Sections

21st Century Battlespace: Increasing Importance of Technology

Strategic Guidance on Future Warfare

Existing Structural Shortcomings

References

[This piece is in continuation to “Transformative Approach with Indian Armed Forces as Pivot – Part I”, which covered previous studies, core issues and national strategy]

21st Century Battlespace: Increasing Importance of Technology

Technology has always played a significant role in determining the manner in which warfare is conducted. The effects of some technologies have been so profound that they have resulted in what are referred to as revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). Over the past several centuries, such RMAs have been few and far between. In this 21st Century, however, RMAs might occur every couple of decades, or even oftener in times to come. This is because breakthroughs in disruptive military technologies are occurring much faster than witnessed hither-to-fore.

Threats emanating from some of the technologies are already manifest on the battlefield, threats from some others loom on the horizon, while from still others the effects might take a decade or more to make themselves felt on the multi-dimensional battlespace of tomorrow. The dramatic impact of the ongoing ‘system of systems’ RMA was first witnessed during the Iraq wars, and was the result of innovative use of ICT technologies for military applications [1]. The ICT RMA spawned two operational concepts, namely, network centric warfare (NCW) and information operations (IO), which together have had a revolutionary impact on the nature of warfare. The devastating effect of these concepts, so successfully employed during the Iraq Wars, spurred China into evolving their military strategy of “winning local wars under informationized conditions” and carrying out transformative re-structuring of the PLA, most notably the creation of the Strategic Support Force, and also triggered similar actions by Russia commencing with their New Look reforms of 2008 [2].

With the amazing breakthroughs being reported almost every few months in the fields of AI & robotics, together with the already visible advent of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) on the battlefield, the potent combine of AI & robotics technologies is widely believed to be the harbinger of the next RMA, which will possibly manifest in full force within the next two decades.

While the impact of nano and bio technologies is already being felt in some military systems, a future ‘AI-Nano-Bio’ RMA may be expected with further advances in AI, robotics, nano and bio technologies, in an estimated time-frame of three to four decades. There are several other technologies which are expected to have transformative effects on the nature of warfare in the coming decades, most notably quantum and hypersonic technologies, as also other dual-use technologies such as 5G, IoT, blockchain and 3D printing [3].

While the importance of the “man behind the gun” and “boots on the ground” must never be underestimated, it is also essential to understand the huge impact that disruptive military technologies are already having on 21st Century warfare. Unfortunately, in Indian military strategic thinking, especially so in the Army, such an understanding has not yet dawned, and most Indian “commanders” still view “technology” and “technologists” almost with disdain. Such a mind-set, groomed in industrial-age warfare concepts, is perhaps one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the way of giving the necessary impetus to defence innovation in India.

Strategic Guidance on Future Warfare

Absence of Higher Direction

As per the Defence Procurement Procedure 2016, the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) flowing out of the 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) is designed to provide necessary guidance to the Industry and defence research establishments for developing the requisite defence technologies. The LTIPP itself should ideally flow out of a National Security Strategy/ Policy, Defence Planning Guidelines, and Defence Capability Strategy/ Plan, none of which have ever been issued by the Indian establishment [4]. Thus, while a classified LTIPP 2012-27 exists, and two TPCRs have been issued so far (in 2013 and 2018) which are available in the open domain [5], these documents are not grounded in formally evolved strategic military thought. The Compendiums of Problem Definition Statements (ADB Compendium) being issued by the Army Design Bureau (four volumes covering 150 problem statements so far [6]) are also an input for the Industry to carry out indigenous R&D, although their relationship with the TPCR is not very clear. In the absence of any higher level strategies/ guidelines/ directives, it can safely be assumed that projects listed in the perspective plans/ TPCR/ problem statements are merely a compilation of projects conceptualised in isolation in order to address an existing or future operational need.

