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Agile and Responsive Organisational Structures

Defence Services: Introspect and Transform, or be Doomed

References

[This piece is in continuation to “Transformative Approach with Indian Armed Forces as Pivot – Part II”, which covered importance of technology, strategic guidance and existing structural shortcomings]

Agile and Responsive Organisational Structures

In the previous section it was brought out that present organisational structures within the Armed Forces tasked with steering indigenous defence R&D include major establishments such as the DGIS and WESEE, various PMOs which have been raised to manage specific large scale projects, and staff establishments such as the ADB. These organisations suffer from a non-specialist culture and are inadequately structured for giving the necessary impetus to defence innovation.

A previous section on national strategy for defence innovation stressed the importance of achieving a much higher level of synergy amongst the main stakeholders, namely, the Industry, Academia, DRDO and the Defence Services, with the Government in support. The section also emphasized that it is the Armed Forces, and not the MoD, which must act as a pivot for creating this synergy and drive the defence R&D process.

This section proposes several structural changes to the current military-industrial enterprise, focusing mainly on those areas where an enhanced role is envisaged for the Armed Forces towards giving an impetus to defence R&D. In particular, restructuring of the DDP on the lines of the French DGA as mooted by the Sisodia Committee, and corporatisation of the Ordnance Factories as proposed by the Kelkar Committee and being acted upon by the present Government, are also measures which need to be taken to completion, but are not being analysed here, since these pertain primarily to procurement and production aspects, and have only an oblique bearing on defence innovation [1].

Indian DARPA: High Risk R&D

The US DARPA may be characterised as a lean, flat and specialist organisation, with time-bound projects. Its many notable features include: taking on only high-risk R&D for potentially transformative technologies; highly specialist profiles of its leaders and managers; absence of bureaucracy and enormous leeway given to project managers; and the fact that R&D is carried out entirely by extramural agencies, primarily the industry and academic & research institutions [2].

It is evident that the above features are at complete variance with the character of the DRDO. If India aspires to leap-frog and be counted amongst the top group of nations in the realm of defence innovation, creating an Indian DARPA (I-DARPA) is essential. If established, the I-DARPA could exploit the vast untapped potential of R&D expertise which exists in its premier educational institutions and private industry, and also leverage the country’s vibrant start-up culture. The real challenge would be to identify project managers and leaders with the right profile and commitment, who would be key to the success of such a venture. It merits mention here that setting up of I-DARPA was also recommended by the Rama Rao Committee, but was not acted upon by the Government [3].

The I-DARPA (suitably named) should be placed under the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), and not the Department of Defence Production (DDP) or the Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D) (please see the recommendation below on restructuring the DRDO). The set-up could start small with 75-100 project leaders/ managers, a significant percentage of these being men in uniform, and should be headed by a professional of international repute in the realm of defence innovation. The US DARPA model should be studied in depth and suitably adapted to Indian conditions.

Defence Innovation Unit: Adaptation of Commercial Cutting Edge Technologies

While the I-DARPA would focus only on futuristic and potentially transformative military technologies, the thrust of the Defence Innovation Unit (DIU) would be to identify and efficiently adapt emerging civil and commercial technologies for military applications and systems. Its goal would be exploit these technologies for fulfilling existing operational voids as well as envision new applications aimed at enhancing combat effectiveness. The DIU models being followed by the US and France may be suitably adapted for setting up the Indian DIU [4, 5].

The DIU, manned by professionals from civilian as well as military backgrounds, must possess the necessary skills to network with the leading R&D institutions within the country and abroad, as also have the requisite acumen to understand military requirements. Once a potential application is identified, the DIU must have the necessary powers to quickly approve it as a project with necessary financial backing, without being tied up by bureaucratic procurement procedures. Like the I-DARPA, the DIU must also be placed under the DMA, and could initially be set-up with an executive work-force of 30-40 professionals.

DRDO Re-Structured as Defence Services Laboratories

The primary charter of the DRDO is to carry out indigenous development of defence equipment and applications needed by our Armed Forces. Hence, the DRDO must be made accountable to the Defence Services. Also, given the lack of adequate military domain knowledge within the DRDO, there should be no research undertaken by the DRDO without the explicit approval of the respective Service. Both these requirements can be met by placing the DDR&D under the DMA. The current arrangement of DDR&D and the DMA being peer departments under the Raksha Mantri, with their actions being coordinated by the Defence Secretary, is unsuited to provide effective apex oversight for indigenous defence R&D. This may involve changing the status of Chairman DRDO from Secretary to Additional Secretary.

