Sections

Organisations

Militarisation of Space

India’s Space Security

Commercialisation of Space

References

[The following is the second part of a talk which was given virtually on 25 May 2021 at the United Services Institution of India to its faculty, and undergraduate and postgraduate students taking part in a summer internship programme at the Institution. The first part covered spacecraft, launchers and exploration aspects. This concluding part gives an insight into organisations, the NewSpace phenomenon, the militarisation of space including capabilities of global space powers, and a brief overview of India’s space security policy and capabilities.]

Organisations

DOS and ISRO

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is India’s national space agency, headquartered in Bengaluru. It operates under Department of Space (DOS) which is directly overseen by the prime minister of India. ISRO is the primary agency in India to perform tasks related to space-based applications, space exploration and development of related technologies. It is one of six government space agencies in the world which possess full launch capabilities, deploy cryogenic engines, launch extra-terrestrial missions and operate large fleets of artificial satellites.

To trace its history, the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was established under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 1962. INCOSPAR grew and became ISRO in 1969, within the DAE. In 1972, the Government of India set up a Space Commission and the Department of Space (DOS), bringing ISRO under the DOS. Since then, it has been managed by the DOS, which governs various other institutions in India in the domain of astronomy and space technology.

ISRO is one of the largest space agencies in the world. It has completed 111 spacecraft missions, 80 launch missions and has placed in orbit 342 foreign satellites from 34 countries so far. ISRO’s launch systems have earned the reputation of being amongst the most reliable and cost-effective solutions in the world [1].

Antrix

Antrix Corporation Limited (ACL), Bengaluru is a wholly owned Government of India (GoI) enterprise under the administrative control of the DOS. Antrix was set up in 1992 as a marketing arm of ISRO for commercial exploitation of space products and transfer of technologies developed by ISRO. Another major objective was to facilitate development of space related industrial capabilities in India.

Antrix is engaged in providing space products and services to international customers worldwide. Antrix provides end-to-end solutions for many of the space products, ranging from simple subsystems to a complex spacecraft; space related services including remote sensing data service; transponder lease service; launch services; mission support services including establishment of ground infrastructure; and a host of consultancy and training services [2, 3].

Space India Limited (NSIL)

NSIL was set up by the DOS in March 2019. It aims to boost the growth of the Indian industry by taking up more technologically advanced space-related work. Its charter is to empower the industry in India. It facilitates transfer of technology from ISRO to the industry; provision of launch services for customer satellites; manufacture of SSLVs in collaboration with the private sector; production of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) through industry; and production and marketing of space-based services [4].

In general, while Antrix will facilitate ISRO’s commercial deals with foreign customers, NSIL will handle capacity building of local industry for space manufacturing.

Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Center (In-SPACe)

IN-SPACe is an independent nodal agency under Department of Space, establishment of which was announced as recently as Jun 2020. It is meant to act as a facilitator and regulator for Non-Governmental Private Entities (NGPEs). A licensing, authorisation, and supervisory regime for space activities has been put in place through IN-SPACe, as required vide the Outer Space Treaty, which India ratified in 1982 [5].

Mission Support Infrastructure

There are several establishments of ISRO which provide different services for satellite missions. Some of the major ones are [6]:-

• Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh is the only spaceport of India.
• Master Control Facility at Hassan in Karnataka and Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh monitor and control all the communication and navigation satellites.
• National Remote Sensing Centre at Hyderabad manages the remote sensing satellites, including dissemination of data.
• ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network, Bengaluru is entrusted with providing tracking support for all the satellite and launch vehicle missions.

Research and Educational Institutes

There are a number of research and academic institutes which provide design, development, and capacity building support to ISRO, such as the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram, the Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre at Trivandrum, Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad, amongst several others. The Indian Institute of Remote Sensing (IIRS) at Dehradun is a premier institute for capacity building in Remote Sensing through postgraduate programmes.

Defence Space Agency (DSA)

In June 2010, India established an Integrated Space Cell, within the Integrated Defence Headquarters, to look after defense-specific space capability requirements. Soon thereafter, the Naresh Chandra Task Force, set up in 2011 to revisit the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, recommended the creation of an Aerospace Command. The DSA is a downsized version of the Aerospace Command and was approved by Prime Minister in Sep 2018. The Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre in Bhopal were subsumed by the DSA [7].

The DSA is headquartered in Bengaluru and is manned by about 200 personnel from all the three Services of the Indian Armed Forces. Its charter is to operate systems for protecting Indian interests in outer space and to deal with potential space wars. The agency also has the responsibility of developing a space warfare strategy.

Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA)

The Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA) is the scientific organisation responsible for developing space-warfare systems and technologies for the DSA. The DSRA was approved by the GoI in June 2019. It is composed of scientists who undertake research and development in close coordination with the Armed Forces. Various types of anti-satellite weapon systems are currently under development [8].

Militarisation of Space

From a security perspective, an increasing number of countries are relying on space to enhance their military capabilities and national security, by developing counter-space capabilities that can be used to provide them military advantages in this new warfighting domain. I will now give you all an insight into the nature of counter-space capabilities which are being pursued globally; the expertise achieved by major world powers; and finally, the Indian perspective and capability status in this area.

Counter-Space Capabilities

Counter-space capabilities are of four types: kinetic physical counter-space weapons; non-kinetic physical counter-space weapons; electronic counter-space weapons; and cyber weapons [9].

Kinetic Physical Counter-Space Weapons. These are weapons which attempt to strike directly or detonate a warhead near a satellite or ground station. The three main forms of kinetic physical attack are direct-ascent ASAT weapons, co-orbital ASAT weapons, and ground station attacks. Direct-ascent ASAT weapons are launched from Earth to strike a satellite in orbit, while co-orbital ASAT weapons are first placed into orbit and then later maneuvered into or near their intended target. Attacks on ground stations are target sites responsible for command and control of satellites. Kinetic physical attacks tend to cause irreversible damage to the systems affected and demonstrate a strong show of force that would likely be attributable and publicly visible. A successful kinetic-physical attack in space produces orbital debris, which can indiscriminately affect other satellites in similar orbits. Four countries, namely, the United States, Russia, China, and India, have successfully tested direct-ascent ASAT weapons.

Non-Kinetic Physical Counter-Space Weapons. These are weapons which have physical effects on satellites or ground systems without making physical contact. Lasers can be used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the sensors on satellites. High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can disrupt a satellite’s electronics or cause permanent damage to electronic circuits. A nuclear device detonated in space can create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would have indiscriminate effects on satellites in orbit. These attacks operate at the speed of light and are more difficult to attribute. Lasers and HPM weapons may be mounted on ground, ship, or airborne platforms, as also other satellites. A laser can be effective against a sensor on a satellite if it is within the field of view of the sensor, making it possible to attribute the attack to its approximate geographical origin. HPM attacks can be more difficult to attribute because the attack can come from a variety of angles, including from other satellites passing by in orbit. The use of a nuclear weapon in space would likely be attributable and publicly visible. The detonation of nuclear weapons in space, however, is banned under the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Electronic Counter-Space Weapons. These are weapons which target the usage of electromagnetic spectrum for data transmission through jamming. An uplink jammer interferes with the signal going from Earth to a satellite, while downlink jammers target the signal from a satellite to users on Earth. In both cases, it is the receiver which is targeted. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack where the attacker tricks a receiver into believing that a fake signal produced by the attacker is the real signal. A spoofer can be used to inject false information into a data stream or could even issue false commands to a satellite. Electronic forms of attack can be difficult to detect or distinguish from accidental interference, making attribution more difficult. Both jamming and spoofing are reversible forms of attack because once they are turned off, communications can return to normal. The technology needed to jam and spoof is commercially available and inexpensive, making it relatively easy to proliferate among state and non-state actors.

Cyber Weapons. Cyberattacks target the data itself and the systems that use, transmit, and control the flow of data. These attacks can target ground stations, end-user equipment, or the satellites themselves. While cyberattacks require a high degree of understanding of the systems being targeted, they do not necessarily require significant resources to conduct. The barrier to entry is relatively low and cyberattacks can be contracted out to private groups or individuals. Accurate and timely attribution of a cyberattack can be difficult because attackers can use a variety of methods to conceal their identity.

Global Space Powers

United States. The US has conducted multiple tests for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both LEO and GEO that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. It has operational midcourse missile defense interceptors that have been demonstrated in an ASAT role against low LEO satellites. The US has an operational EW offensive counter-space system, which is deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary communications satellites. It also has the capability to jam global navigation satellite services (GPS, GLONASS, Beidou) within a local area of operation. Over the past several decades, the US has conducted significant R&D on the use of ground-based high energy lasers for counter-space and other purposes. It has evolved doctrine and policy on counter-space capabilities over several decades, although not always publicly expressed. Its setting up of the Space Force in 2019 demonstrates the determination of the US to maintain its domination in this new warfighting domain [10].

China. There is strong evidence to indicate that China is making a sustained effort to develop a broad range of counter-space capabilities. Like the US, it has conducted multiple tests of technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. China dramatically demonstrated DA-ASAT capability in 2007 by destroying a satellite in polar orbit at an altitude of 865 kms. China likely has significant electronic warfare (EW) counter-space capabilities against navigation and communication satellites and is also assessed to be developing directed energy weapons (DEW) for counter-space use. Setting up of Space Segment Department under newly raised PLA Strategic Support Force is a major organisational transformation carried out by China towards militarisation of space [11].

