Sections

Existing Indian IO Structures

India’s Response Options

Contours of a Tri-Service IO Command

References

[This piece is in continuation to “Infospace Wars: Towards an Indian Information Operations Command (Part I)”, which covered proposals for the Infospace Arena and Force Structures]

Existing Indian IO Structures

Joint Services IO Structures

The only IO organisation at the joint services level in India is the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). Originally established as the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) and subsequently re-christened to Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA), the DCA has now been partly established as a tri-services organisation headquartered in Delhi. Approval was accorded in 2017 to upgrade DIARA to the DCA, which is a whittled down version of the Cyber Command proposed by the Naresh Chandra Committee as early as 2012. The DCA, once fully raised, is expected to have a decentralized structure, wherein the bulk of the Agency will be split into smaller teams embedded within operational forces in the tri-services commands, with its command centre in Delhi. It also aims at putting dedicated officers in major headquarters of the tri-services to deal with emerging cyber warfare issues [1].

IO Structures at Individual Service Levels

The following IO establishments exist at the individual Service levels:-

• Staff Structures. In the Army, so far, the ADG MO (IW) was responsible for all aspects of cyber, EW and psychological warfare. The ADG Public Information (PI) is chartered to carry out the PI function. Approval of the MoD has now been granted for the creation of the posts of DG (IW) as well as DCOAS (Strategy), with the former reporting to the latter. The DG (IW) will have under him the existing ADG (IW) and the erstwhile ADG (PI) re-designated as ADG (Strategic Communication). This re-structuring is currently under implementation [2]. As regards field formations, specific IW related staff appointments exist at higher HQ, while at lower levels this function is carried out by the operations staff officers in addition to their normal duties.
• CO. The Army Cyber Group (ACG) is mandated to carry out all aspects of CO for the IA, less the implementation of defensive measures. Similar establishments exist within the AF and the Navy for providing cyber support to their respective Services.
• EW. Army EW resource being scarce, EW groups/ sub-groups are presently placed directly under Command HQ from considerations of efficient utilization. Notwithstanding this, their employment is entirely at tactical levels in close support to the fighting formations. In the IAF and the Indian Navy (IN), EW effort mostly focuses on platform based non-communication (anti-radar) capability.
• PSYOP. As per open domain information, no PSYOP units/ establishments are presently in existence.

Space Operations

Space operations are currently the charter of the Defence Space Agency (DSA), a downsized version of the Aerospace Command, the establishment of which was recommended by the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012, together with the setting up of a Cyber Command and Special Operations Command. Its creation was approved in Sep 2018. The Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre (DSCC) in Bhopal have been subsumed by the DSA. The DSA is mandated to operate systems for protecting Indian interests in outer space and dealing with potential space wars, as well as for developing a space warfare strategy.

The Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA) was approved in 2019 as the scientific organisation responsible for developing space-warfare systems and technologies for the DSA. It is currently pursuing the development of various types of anti-satellite weapon systems [3].

India’s Response Options

‘Force’ vis-à-vis ‘Command’ Structure

The Chinese ‘SSF’ model appears to have significant advantages over the US ‘Command’ model, since it facilitates a much higher synergy amongst various IO capabilities, which is very desirable for effective CEMA, cyber influence operations (CIO), etc. Moreover, a force, with its captive cadre and optimally tailored HR policies, is better suited for nurturing the high levels of specialisation necessary for developing expertise in various IO disciplines.

Notwithstanding the advantages of raising a separate IO Force, it is recommended that, in order build up requisite warfighting capability in the Infospace dimension and also blunt the strategic edge which China currently enjoys by creating the PLA SSF, India’s objective should be to raise a Tri-Service IO Command over the next few years. Several practical considerations dictate against raising a force, as under:-

• In contrast to the US and China (and even Russia), doctrinal thought on IO in the Indian Armed Forces has not matured enough to generate the necessary conviction and will, even within the Forces, to bring about such a revolutionary change.
• Keeping in view India’s resource constraints, creating a separate force would need to be done through a “save and raise” approach. The current level of coordination amongst the Services is not very conducive towards shedding manpower for a tri-Service force.
• The overheads involved in creating a separate force are likely to be higher.

As regards space operations, the DSA is recommended to be upgraded to a full-fledged Aerospace Command in due course.

A Phased ‘Bricks and Clay’ Approach

A ‘bricks not clay’ approach could be adopted by the PLA because the desired capabilities for carrying out for carrying out the entire spectrum of IO were already in existence, albeit spread across different departments. In India’s case, however, certain capabilities do not exist at all, eg, psychological operations units. Therefore, a ‘bricks and clay’ approach is necessary, wherein existing as well as fresh resources are stitched together in a phased manner in order to achieve the ultimate objective of raising a full-fledged tri-Service IO Command.

