Sections

Introduction

Infospace: The Fifth Domain of Warfare

The PLA Strategic Support Force

The US IO Organisations

References

Introduction

Major world powers have been quick to recognise the changing nature of warfare in the 21st Century, wherein the arena of warfighting is gradually shifting from kinetic conflicts in the physical realm to grey zone operations in the information and cognitive realms.

The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created in 2016 as part of the reforms to carry out a major restructuring of the PLA. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century. Russia has demonstrated the most noteworthy strategic effects in Infospace, by conducting dramatic information operations (IO) in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2015 onwards), in addition to its alleged interference in US presidential elections (2016) and France (2017) [1]. The US takes credit for being a pioneer in the conceptualization of IO, maturing their doctrinal thought in this area over a decade and a half commencing in the late 1990s. It went on to be the first to raise a Cyber Command in 2010, a Space Command in 2019 and holds significant resources for the conduct of psychological operations.

Against the backdrop of such agility demonstrated by major world powers in coming to grips with the changing character of modern warfare, it is imperative for India to introspect and assess whether our current efforts so far towards developing non-kinetic warfare capabilities are commensurate with our geopolitical aspirations.

This two-part series outlines a roadmap for creating an Indian IO Command. Towards this end, it first discusses the defining characteristics of IO and analyses the organizational models for information forces adopted by China and the US with the aim of determining IO structures best suited for India. It concludes that while the PLA SSF model is more optimally structured, the US ‘Command’ model is better suited in the Indian context. Thereafter, it reviews IO capabilities currently in existence with the Indian Armed Forces and presents a phased ‘bricks and clay approach’ for upgrading these to a full-fledged IO Command.

Infospace: The Fifth Domain of Warfare

Five-Dimensional Battlespace

Several modern militaries have recognized the Information Age battlespace as comprising of five domains, namely, land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. These domains are also sometimes referred to as spheres or dimensions of warfare, which collectively are the arena for multi-domain operations (MDO). Warfighting expertise has traditionally been grounded in the physical domains of land, sea and air, and military forces almost universally structured as the Army, Navy and Air Force, corresponding to these domains. While the term dimension refers to the conceptual facet of this five-dimensional battlespace, the term ‘domain’ implies jurisdiction and resources associated with each dimension. Thus, for instance, giving cyberspace the status of a warfighting domain in military doctrine is not merely an academic construct but mandates the creation of a dedicated ‘force’ for conducting cyber warfare [2].

Infospace and Information Operations

The cyberspace dimension requires further elaboration. An analysis of military literature will reveal that this term, however ill-defined, captures the virtual (non-physical) constituent of the modern battlespace. In the author’s opinion, this virtual dimension is widely understood as comprising of information at rest or in motion and thus is better represented by the term Infospace [3]. IO are means for achieving information supremacy and comprise of three types of warfighting capabilities: electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare/ operations (CO) and psychological warfare, which play out in the physical, information and cognitive realms respectively. These capabilities may be distinguished from each other by the weapons and targets associated with them, as tabulated below:-

In the balance of this work, in the context of a five-dimensional battlespace, the term Infospace is preferred over Cyberspace for denoting the virtual arena where full spectrum IO are conducted, in isolation or as part of MDO. Also, the term Cognitive Operations (Cognitive Ops), rather than Psychological Operations will be used to denote the full playout of IO in the cognitive domain, for reasons elaborated upon in the next sub-section.

The IO Hierarchy

The different types of IO capabilities may further be classified into two streams: Information Technical Operations and Cognitive Ops. Information Technical Operations, comprising of CO and EW, are also referred to as Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) [4]. Cognitive Ops comprise several distinct IO capabilities, with the foremost amongst them being psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs/ public information (PA/ PI), military deception (MILDEC) and strategic communication (SC). The hierarchy of IO capabilities may be depicted diagrammatically as under [5]:-

Cognitive Ops

While the connotations of CEMA are generally well understood, the same is not the case with Cognitive Ops. A proper treatment of various Cognitive Ops capabilities is beyond the scope of this work and the reader is referred elsewhere for a more detailed treatment [6]. However, a very brief description of the main IO capabilities which come under the ambit of Cognitive Ops is as under:-