Russia. There are strong indicators that Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO especially over the last couple of years. It is almost certainly capable of some limited DA-ASAT operations. Russia has operational experience in the use of counter-space EW capabilities from recent military campaigns. Russian ground-based satellite laser ranging facilities could be used to dazzle the sensors of optical imagery satellites. The Russian Space Forces are a branch of the Russian Aerospace Forces which are chartered to defend its space assets and secure its interests in this domain [12, 13].

India’s Space Security

Policy

Shifts in India’s Position on Militarisation of Space. India’s traditional approach to outer space emphasized non-militarization of space. However, this began to change in the early 2000s, driven by the evolving security threats that India faced, especially in relation to Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s acquisition of ballistic missiles has led India to pursue ballistic missile defenses. In addition, China’s first successful ASAT test in January 2007 suddenly made India’s space-based assets vulnerable. As a result, India is beginning to have a much more determined approach to how it wants to protect its space assets and develop its own ASAT capability as a deterrent [14].

Growing Synergies between Space Initiatives and the Indian Security Establishments. Some concrete actions have been taken by India to integrate its space program more fully with military. I have already talked about the Integrated Space Cell, the DSA and the DSRA. In a first, India conducted a space security table-top war game called IndSpaceEx in July 2019, which was attended by stakeholders from the military and the scientific establishment. The Ministry of Home Affairs has also established the Space and Technology Cell to monitor border areas to check for intrusion from Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s expanding nuclear weapons program has also prompted India to develop suitable space-based assets for surveillance of Pakistan’s nuclear forces.

International Partnerships. The growing competition with China is leading to greater cooperation between India and a number of space powers in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, Australia, and France, all of whom feel threatened by China. These partnerships are likely to gather greater momentum given the recent aggressive stance adopted by China in its neighbourhood and beyond [15].

Military Space Assets

India currently has 15 operational remote sensing satellites which can be used for civil as well as military purposes. RISAT-2 has a day-night, all-weather monitoring capability with one-metre resolution. The CARTOSAT-2 with a camera in the visible region is a dedicated satellite for the Indian Armed Forces. Because of its high agility, it can be steered to facilitate imaging of any area at short notice. The Indian Navy uses GSAT-7, launched in 2013, for real-time communication among its warships, submarines, aircraft, and land systems. GSAT-7A or ‘angry bird’, an advanced military communications satellite, was launched in December 2018 and is being utilised by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army (IA) on a 70:30 sharing basis. For the IAF, it facilitates enhanced network-centric warfare capabilities by interlinking the ground radar network and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. In the IA, it is used by the Aviation Corps and some other elements. GSAT-6A was launched in 2018 for the Indian Armed Forces but communication with it were lost before it reached its orbit. GSAT-32 is planned as its replacement. Electromagnetic Intelligence-gathering Satellite (EMISAT) was launched in Apr 2019 to detect enemy radar signatures. In all, India has 14 satellites with military applications [16].

Counter-Space Weapons

I shall now provide a brief overview of India’s counter-space weapon capabilities [17, 18].

Kinetic Physical. India conducted a successful direct-ascent ASAT test in March 2019. As per Chairman DRDO, while this test was conducted at a low altitude to limit space debris, the missile system used in the test was capable of reaching most satellites in LEO. He also stated that India is working on technologies related to co-orbital weapons.

Non- Kinetic Physical. In late 2020, Chairman DRDO announced a program for the development of high-energy lasers and high-powered microwaves which could be adapted as counter-space weapons. India reportedly has two laser-based weapon systems capable of striking short range aerial targets such as drones by jamming command and control links.

Electronic. India has indigenously developed the fully mobile Samyukta EW system, which is capable of jamming communications and radar signals over a wide range of frequencies. Himshakti, another such system, is the most recent electronic warfare system in India’s arsenal, capable of jamming frequencies over 10,000 square kilometres. India reportedly jammed Pakistani radars and communications during the 2019 Balakot airstrike.

Cyber. As the country’s cyber capabilities grow, its most frequent targets are the governments of Pakistan and China. However, there is no evidence to indicate that India has tested or employed its cyber capabilities against space systems.

Commercialisation of Space

In India, space activities have traditionally been driven by the government to meet national needs with high focus on self-reliance and security. Commercial activities till recently were driven by ISRO through its commercial arm, Antrix Corporation, closely regulated and controlled by the Department of Space (DOS). However, with the setting up of the NSIL and IN-SPACe, commercial activities are bound to get a fillip, which today account for merely about 2% of the $360 billion global space economy. This is intended to be achieved by incentivising private players to participate across the space value chain [19].