In a future phase, the DRDO is recommended to be re-structured into four clusters, and placed under the direct control of HQ IDS (for tri-Services research) and the three Services. This might involve multi-way splitting of laboratories which presently carry out R&D work for all the three Services. Useful ideas may be taken from the organisational structures and processes being followed by the defence laboratories which are integral to the US Army (eight laboratories under the Combat Capabilities and Development Command), the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) under the US Air Force, and the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) [6].

Restructuring the DRDO in the above manner would be a truly transformative step, and may seem too drastic at this juncture. However, it is felt that only such a step would enable the Armed Forces to break out of the clutches of a system which has proved to be largely ineffective over the decades.

However, mere restructuring of the DRDO in the above manner would not suffice to achieve the desired results. Equally transformative reforms are needed within the Defence Services for such a radical measure to yield results. This issue is dwelt upon in the next section.

Military Incubation Centres

Incubation centres are an effective means of encouraging entrepreneurship in emerging and niche technologies. Defence technologies have all the right characteristics for benefiting from this concept, for the following reasons: domain knowledge on operational requirements in very weak, especially so in India; disruptive military technologies in general have a niche character; and the market for these technologies is relatively limited. All these factors make many of the military technologies well suited for being taken up by start-ups and entrepreneurs, suitably supported by defence sponsors. Incubation centres are designed to do just that. Unfortunately, the concept of incubation centres has not yet been adopted by the Armed Forces.

There is an urgent need to work out modalities for setting up incubation centres for specific technologies and applications on the premises of our premier academic and research institutions, including military institutions. These centres must receive adequate financial support and, even more importantly, must have ‘soldier scientists’ as part of the R&D teams. The oversight of these incubation centres must rest with specific technology verticals within the three Services.

Military Testbeds

Poor domain knowledge of the military environment is one of the primary reasons for the current reluctance on the part of Industry and Academia to undertake R&D in defence technologies. The Industry attempts to overcome this disadvantage by employing retired defence personnel, but more often than not this is from a ‘liaison’ perspective. The Academia tries to leverage the domain knowledge of defence officers who undergo post graduate courses in various institutes. Both these measures are inadequate to bridge the knowledge gap. There is a need, therefore, to set-up defence testbeds on the lines of the US & NATO Project Scorpion [7] and the French techno-operational laboratories (LTOs) and Scorpion Battle Lab [8], in order to simulate an operational environment. These testbeds would serve to provide a suitable environment for conjointly evolving new defence applications for emerging technologies, and also serve as testbeds to evaluate prototypes once developed.

Apex Committee under the PMO

Giving the desired impetus to defence R&D requires the coordinated participation of several ministries, including defence, finance, home, external affairs, commerce & industry, education, and skill development & entrepreneurship, amongst others. Thus, there is a need to steer defence innovation from highest level of governance. Presently the Prime Minister chairs several cabinet committees, including committees on Security, Appointments, Economic Affairs, Political Affairs, Investment & Growth, and Employment & Skill Development. The last two were created very recently in 2019, since the Prime Minister had special interest in these areas. It is very desirable that Defence R&D be provided leadership directly by the Prime Minister through a new cabinet committee constituted for this purpose [9]. Further, the secretarial support for this committee should be provided by the DMA. It merits mention here that China’s Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, established in 2017, is chaired by President Xi, while the Russian Military-Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation was upgraded and brought under the leadership of President Putin in 2014 [10, 11].

Defence Services: Introspect & Transform, or be Doomed!

In the preceding sections, several transformative proposals have been made, summarised as follows: participative R&D through specialist led project management; creation of an I-DARPA and DIU, with oversight provided by the DMA; restructuring of DRDO into Defence Services Laboratories functioning under the control of respective Services; setting up of military incubation centres and testbeds; and instituting a Cabinet Committee on Defence R&D with secretarial support from the DMA. In each of these proposals, the Armed Forces are envisaged as playing a key role.