Such an approach is outlined in the next section.

Contours of a Tri-Service IO Command

Apex Level Architecture for IO

Broadly speaking, operations in Infospace (often substituted by Cyberspace, an imprecise synonym) require a whole-of-government approach and are not restricted to the Armed Forces alone. Therefore, at the national level the charter for IO could be distributed amongst the Armed Forces and other government agencies. For instance, in Russia it was the FSB which was mainly responsible for operations in Estonia and Georgia, but subsequently the charter for executing IO shifted to the GRU [4]. In the US, IO is primarily a military responsibility, with the DOD being responsible for CO, EW and PSYOP [5]; Public Diplomacy (PD), on the other hand, is to be conducted primarily by diplomats; the Department of Homeland Security too is responsible for defence of national cyberspace; and PA needs the involvement of the national broadcast media. Thus, nations evolve IO structures which best suit their requirements.

The following considerations dictate that IO in India must be chartered to the Armed Forces:-

• IO are operations in Infospace which need to be synergistically employed by the Armed Forces as part of multi-domain operations (MDO) in a five-dimensional battlespace [6].
• It has been argued elsewhere that offensive cyber operations should primarily be the responsibility of the MoD/ Indian Armed Forces.
• As regards cognitive operations, PSYOP should be purely a military charter, as these operations can only be justified in conflict scenarios (not necessarily hot war). On the other hand, close coordination would be needed with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B Ministry) for PI, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) for SC (MD) and several other ministries for SC (MCO).
• EW and MILDEC are also essentially military activities.

Tri-Service IO Command: Proposed Architecture

In view of the above considerations, the objective over the next few years for the Indian Armed Forces must be to raise a full-fledged tri-service IO Command, which would coordinate the three main components of IO: CO, EW and Cognitive Ops. In such a plan, the three Services would field Group level establishments (the equivalent of PLA bases) subordinate to the IO Command, tasked with actual conduct of operations. Thus, in the realm of CO, while the Army already has an Army Cyber Group, existing cyber resources within the AF and Navy could also be restructured as groups and/ or sub-groups. A dual-control structure is recommended, with part control being exercised through the technical channel (eg, ‘Cyber’ channel), and partly by the respective Service. Such a notional structure is depicted diagrammatically below [7]:-

The above architecture depicts the dual-control structure only with respect to the cyber establishments. The specialist control would extend down to the lowest establishment/ unit. While respective Services would exert the second control channel at the Service HQ level, at Command HQ and below these would be replaced by the respective formation HQ. The nature of the dual-control structure would be dictated by operational requirements as well as the type of IO capability. For example, in the case of cyber operations, the specialist control channel would carry greater weight, while for EW it is the formation command line which would take precedence over the specialist one (the rationale for this distinction is beyond the scope of this work).

Phased Implementation

The above architecture is recommended to be gradually built up in a phased manner, prioritized based on operational requirements. In the entire spectrum of operations which may be conducted in Infospace, Cyber Influence Operations (CIO) conducted by adversaries pose an imminent threat to India’s national security. Countering CIO threats requires the integrated employment of CO and Cognitive Ops capabilities. Therefore, these capabilities need to be enhanced on priority. This would involve upgrading the existing DCA to a Cyber Command, creating cognitive operations capabilities which do not exist as of now and optimizing staff structures for integrated employment of IO resources. These aspects are elaborated upon in the succeeding paragraphs.

IO Staff Structures

It is important that, at all levels, design of staff structures be premised on a clear separation of the CEMA and Cognitive Ops streams of IO. For instance, in the IA, ADG (IW) and ADG (Strategic Communications) should be re-designated ADG (CEMA) and ADG (Cognitive Ops) respectively, with the two verticals merging at the level of DG (IW), which should be re-designated as DG (IO). Separate specialist staff appointments for CEMA and Cognitive Ops are recommended to be created down to Corps HQ.

Cyberspace Operations: Upgrade DCA to Cyber Command

Raising of a Cyber Command has been under consideration since 2012. Keeping in view the final objective of raising the unified IO Command as per the structure discussed above, the DCA needs to be upgraded to a tri-Services Cyber Command at the earliest, primarily for building requisite capability for conducting offensive cyber operations including active defence. As part of this Command, in addition to a Command HQ, cyber units should be raised and deployed down to tactical levels, along with intermediate subordinate Cyber HQ as felt necessary. While at places these Cyber HQ may be inter-Services in composition, Service purity should be maintained at unit level, much like the model which has been adopted by the Signal Intelligence Directorate.

