

In contrast to CO and EW, the PSYOP practitioner needs to have a grounding in the social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, political science, history, etc. This is true for the MILDEC function as well, although not to the same extent. The SC and PA functions also require a humanities and social sciences background, with focus on mass communications, journalism and public relations. Here again, all areas require special expertise well beyond the foundation courses in social sciences, which needs to be honed through specialist training, as well as on the job exposures over extended periods in specific military environments.

Human Resource (HR) Management Models

Establishing highly specialist organisations mandates the implementation of HR management models specifically designed to support them, if these are to effectively execute their charter. Given the current HR policies in place in our Armed Forces, evolving and implementing the right talent management models is perhaps a greater challenge as compared to raising/ reorganising optimum IW organisational structures. This may be attributed to several factors which include, in addition to their highly specialist nature, the fairly embryonic state of almost all the IW disciplines, as also the fact that most of these disciplines are specific to a military environment.

In order to address this challenge, some of the measures which need to be adopted are as follows: conduct of specialist structured training courses of duration ranging from a few months to full-fledged under-graduate and post graduate courses; new recruitment policies to tap existing talent within the country; raising of new cadres or new specializations within existing cadres; managing profiles based on repeated tenures, wherever creation of dedicated cadres is not feasible; and, adopting attractive career progression models unconstrained by considerations such as “rounded” profiles, etc. Even at the highest levels of hierarchy, profiles of various hues are needed, varying from fully combat oriented profiles for combatant commanders, to those with a very high specialist orientation for commanders/ staff heading establishments and staff verticals such as a Cyber Command, IW Directorate, etc.

Level of Operational Deployment

Before attempting to evolve the right IW structures, it is also important to analyse the operational levels (national/ strategic/ operational/ tactical) at which each of the IO functions may usefully be deployed.

EW

In the context of the Army, given the line-of-sight nature of most wireless communications, the bulk of EW resources find utility mostly at the tactical level. Some special areas of employment at the operational/ strategic levels also exist, such as anti-satellite jamming both for communications/ GPS satellites. Although very important as capabilities, these strategic assets would account for only a small percentage of the total EW resource. In the case of the Air Force and the Navy, both strategic (eg, ES through AWACS) and tactical (aircraft based jamming of air/ ground based radars) deployment is necessary and feasible.

CO

There are divergent views in the matter of deployment of CO resources. There is a view that in a connected world CO, even if deployed centrally, can target operational and tactical targets too effectively. The other rationale for centralised deployment of CO resources is that it is very difficult to contain the effects of a cyber-attack within tactical boundaries. De-confliction too is an issue, since the same target may be acquired for engagement by different CO teams if not deployed centrally. Also, it is often assumed that CO targets would generally be strategic in nature, such as critical information infrastructure.

Counterviews on this issue, however, are equally persuasive, as follows: a strategically located and centrally controlled resource can never effectively meet the requirements of a fast changing tactical battle scenario, since the desired level of coordination is too difficult to achieve; next, in the 21st Century battlespace, ruling out tactical cyber targets such as weapon control systems as well as decision support systems in the TBA would be quite imprudent; and finally, gaining access into isolated tactical (and even operational/ strategic) networks may only be feasible through physical intrusion at the tactical level.

In summary, there is a very strong case for deployment of offensive cyber resources at operational and tactical levels, albeit with stringent centralised control being exerted over them.

IO Components: Level of Operational Deployment

Psy W: SC, PA, PSYOP and MILDEC

SC is inherently strategic in nature, while PA resources may be usefully deployed at strategic and operational levels. Suitably developed PSYOP resources, on the other hand, are expected to find significant utility at the tactical level. Unfortunately, in the Indian context, PSYOP has mostly been viewed from the prism of perception management in the J&K Sector. Further study is needed to ascertain the full potential of this IO discipline in the context of conventional conflicts. As regards MILDEC, it would find applicability at all operational levels, although the manner in which it manifests itself would vary considerably.