It can be predicted with reasonable certainty that each of the above measures would be considered as drastic, impractical and even absurd, not only by the MoD (ie, the defence bureaucracy), but also by our military hierarchy! And yet, all these proposals have a basis in practices being successfully followed by countries who are currently world leaders in military technologies. One can understand the reluctance to such transformative changes on the part of bureaucrats based on “turf” considerations, since the changes would effectively shift the fulcrum of the defence innovation process from the MoD to the Armed Forces. However, it is worth analysing why such proposals are not likely to be treated with enthusiasm even by the uniformed hierarchy.

Transforming the Military Mindset

The CDS and Service Chiefs have often proclaimed the need to modernise the Armed Forces and have stressed the importance of indigenously developing military technologies [12, 13]. However, there has been hardly any effort to analyse, and also introspect, as to why our military-industrial complex has failed to adequately deliver over so many decades. Some facets of the current Indian military mindset which need to be seriously reviewed by our military leadership are as under:-

• “Information Age” Warfare: An Esoteric Concept. The full significance of the changing nature of warfare in the 21st Century has not yet dawned on the current Indian military leadership. Operational concepts emerging from new technologies, such as NCW and IO, are treated at best as resulting in “force multiplier” effects, playing a very limited role in military strategy as compared to, for instance, 20th Century operational art in mechanised warfare, the grit of the well-trained soldier in harsh terrain, or the complexities inherent in a difficult CI environment. C4ISR & Tactical C3I systems and cyberspace conflicts are considered as esoteric facets of warfare having minimal bearing on military planning. Although much lip-service is paid to cyberspace as the newest domain of warfare, it is far from being considered as being on par with the traditional domains of land, sea and air, and “cyber warriors” are not placed on the same pedestal as warfighters in the physical domains.
• Defence R&D Outside the Purview of Defence Services. The premise has always been that the DRDO and Industry, with the MoD in the lead, are solely responsible for the poor performance of our DSTI sector, with the role of the Defence Services being restricted to drawing up QRs and projecting demands. This work has proposed that the Services need to be the primary driving force behind all defence R&D, with the DRDO, DIU and I-DARPA being placed under military control. Such an enhanced role, which would make the Armed Forces directly accountable for the performance of the DSTI sector, is quite at variance with the existing views of our military leadership.
• Pre-Eminence of “Generalists” over “Specialists”. The conviction that a “generalist” with a combat profile is best suited to be at the helm of affairs, even in specialist realms such as defence R&D, has resulted in our project management establishments having an essentially non-specialist character, leading to their dismal performance in nurturing projects to successful completion (please refer to the preceding section on Existing Structural Shortcomings). The increasing role of “specialist” warfighters in 21st Century warfare in general, and their indispensability in the realm of defence R&D in particular, is yet to be accepted as an imperative which can no longer be ignored.

A change in mindset is a necessary prerequisite for carrying out the transformative restructuring so essential for the Armed Forces to play a pivotal role in the military-industrial enterprise.

Grooming ‘Soldier Scientists’

If the Services are to act as a fulcrum in the R&D process, as has been proposed in a previous section, then there a need to groom ‘soldier scientists’. The broad contours of this concept may be stated as under:-

• The current R&D efforts are ineffective because our civilian scientists do not understand warfare, and the soldiers (in the right places) do not understand technology. Consequently, the desired interfaces between the Services on the one hand and the Industry and Academia on the other are not efficient enough to result in successful R&D. While making the scientists understand warfare may be an infeasible proposition in the Indian context, the reverse is not true, as there are enough soldiers who understand technology pretty well and can be groomed as ‘soldier scientists’ by implementing suitable HRD policies.
• The important role which technical specialists in the defence forces need to play for successfully harnessing the power of complex technologies, especially those which manifest in the information and cognitive domains, cannot be over-emphasized. This role commences at the stage of product conceptualization itself, and extends across all stages of R&D till successful fielding of the product, and even beyond. In contrast, for traditional military hardware such as tanks and artillery guns, the role of the military project manager could be less specialist-centric. It merits mention here that, with the intelligization of the battlespace and the advent of LAWS, such traditional weapon systems are expected to become extinct over time.
• HRD policies must undergo significant modification to enable the creation of more streams of specialisation and super-specialisation. In order to create such streams, several measures need to be taken, as follows: giving ownership of different technologies to specific arms/ services; ensuring that sufficient number of officers undergo formal training in the desired disciplines; providing multiple tenures to specialists in vacancies related to their specialisation; getting the most talented soldiers to opt for specialisation and protecting their careers up to the highest ranks; life-cycle association of specialists to projects; and other such measures [14].
• The above listed measures are designed to train soldiers to become ‘soldier scientists’. However, the fact that this breed of officers are first soldiers and then scientists cannot be lost sight of. Hence, their careers need to be carefully planned to ensure an even balance between their training and tenures as soldiers as well as scientists. This would require innovative and focused planning on the part of personnel management branches of the three Services. Since the numbers envisaged are small, spread across multiple disciplines, creating separate streams may not be a feasible proposition, and specialisation may need to be based on a concept of ‘repeated tenures’, as stated above.