With the institution of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) [7] and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) [8] in Apr 2018 and Dec 2020 respectively, national/ military security strategies/ policies will hopefully be issued in the foreseeable future. However, there is a need to explore measures for giving a boost to indigenous defence innovation, both in respect of transformative breakthroughs as well as for incremental improvements in defence technologies, even if requisite strategic guidance emanating from the national apex level is not forthcoming in the near future.

Need to Evolve Concept Papers and Doctrines on Modern Warfare

As stated above, presently there are two types of documents which are available to the Industry for helping them to participate in defence R&D, namely, the TPCR and the ADB Compendiums. The format of these two documents are a clear indicator that the projects listed therein are an assortment of felt needs, and do not flow out of any well thought out operational concept or formal doctrine. This is because, in addition to the fact that apex level documents (such as the National Security Strategy) have never been issued, there is hardly any doctrinal literature pertaining to modern warfare which has been evolved by our Armed Forces. This is elaborated upon below.

The ICT RMA referred to above has been unfolding on the world arena for almost three decades now, and the two operational concepts spawned by it, namely NCW and IO, are over two decades old. The three primary sub-disciplines of IO, ie, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and psychological operations, have also been operationalised by armies across the world, and to an extent by the Indian Armed Forces, for several decades now. Despite this, there are hardly any concept papers and doctrines which have been issued out in these areas by the three Services [9]. Those which do exist treat these operational disciplines in very general terms, and are not insightful or comprehensive enough to be able to provide strategic guidance for carrying out innovative R&D.

Similarly, while the emerging technologies discussed above have caught the attention of military decision makers, mostly as a result of regular reportage of military systems and applications being developed by advanced militaries, the current level of activity is mostly restricted to keynote addresses and paper presentations in various conferences. The only formal study carried out so far has been by the AI Task Force for ‘Artificial Intelligence for National Security & Defence’, under the aegis of the MoD which, interestingly, was headed by Chairman Tata Sons (Industry, rather than the Armed Forces, in the lead!), with two-star representatives from the three Services [10]. Another in-house study has now been ordered for the Army, headed by an Army Commander, to look into Army applications of disruptive technologies [11].

There is an urgent need, therefore, to evolve joint services and service-specific doctrines on NCW, IO (a much more refined version than the one currently available), Cyber Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Psychological Operations. In addition, concept papers need to be prepared, which enunciate thoroughly war-gamed operational concepts based on emerging technologies that are expected to have game-changing effects on conflicts in the coming decade, in particular AI & Robotics, Quantum and Hypersonic technologies. Furthermore, open domain versions of these doctrines should be available for perusal by all stakeholders.

The above doctrines and concept papers will serve to provide clarity of thought and purpose to warfighters at all levels, and also form a basis for preparation of documents such as TPCRs and ADB Compendiums. The extremely poor progress made by the Indian Army in development of Tactical C3I / C4ISR systems over the last three decades, and the less than desirable status of our EW and Cyber capabilities, may be largely attributed to near absence of concept papers and doctrines in modern warfighting concepts.

Leveraging Military Veterans and Think Tanks

The poverty of formal and documented doctrinal thought in the Indian Armed Forces may be ascribed at least partly to their pre-occupation with devious adversaries on extended and live frontiers, resulting in a culture and professional ethos which leaves little time and inclination for strategic and visionary thinking, even though there is no dearth of either intellectual prowess or professional excellence amongst men in uniform.

The above constraint can well be overcome by tapping into the professional acumen of a large number of committed officers who, after superannuation, continue to remain engaged with their respective areas of expertise and interest either in a personal capacity or as part of a large number of defence-oriented think tanks. This precious resource can be usefully exploited by the Armed Forces to generate high quality military concepts and doctrine. Unfortunately this is not being done, possibly for the following reasons: an undue obsession with security; and a lack of proper appreciation of the role which this body of professionals can play in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. There is, therefore, a need to evolve formal mechanisms to support and leverage the rich resource of our military veterans and think tanks, especially in the academic realm of evolving future warfighting strategies.