• PSYOP. PSYOP, as an abbreviation for psychological operations, is a US DOD term which is defined as follows: planned operations to convey selected information (not necessarily truthful) and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviour of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals [7]. A narrower conception, relevant to combat scenarios, describes psychological operations as those which are meant to target the adversary’s combat forces with the objective of inducing fear and reluctance or refusal to fight [8]. In the broadest usage of this term in the literature, psychological operations refer to all hues of cognitive operations. Indian doctrine prefers the abbreviation Psy Ops, with a connotation very similar to the US definition. This work uses the term PSYOP and implies the US definition.
• PI. These are actions aimed at informing foreign (hostile, neutral and friendly) as well as domestic audiences, and increasingly world opinion, with the objective of diminishing support for the adversary regime and generating support for own objectives [9]. The PI function mostly executes its missions through media of all types.
• MILDEC. MILDEC may be characterized as actions executed during military campaigns to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission [10]. In another view of a similar notion, camouflage, deception and subterfuge are the means to create a false understanding on the part of an adversary of the physical, electronic or cognitive environments [11].
• SC. For the purpose of this work, SC implies two types of cognitive operations which are not covered within the ambit of PSYOP, PI or MILDEC, namely, Military Diplomacy (MD) and Civil Military Operations (CMO).

This work advocates that use of the terms Perception Management and Psychological Operations as umbrella terms instead of Cognitive Ops should be avoided, mainly due of their negative overtones, but also because their literal meanings do not adequately cover the scope of all operations in the cognitive domain envisaged to be conducted by the Indian Armed Forces [12]. On the other hand, the term Cognitive Ops appears to be a good choice, since all disciplines which it is intended to represent (PSYOP, PI, MILDEC and SC) are essentially information operations in the cognitive domain.

The table below captures the main distinguishing features of these four Cognitive Ops capabilities:-

Considerations for Organization Design

It is important to understand that there is a fundamental difference between CEMA and Cognitive Ops streams of IO, as making such a distinction impinges on operational, organizational and training issues.

CEMA capabilities (CO and EW) have their theoretical foundations in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). In general, the CO function is an order of magnitude more complex than EW from the point of view of training. On the other hand, equipment sophistication in EW is much higher. Although developing expertise for both CO and EW is based on foundation ICT disciplines, specialisation in these follow distinctly divergent paths. The degree of specialisation needed in both cases is very high, with Offensive CO occupying the highest rung on the specialisation ladder.

In contrast, the Cognitive Ops practitioner needs to have a grounding in the social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, political science, history, etc. The PI and SC functions require expertise in mass communication, journalism and public relations as well. Here again, all areas require special expertise well beyond the foundation courses in social sciences, which needs to be honed through specialist training, as well as ‘on the job’ exposures over multiple tenures in specific military environments.

The above considerations dictate that at the execution unit level, organizational purity must be maintained for the three primary IO functions of CO, EW and Cognitive Ops. Within the ambit of Cognitive Ops, the functions characterized by ‘deceit/ lies’ (PSYOP/ MILDEC) must be kept sufficiently isolated from activities which rely on truth and positive messaging (PI/ SC), from considerations of credibility. Integrated employment of two or more IO capabilities for achieving an IO objective is best carried out through staff coordination and/ or mission oriented multi-disciplinary teams.

The Space and Infospace Dimensions: A Symbiotic Relationship

At this point in time, the Space segment fulfills three primary functions: provision of communications (facilitating information flow), geolocation (information about location) and ISR (information about adversary forces). The advent of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, both co-orbital and earth-based, have introduced an element of kinetic warfare into the space segment. Nevertheless, space is still not considered an arena of warfare in the same sense the other four dimensions are, ie, land, sea and air dimensions are for kinetic operations, and Infospace for IO. Rather, it may be better perceived as a non-terrestrial sub-stratum for Infospace.

Due to this symbiotic relationship between Space and Infospace, there is merit in striving for organizational synergy between military capabilities in these two dimensions, as has been achieved to a large extent in the case of the PLA SSF.

The PLA Strategic Support Force

Concept

The PLA SSF is a force which has been created, or rather restructured mostly from within existing resources, to conduct strategic operations in Infospace. The scope of its charter covers all the three primary components of IO as discussed above, namely, CO, EW and Cognitive Ops. In addition, a significant part of space operations is also included in its charter.

One of the key Chinese warfighting concepts which the SSF operationalizes is Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) [13], which directly corresponds with the CEMA component of IO, ie, the integrated employment of CO and EW. The Cognitive Ops paradigm finds resonance with the Chinese Three Warfares concept, which comprises of Psychological Warfare, Legal Warfare and Public Opinion Warfare [14], which may be briefly described as follows:-

• Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. As such, this component corresponds to the PSYOP function discussed above.
• Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. Media Warfare, as applicable to military operations, corresponds to the PI function.
• Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. Legal Warfare does not correspond to any of the four Cognitive Ops functions discussed above.