It is reiterated here that the success of the proposals mooted above for creation of new establishments such as the DIU and I-DARPA and restructuring DRDO as Defence Services Laboratories is contingent upon creation of a hierarchy of soldier scientists within the Armed Forces for requisite participation in and providing oversight to these establishments.

Revitalizing our Project Management Establishments

Our project management organisations (DGIS, PMOs, etc) need to be revitalized both in terms of numbers and quality, with ‘soldier scientists’ as project managers as well as in leadership roles.

The “generalist” rationale which is often applied to leadership of organisations such as the DGIS needs further discussion. Specialist verticals are a fundamental basis for the traditional structure of the Services (Infantry, Armoured, Artillery, Signals, etc in the Army; Fighters, Helicopters, Logistics, etc in the Air Force; Executive, Engineering, Electrical with sub-specialisations within each, in the Navy). However, when it comes to the Information Systems (IS), the requirement of specialisation is pushed aside, on the grounds that the user base is from all arms. This flawed perspective has resulted in the DGIS becoming an organisation manned by a floating population of non-specialists (please see previous section on Existing Structural Shortcomings). It is true that there is a significant role of arm/ service specific domain experts in project management teams. However, it is the IS specialists which need to be at the helm, to enable effective conceptualisation and steering the development of complex systems based on information technologies. With the emergence of ever more complex military technologies (AI, robotics, nano, IoT, hypersonics, etc), the necessity for specialists to lead project management establishments has become even more accentuated.

As has already been brought out above, given the nature of our Industry, Academia and even the DRDO, all characterised by an abject lack of domain knowledge about operational scenarios and requirements, it is imperative for the Armed Forces to adopt a model of ‘participative R&D’, where ‘soldier scientists’ and civilian scientists work together as teams for pursuing research in sophisticated military technologies. If the Armed Forces continue to limit their roles to making QRs, and then expecting the R&D community to deliver the end products, there is little hope of succeeding as this model has clearly proven to be ineffective, especially so in the information and cognitive realms.

Transformative Restructuring: Recommended Approach

India’s poor performance in defence R&D appears to be largely an outcome of its inadequately structured organisations and processes as compared to those adopted by world leaders in military technology. Many meaningful recommendations put forth by studies carried out over the last two decades have not been taken seriously. In general, there has been a lack of vision and determination on the part of our political leadership, bureaucracy and military hierarchy alike to bring in reforms. Given the current geopolitical landscape, such complacency is no longer sustainable.

In the author’s view, the responsibility for driving the process of restructuring rests primarily with our military leadership. The charter, professionalism and commitment which characterise our Armed Forces dictate that we must assume responsibility for defence R&D with the same solemnity as all other facets of defence preparedness. This involves, first and foremost, making an attitudinal shift from being “requisitioners of defence systems” to “drivers of indigenous defence R&D”. Our actions so far have shown little evidence of movement in this direction.

Several transformative proposals have been mooted in the preceding sections. While all of these involve the Armed Forces for their implementation, there are some which do not require government approval and are, in a sense, a prerequisite for those which do require such approval. These two categories may be summarised as under:-

• Measures Internal to the Armed Forces. These include internalizing the enhanced role of being “drivers of defence R&D”; evolving requisite concept papers and doctrine; carrying out substantial modifications to our HRD policies in order to usher in a culture of super-specialisation, and in particular grooming ‘soldier scientists’ with protected career prospects; and restructuring and revitalizing our project management establishments.
• Measures Requiring Government Approval. These include raising new defence innovation establishments, namely the DIU and the I-DARPA; restructuring the DRDO as Defence Services Laboratories; establishing incubation centres in our premier academic institutions, civil research establishments and even the Industry; and setting up military testbeds.