Existing Structural Shortcomings

In the previous section, it was brought out the ongoing ‘system of systems’ RMA is the outcome of information and communication technologies (ICT), while the next RMA, already looming on the horizon, would be powered by AI & robotics technologies. As a result, the nature of warfare is changing fast, and already there is a growing school of thought that traditional industrial age weapon systems such as tanks and aircraft carriers would soon give way to smarter, more agile lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) [12]. Therefore, for a country like India, instead to trying to play catch up on bulky, manned weapon systems, it would be a good strategy to optimise our R&D efforts on to Information Age technologies. Our national expertise in ICT disciplines (including its super-specialist sub-domain of AI) can be leveraged to advantage for this purpose. The discussion which follows is carried out against this backdrop.

Ongoing ‘System-of-Systems RMA’: Lackluster Performance

Establishments within the Armed Forces specifically chartered to promote and manage indigenous defence systems and applications include the Army Design Board, the Directorate General of Information Systems (DGIS), various Project Management Organisations (PMOs) for Tactical C3I systems and networks, and the Weapons and Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE), amongst others. In general, these organisations are not adequately structured to steer successful R&D. In particular, project managers lack specialisation in the desired fields and, more importantly, their posting to R&D assignments is mostly on a single tenure basis. In other words, almost all these establishments are manned by a floating population of non-specialists.

The performance of the DGIS (including its earlier avatars) over the last three decades is particularly revealing (and disappointing). Despite a several decades long gestation period, none of its flagship Tactical C3I and C4ISR projects (which are a manifestation of the NCW concept on the battlefield) have reached full operational status, and most of them are either still under development or already short closed. It is also pertinent to point out here that the ICT technologies involved in these projects are essentially dual-use in nature and are being extensively used in commercial environments. With such poor results to show in leveraging even decades-old know-how, it would be futile to expect the DGIS to handle cutting edge technologies such as AI and robotics which are expected to power the next generation of military weapons and systems.

It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to the DGIS, establishments with a higher degree of specialisation in their ethos have produced better results over the years, most notably the WESEE.

Looming ‘AI RMA’: Weak Initiatives

Our national as well as military efforts to leverage AI for military operations have also been very tardy. Based on the report submitted in Jun 2018 by the AI Task Force for ‘Artificial Intelligence for National Security & Defence’ set up by the MoD, a High Level Defence AI Council (DAIC) was constituted in 2019 under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister, with the primary charter of providing strategic direction for AI driven transformation in defence, and facilitating R&D and technology adaptation. Simultaneously, a Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA), with Secretary (Defence Production) as the chairman, was also instituted [13]. However, there is as yet no evidence of any impactful initiatives undertaken by these apex organisations.

Up until now, our Defence Forces are also not fully seized of the imperative for developing critical AI applications and systems. The latest TPCR-2018 does not list out a single project related to AI & robotics. The fact that the AI Task Force referred to above was neither initiated nor steered by the Armed Forces itself speaks volumes about their perspective on the issue. However, under DAIPA’s directions, some projects areas are now being progressed.

The DRDO’s main facility working in this area is the Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR). CAIR has made limited headway in making some prototype systems, such as “Muntra” UGV, “Daksh” remotely operated vehicle, wall climbing and flapping wing robots, etc. However, if India is to keep pace with advancements in the international arena, these efforts are grossly insufficient [14].

Need for Participative R&D

In general, so far the approach to steering R&D has been to formulate qualitative requirements (QRs) and then expect the research establishments (DRDO, Industry, and on a smaller scale, Academia) to come up with solutions. Once prototypes are ready, PMOs carry out trials and evaluation with user involvement.