Considerations for Integrated Deployment

Horizontal Integration

Integration across domains (CO, EW, Psy W) may be carried out either by raising composite units, such as the IW Brigade which was set up in the Valley and subsequently disbanded, or through staff coordination as, for instance, the IW staff at various headquarters. A third model for achieving horizontal integration could be task-based groupings of two or more pure domain teams. For composite units to be a successful venture, convergence amongst the functions to be integrated needs to be significant. One of the primary reasons for the failure of the IW Brigade experiment was that too many IO disciplines with insufficient convergence amongst them were placed under one umbrella. Thus, while there may be a reasonably high degree of operational convergence between EW and CO, the same is not true for EW/ CO on the one hand and Psy W components on the other, from the viewpoint of both expertise and synergy in employment.

Vertical Integration

In case a specific IO function is resourced at several levels of organisational hierarchy, one of many available command and control models may be adopted for best effect. Depending on the degree of intra-function cohesion desired, resources at lower echelons may be placed either under command lower headquarters or only in location. Even if placed under command, mechanisms may be put in place to ensure that the right degree of control is exerted from the higher echelons, in line with the principle of centralised control, decentralised deployment. These considerations have special relevance in the case of Offensive CO, wherein although a tight centralised control is considered essential, but at the same time distributed tactical deployment is equally desirable. Such a model also becomes attractive when the available resource is scarce, or when integrated deployment is expected to yield better results, as is the case with EW in the context of the Army.

Integration at the National Level

There exist two models for integrated deployment of cyber capabilities at the national level. Countries like the United States (as also China and the UK, amongst others) perceive cyber threats through the lens of national security, and thus their cyber threat management strategy is military-centric, handled by the US Cyber Command. The European Union and some other countries, on the other hand, view vulnerabilities in cyberspace primarily as a threat for commerce and data integrity, leaving their management mostly to civilian authorities. In the Indian context, the division of authority/ responsibility between military and civil authorities as regards cyber operations at the national level needs to be spelt out in unambiguous terms, in a manner which best meets our national security needs [8].

As regards EW, only certain types of strategic assets may require to be integrated and controlled at the national level. For instance, at least in the Indian context, all space based as well as anti-satellite EW assets would fall in this category, whether these are jamming capabilities, directed energy weapons or future electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.

Psy W resources and capabilities for SC and PA would require centralised coordination at the national level to a certain degree, while at the same time permitting requisite freedom of action at all levels of military deployment. On the other hand, there is no role envisaged for PSYOP and MILDEC components of Psy W at the national level.

Conclusion

In this part, the areas of convergence amongst the three primary components of IO, namely, CO, EW and Psy W, have first been touched upon briefly. Thereafter, differences in their characteristics have been brought out in in the context of how they play out vis-à-vis the ISO reference model for data networks, their academic nature and complexity as well the HR models which are required to support these disciplines, and the level of operational deployment where these components are effective. Finally, factors to be considered for their integrated deployment have been discussed.

Part III of this series gives an overview of the IW structures which have presently been adopted by the United States, China, Pakistan and India.

References

(1)     US DoD Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Feb 2006, Accessed 12 Oct 2020, pp. II-1.

(2)     US DoD Joint Publication 3-12, Electronic Warfare, Feb 2012.

(3)     US Army Field Manual 3-38, Army Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Feb 2014.

(4)     US Army Field Manual 3-12, Army Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations, Apr 2017.

(5)     Gurmeet Kanwal, China’s Emerging Cyber War Doctrine, Journal of Defence Studies Vol 3 No 3, IDSA, July 2009.

(6)     Van Niekerk, Convergence of Functional Areas in Information Operations, South African Journal of Information Management 17(1), Art. #605, 2015, pp. 3/7 http://dx.doi.org/ 0.4102/ sajim.v17i1.605.

(7)     Ibid.

(8)     Lt Gen R S Panwar, Strategic Thinking for Cyber Security: Defending the National Cyberspace, Data Security Council of India Blog, Jan 2018.