An analysis of the resources allocated to the SSF suggests that it operationalises the PSYOP and PI functions. It is not evident from available literature whether MILDEC at the strategic level is also tasked to the SSF, or whether this capability is purely the domain of the Regional Commands. Similarly, the literature is silent on whether the SSF is involved in SC, conceptualised in this work as comprising of MD and CMO.

By restructuring its strategic IO resources under the SSF, the PLA has achieved two levels of integration: firstly, the ‘attack’ (information destruction, denial, corruption) and ‘exploit’ (information stealth/ interception) capabilities have been brought under the same department; and secondly, almost all strategic IO capabilities spanning the Space and Infospace domains have been organised as a single force. This high degree of integration is expected to enormously increase the potency of available resources.

More significantly, raising the SSF as a separate force at par with the PLA’s Army, Navy and Air Force components is emphatic evidence that the PLA now considers Infospace as a warfighting domain in its own right. It has also underscored the importance, in Chinese strategic thought, of bringing space capabilities under military jurisdiction.

Organisation

The SSF comprises of two operational departments, namely, the Space Systems Department (SSD) and the Network Systems Department (NSD). The former controls nearly every aspect of PLA space operations, including space launch and support; telemetry, tracking, and control; information support; and space warfare, while the latter is responsible for cyber, electronic and psychological warfare. In addition, amongst its first-level departments, the SSF has a standard four-department administrative structure that includes the SSF Staff Department, Equipment Department, Political Work Department, and a Logistics Department. Administratively, the SSF operates in a manner which is similar to the PLA Second Artillery Force (restructured now as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)), with its strategic capabilities directly under the control of the CMC. Functional responsibilities of the SSD and NSD are depicted diagrammatically below [15]:-

The SSD and the NSD function mostly independently, and although the Staff Department serves as the operational headquarters of the SSF, all three departments have the same grade. Such an arrangement is possibly adopted to enable the SSD and NSD to independently prioritize and develop their cadre, capabilities, training programs and other force needs, and at the same time allow the CMC to integrate their missions whenever such a need arises.

Under the respective departments, the SSF appears to be organized as bases, many of which existed as part of the pre-reform structure. For instance, five of the former General Armament Department (GAD) test bases responsible for space operations have been transferred to the SSF, as is also the case with the 311 Base, China’s Three Warfares base known to have the exclusive mandate for psychological operations, which was earlier under the General Political Department (GPD). A new base, called the SSF 35th Base, is also learnt to have been created for space operations such as survey, mapping and navigation missions as well as management of the Beidou satellites [16].

The SSF has so far been created using a “bricks, not clay approach” wherein, instead of raising it from scratch, existing organisations and their component parts have been renamed, re-subordinated and moved, and their command relationships redefined. In the future, raising additional organisations in support of its role can very well be expected, and is possibly already underway.

The SSF is structured to conduct essentially strategic IO, while the five theatre commands have their integral IO resources as well for supporting operations at the operational and tactical levels, although not much information about these is available in the open domain. Some form of control over theatre resources from the apex level is likely to be in place, especially in the CO and Cognitive Ops verticals. Notably, the Intelligence function is handled by the Joint Staff Department’s Information and Communications Bureau (JSD-ICB) and does not come under the ambit of the SSF.

Finally, the PLA SSF (together with the PLA RF) differs from the three Services in another significant aspect: while the Services are responsible for force construction and actual fighting is the domain of theatre commands, the SSF is vested with the responsibility for force construction as well as conduct of operations and is therefore organizationally a hybrid between a force and a service.

As per information available in the open domain, the IO resources placed under the NSD are depicted diagrammatically below:-

The Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRBs) are known to be responsible for cyber exploit/ espionage and signal intelligence (SIGINT) missions. Elements integral to the erstwhile GSD’s Fourth Department trained for cyber-attack missions have also perhaps been integrated into the TRBs. The 56th, 57th and 58th Research Institutes (RIs) are known to possess the R&D and weaponization expertise for cyber operations as well as SIGINT missions, while the 54th RI is responsible for R&D on electronic attack and offensive cyber operations. For Cognitive Ops, the erstwhile GPD has taken the form of the new CMC Political Work Department, while the 311 Base has been shifted to the SSF. Within the SSF, although the location of the 311 Base is not confirmed, it is expected to be either under the SSF Political Work Department or, more likely, under the NSD.