Several problems have plagued this approach towards project management, given the non-specialist profiles of project managers. The user, including the project manager, generally defaults on two counts: inadequate understanding of the underlying technologies results in QRs which are either unable to adequately exploit existing technologies, or specifications are laid down which are unrealistic. On the other hand, the R&D scientist, with insufficient understanding of the operational requirement, designs prototypes which fail to live up to user expectations. This knowledge gap between the soldier and scientist, together with lack of adequate interaction between the users and R&D agencies, inhibits the creation of the right environment for successful R&D.

The role of a project manager is to bridge the gap between the soldier and the scientist, for which he and his team need to fulfil several criteria: possess the right educational qualifications to understand the relevant technologies; thoroughly understand the operational requirements; have adequate expertise and experience in project management; and hold on to project management assignments long enough to steer projects to completion.

Developing effective interfaces between the PMOs and the R&D establishments entails procedures which allow very frequent, if not continuous, interactions between the user/ project manager and the developer. The way our PMOs are presently structured, this requirement is not adequately met. For instance, the quality of interaction between PMOs located at New Delhi and development agencies working at Bangalore/ Hyderabad cannot but be sub-optimal.

Briefly stated, there needs to be a quantum improvement in the quality as well as intensity of participation by the Defence Services in the R&D process. The manner in which this may be achieved is touched upon in subsequent sections.

[Continued in “Transformative Approach with Indian Armed Forces as Pivot – Part III”]

References

(1)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, The Changing Nature of Warfare – Part I (Section: Revolution in Military Affairs), 05 Sep 2017, Future Wars, Accessed 19 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/the-changing-nature-of-warfare-part-i/.

(2)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I: Concept, Organisation and Space Operations (Section: Concept), 09 Jun 2020, Future Wars, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/chinas-special-support-force-and-its-implications-for-india-part-i/.

(3)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part I: Classification, AI & Robotics and Quantum Technologies (Section: Disruptive Military Technologies: A Classification), Future Wars, 28 Apr 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/disruptive-military-technologies-an-overview-part-i/.

(4)     Make In India – Through Indigenous Research and Development by DRDO/Industry, VIF Task Force Report, 15 Feb 2019, Vivekananda International Foundation, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/vif-task-force-report-make-in-india_0.pdf.

(5)     Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap, Indian Ministry of Defence, Accessed 12 Sep 2018, https://www.mod.gov.in/technology-perspective-and-capability-roadmap.

(6)     Compendiums of Problem Definition Statements – Vol IV (2019), Army Design Bureau, Dte Gen of Perspective Planning, 31 Dec 2018, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://indianarmy.nic.in/makeinindia/CPDS%20Vol%20IV%202019.pdf.

(7)     Defence Planning Committee, Wikipedia, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Planning_Committee.

(8)     Department of Military Affairs, Indian Ministry of Defence, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://www.mod.gov.in/department-military-affairs.

(9)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Existing IW Structures), 21 Apr 2020, Future Wars, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/iw-structures-for-the-indian-armed-forces-part-iv/.

(10)   Implementation of the Recommendations of the Multi-stakeholder Task Force Constituted by the Ministry of Defence for ‘Strategic Implementation of Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defence’, Department of Defence Production Order, 08 Feb 2019, GOI, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://ddpmod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AI.pdf.

(11)   Times News Network, Need to Invest in Disruptive Tech: Army Chief, 26 Aug 2020, The Times of India, Accessed 19 Sep 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/need-to-invest-in-disruptive-tech-army-chief/articleshow/77754905.cms.

(12)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations: An Overview – Part I, 19 Sep 2017, Future Wars, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/artificial-intelligence-in-military-operations-an-overview-part-i/.

(13)   Implementation of the Recommendations of the Multi-stakeholder Task Force Constituted by the Ministry of Defence for ‘Strategic Implementation of Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defence’ …

(14)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations: An Overview – Part II (Section: AI in Military Operations – Indian Perspective), 29 Sep 2017, Future Wars, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/artificial-intelligence-in-military-operations-an-overview-part-ii/.