ISRO is currently working to bring in more private industry participation in both launch systems and satellite manufacturing, in order to build capacity and reach its designated targets and goals. India has a large base of Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs) involved in supplying parts and components for satellite and launch vehicle manufacturing, contracted by ISRO for meeting its demands. Over the last four decades, an ecosystem of approximately 500 Indian companies has been developed. As per ISRO, 80% of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) production is outsourced to private industries, while in the case of major satellite missions such as the Mars Orbiter Mission (MoM), over 120 companies contributed to manufacturing [20]. In recent times, ISRO has adopted public private partnership policies to encourage companies to take up more production activities rather than being merely part/ component manufacturers. ISRO has also built a facility spread over 25 acres in Bengaluru where the amenities have been set up for use by the industry [21].

As already brought out, while Antrix handles ISRO’s commercial deals for satellites and launch vehicles with foreign customers, NSIL is chartered to deal with capacity building of local industry for space manufacturing, although there is considerable overlap in the functions of these two public sector entities. IN-SPACe has been set up to act as a single-point interface between ISRO and everyone who wants to participate in space-related activities, by regulating space activities and facilitating usage of ISRO facilities by NGPEs (non-government private entities). It will also handhold and guide the private industries in space activities through incentives and a friendly regulatory environment.

The GoI has released a draft Spacecom Policy-2020 in Oct 2020, which seeks to foster promotion of Indian industry as a co-traveller along with DOS towards meeting the growing demands of space-based communication [22].

With these initiatives, private industry including start-ups in the country should be able to leapfrog by piggy-backing on five decades of experience and expertise gathered by ISRO, and come up with offerings that complement the efforts of ISRO. This would empower them to integrate into the global space supply chain and compete internationally.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me summarise what we have covered during the course of this lecture on India’s Space Program. After an initial brief explanation of the different types of orbits, namely the GEO, LEO, MEO and Polar/ SSO, I gave you a tour of ISRO’s commendable achievements over the years in the three main types of space applications, ie, earth observation, communications, and navigation, as also the different types of launch vehicles which ISRO has developed, primarily the SLV, PSLV and the GSLV. We then saw a brief glimpse at India’s exploration missions, ie, the Chandrayaan and Mangalyaan, and also went over some of its future development and exploration plans. I introduced you to the primary government organisations involved in developing its space sector which, apart from ISRO, include the DOS, Antrix, NSIL, IN-SPACe, DSA, DSRA and several other establishments providing mission support services as well as R&D support. Finally, we discussed two important facets of the space sector, namely the militarisation of space including India’s initiatives in this important area, and the equally relevant aspect of commercialisation of the space sector, highlighting the increasingly important role of private industry in this sector.

I hope you have found this exposure useful. If you have any questions, I shall be happy to take them on.

 

References

(1)      Organisation Structure, ISRO, DOS, Government of India, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(2)      About Antrix, Antrix Website, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(3)      Antrix Corporation Limited, ISRO, DOS, Government of India, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(4)      Mandate, NewSpace India Ltd Website, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(5)      Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe): Roles and Responsibilities, ISRO, DOS, GoI, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(6)      Organisation Structure, ISRO, DOS, Government of India, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(7)      Defence Space Agency, Wikipedia, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(8)      Ibid.

(9)      Space Threat Assessment 2021, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Apr 2021, pp. 3-4, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(10)     Global Counterspace Capabilities: Executive Summary, Secure World Foundation, Apr 2021, pp. xix-xx, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(11)     Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

(12)     Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.

(13)     Space Threat Assessment 2021, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Apr 2021, pp. 8-16, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(14)     Rajeshwari P Rajagopalan, India’s Space Program: International Competition and Evaluation, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Centre for Asian Studies, Dec 2019, pp. 21-22, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(15)      Ibid. pp. 23-24.

(16)     Air Mshl Anil Chopra, Militarisation of Space: Imperatives for India, Indian Defence Review, 15 Oct 2020, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(17)     Space Threat Assessment 2021, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Apr 2021, pp. 25, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(18)     Global Counterspace Capabilities: India, Secure World Foundation, Apr 2021, pp. 5.1-5.7, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(19)     Preparing to Scale New Heights: Enhancing Private Participation in India’s Commercial Space Sector, PwC, Jan 2020, pp. 11, Accessed 16 Jul 2021.

(20)     Ibid., pp. 9.

(21)     Dinakar Peri, ISRO Opens Doors to Private Sector, The Hindu, 20 Nov 2017, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.

(22)     Draft Spacecom Policy – 2020, Department of Space, Government of India, Accessed 17 Jul 2021.