The US IO Organisations

Cyber Operations

The US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is one of the eleven unified commands of the DOD, which has Component Commands provided by the each of the four Services, namely, the Army Cyber Command, the Fleet Cyber Command (10th Fleet), the 16th Air Force and the Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.

The US Cyber Command achieved initial operational capability in 2010 as a component of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). It comprises of 133 Cyber Mission Teams with a total strength of 6200 personnel. A good proportion of these teams are distributed amongst the geographical commands to be deployed at operational and tactical levels. In Aug 2018, the Cyber Command was upgraded to the status of a unified combatant command [17].

Electronic Warfare

DOD has several organizations responsible for developing and maintaining EW capabilities. The EW Executive Committee, led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is tasked with synchronizing and integrating EW across DOD components by sharing tactics, techniques, procedures, intelligence, and technologies. However, in the case of special operations, EW capabilities are coordinated by the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) [18]. The EW EXCOM is responsible for establishing DOD EW policy.

The congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission has stated that the US is losing its advantages in EW vis-à-vis China and Russia, hindering the nation’s ability to conduct military operations against capable adversaries. The Commission recommended increasing EW investments and developing new concepts to regain US military advantage.

The FY-2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandated the creation of an Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cross Functional Team to develop an electronic warfare strategy leading to an acquisition plan. The Cross Functional Team released the Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy in Oct 2020.

Psychological Operations

The DOD active components mandated to carry out psychological operations are placed under the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These components are the 4th & 8th Psychological Operations Groups, each comprising of 3-4 Psychological Operations battalions. There are several reserve components tasked to carry out psychological operations, which are part of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps does not have any component with the sole charter related to psychological operations, either as active or reserve components.

Space Operations

US Space Command (USSPACECOM) is a unified combatant command of the US DOD, responsible for military operations in outer space. US Space Command was originally created in September 1985 to provide joint command and control for the US Armed Forces in outer space but was inactivated in 2002. US Space Command was re-established in Aug 2019, due to an increased focus on military space operations.

US Space Command has two subordinate components. While the Combined Force Space Component Command uses “space assets to provide effects to the warfighting units across the globe, the Joint Task Force-Space Defense has the responsibility to protect and defend space assets from both terrestrial and space-based threats [19].

The overall structure of US IO organisations is depicted diagrammatically below and briefly explained in subsequent paragraphs:-

[Continued in “Infospace Wars: Towards an Indian Information Operations Command (Part II)”]

References

(1)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – Strategies and Capabilities of Major Players (Part I) [Section on Russia: Dramatic Successes in CIO], Future Wars, 17 Nov 2020, Accesses 13 Jan 2021.

(2)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part I: Concepts and Doctrine [Section on IW in 21st Century Battlespace], Future Wars, 31 Mar 2020, Accesses 13 Jan 2021,

(3)     Ibid.

(4)     Field Manual 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 12 Feb 2014, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(5)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures [Section on Proposed IW Structures], Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accesses 14 Jan 2021.

(6)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part I) [Section on Proposed Doctrines: Conceptual Underpinnings], Future Wars, 08 Dec 2020, Accessed 13 Jan 2021.

(7)     Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, US DOD, 27 Nov 2012 (20 Nov 2014), pp. II-9, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(8)     Peter Nicholson, Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain, Security Challenges Vol 2 No 1, 2006, pp. 140, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(9)     Joint Publication 3-61: Public Affairs, US DOD, 17 Nov 2015 (19 Aug 2016), Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(10)   Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US DOD, 08 Nov 2010 (15 Feb 2016), pp. 152, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(11)  Peter Nicholson, Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain, Security Challenges Vol 2 No 1, 2006, pp. 140, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(12)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part I) [Section on Proposed Doctrines: Conceptual Underpinnings], …..

(13)   Col Deepak Sharma, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare: China’s New Concept of Information Warfare, Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA, New Delhi, Vol IV, No 2, Apr 2010, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(14)   Elsa B Kania, The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares, Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 13, 22 Aug 2016 2016, pp. 10-14, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(15)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I: Concept, Organisation and Space Operations [Section on Organisation], Future Wars, 09 Jun 2020, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(16)   John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, Washington, National Defence University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, No 13, Oct 2018, pp. 17.

(17)   United States Cyber Command, Wikipedia, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(18)   US DOD Directive 3222.04: EW Policy, 26 Mar 2014 (updated 2018), Accessed 14 Jan 2021.

(19)   United States Space Command, Wikipedia, Accessed 14 Jan 2021.