Cyber units should be of two broad flavours: cyber execution units and cyber R&D units, with each of the R&D units focusing in a different area of expertise in support of the execution units. Command & control structures should be put in place in line with the philosophy of ‘centralized control, decentralized execution’, in order to address the disadvantages of deploying offensive cyber resources at multiple echelons. Finally, suitable linkages should be established with EW organisations at all levels for achieving the desired synergy for conduct of CEMA.

As and when an IO Command comes up, HQ Cyber Command would get absorbed into the ‘Cyber Operations’ box of HQ IO Command depicted above. Execution units, under the command of Service HQ and various formations, would be subordinate to the HQ in both scenarios.

Cognitive Operations: Raise Pilot Cognitive Ops Unit

As of now, no PSYOP units/ establishments are in existence. Cognitive operations are being undertaken by non-specialist staff officers posted at various headquarters, thereby resulting in ineffective execution. The only formal structure which exists in support of cognitive operations is the ADG (PI), with the limited charter of media operations. There is an urgent need to raise separate field establishments for conduct of these specialist operations. As a first step, it is recommended that a tri-Service Cognitive Operations Unit be raised, manned by personnel trained in the different cognitive disciplines (PSYOP, PI, MILDEC, CMO). There are several reasons why a tri-Service structure is being proposed here (in contrast to the Cyber vertical), as under:-

• Since there are no Service specific structures in existence, there would be no need for any (disruptive) reorganization.
• Specialist expertise in Cognitive Operations is to be built up from scratch. It would be more economical to create a common tri-Service training establishment catering for all the cognitive disciplines.
• Execution of cognitive operations arguably requires a higher degree of coordination amongst the three Services as compared to CEMA.

Based on experience gained with the pilot unit, additional cognitive ops units/ formations may be created in subsequent phases.

EW: Boost Strength and Modernize

Existing EW formations/ units/ establishments are recommended to be upgraded to a state-of-the-art equipment profile and new formations/ units raised to fill existing voids.

Final Phase: Amalgamation of Bricks

In the final phase, a HQ IO Command would be raised, into which the existing Cyber Command as well as Cognitive Ops and EW formations/ units would be amalgamated, leading to a potent tri-Service IO Command.

Conclusion

This work has endeavoured to analyse the changing nature of warfare in the Information Age, wherein inter-state conflicts are increasingly shifting from the physical (kinetic) to the virtual (information and cognitive) domains, in the process blurring the boundaries between peace and war. It has highlighted the enhanced threat posed by China in Infospace and Space domains consequent to the creation of the PLA SSF. Against this backdrop, this article has explored India’s response options for developing requisite capability to engage effectively in Infospace conflicts. Towards this end, the relative pros and cons of the PLA ‘Force’ model vis-à-vis the US ‘Command’ Model have been analysed and a conclusion reached that while the former is more optimally structured, the latter is better suited in the Indian context.

The work advocates the creation of a tri-Service IO Command over the next few years. A dual-command architecture for the IO Command has been proposed and a roadmap presented for upgrading and amalgamating existing IO resources together with new raisings into the IO Command in a phased manner. For space operations, upgradation of the DSA to a full-fledged Aerospace Command has been recommended, but not its organisational integration with the IO Command.

It is time for the Indian Armed Forces to take serious note of the strategic potential of grey zone conflicts in 21st Century geopolitics and shore up our capabilities in conformance with India’s aspirations to be looked upon as a regional superpower.

References

(1)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Existing IW Structures), Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(2)     Snehesh Alex Philip, Why Army wants a new Deputy Chief and Director General at its Headquarters, The Print, 04 Dec 2020, Accessed 23 Dec 2020.

(3)     Defence Space Agency, Wikipedia, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(4)     Bilyana Lilly and Joe Cheravitch, The Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces, 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict/ 2020, NATO CCDCOE Publications, Tallinn, pp. 139-146, Accessed 01 Dec 2020.

(5)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – Strategies and Capabilities of Major Players (Part I) (Section: United States: Pioneers in IO), Future Wars, 18 Nov 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(6)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, 21st Century Warfare: From “Battlefield” to “Battlespace” (Section: Warfighting Domains: Five-Dimensional Construct), Future Wars, 18 Nov 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(7)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part II) [Section on Proposed IO/ CIO Structures], Future Wars, 08 Dec 2020, Accesses 13 Jan 2021.