A two-pronged approach must be adopted, as follows: take resolute steps to implement the internal measures; and, on a parallel track, prepare convincing cases for measures requiring Government approval, and pursue these vigorously at the highest levels for acceptance and implementation on priority.

Conclusion

In this concluding article of the series titled “Ideation for Defence R&D in India”, a fresh approach to defence innovation in India has been proposed. The approach revolves around two principal ideas: firstly, the Armed Forces must play a pivotal role in the defence innovation process; and secondly, in order to take on this responsibility, significant internal transformation is required to be undertaken by the Armed Forces with a view ushering in higher levels of specialisation and grooming ‘soldier scientists’. It advocates the creation of an I-DARPA and a DIU and recommends the restructuring of the DRDO as Defence Services Laboratories, placed under direct control of the Defence Services. Issues related to defence procurement and production, however, have not been dealt with in this work.

The approach recommended in this work is clearly transformative, if not revolutionary, in character. It would not be surprising if it is termed as impractical, even absurd, by certain sections of the bureaucracy and military hierarchy alike. And yet, each of the measures suggested here has been successfully adopted by one or more world leaders in military technology. Moreover, in the author’s view, it is very much feasible to implement each of the proposals mooted here in the Indian R&D ecosystem, provided the will to do so exists.

The geopolitical scenario currently unfolding in the world and the highly enhanced and imminent military threats being faced by India, together dictate that our self-reliance in the defence sector, including in the realm of emerging disruptive technologies, needs to be taken to the next level on priority. Incremental steps taken over the last two decades by way of policy modifications to incentivise the Industry, and other feeble attempts at improving the existing R&D enterprise, have little chance of succeeding. The time to take radical, but well-thought out, action is now!

References

(1)     Laxman Kumar Behra, Indian Defence Industry: Issues of Self-Reliance, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 21 July 2013, pp. 57-70, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://idsa.in/monograph/IndianDefenceIndustry.

(2)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – The United States Approach to Defence Innovation (Section: DARPA), Future Wars, 21 Jul 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rnd-in-india-the-us-approach-to-defence-innovation/.

(3)     Laxman Kumar Behra, Indian Defence Industry: Issues of Self-Reliance, ….

(4)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – The United States Approach to Defence Innovation (Section: Defence Innovation Agencies) …

(5)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India: Defence Innovation of Russia, Israel and France – Part II (Section: Defence Innovation Agency), 18 Aug 2020, Future Wars, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-defence-innovation-approaches-of-russia-israel-and-france-part-ii/.

(6)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – The United States Approach to Defence Innovation (Section: R&D Organisations of the Military Departments) …

(7)     Project Scorpion, Wikipedia, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Scorpion.

(8)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part II (Section: France/ Defence Research Laboratories), 18 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-defence-innovation-approaches-of-russia-israel-and-france-part-ii/

(9)     ThePrint Team, Here’s the full list of Cabinet Committees after Reshuffle: PM heads 6, Amit Shah 2, 06 Jun 2019, ThePrint, Accessed 19 Sep 2020, https://theprint.in/india/heres-the-full-list-of-cabinet-committees-after-reshuffle-pm-heads-6-amit-shah-2/246277/.

(10)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part I (Section: Civil-Military Integration), Future Wars, 28 Jul 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-chinas-approach-to-defence-innovation-part-i/.

(11)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part I (Section: Russia), 11 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-defence-innovation-approaches-of-russia-israel-and-france-part-i/.

(12)   Press Trust of India, Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat says will fight and win the next war with indigenous weapon systems, 15 Oct 2019, Financial Express, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/indian-army-chief-bipin-rawat-says-will-fight-and-win-the-next-war-with-indigenous-weapon-systems/1736204/.

(13)   Press Information Bureau, Indian Army Organises Seminar on Disruptive Technology, Indian Defence Industries, 25 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, http://indiandefenceindustries.in/army-disruptive-technology.

(14)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part III: Defence R&D – Services at the Fulcrum (Section: Services at the Fulcrum: Transformation with Specialisation), Future Wars, 12 May 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/disruptive-military-technologies-an-overview-part-iii/