Sections

Introduction

Previous Studies and Policy Initiatives

Fresh Approach to Defence Innovation: Core Issues

National Strategy for Defence Innovation

References

Introduction

India was the second largest importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-19 with a share of 9.2%, and more than 80% of its imports were from Russia, Israel and France, in that order. During the same period, India’s share of international arms exports was only 0.2%, while Israel, born as a nation almost simultaneously with India’s attaining independence and with a GDP eight times smaller than India, enjoyed an arms exports share of 3%, the eight largest in the world [1, 2]. Despite honest efforts by the Government to energize our Defence Science, Technology and Industry (DSTI) sector over the years, there has been no marked improvement. It is evident that serious introspection is needed to examine India’s approach to defence R&D.

It is worth mentioning here that defence innovation in disruptive military technologies has become increasingly important against the backdrop of the fast changing nature of warfare in this Information Age, and this trend is expected to accelerate in the coming decades. Equally important is the fact that, given India’s inherent expertise in the ICT disciplines (with AI as a super-specialist sub-discipline), if the right emphasis is given to defence innovation by India, it could leap-frog to a large extent the gap in military technologies which exists today vis-à-vis its primary adversary, namely, a belligerent China.

This is the concluding article (in three parts) in a series written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s military-industrial complex, after studying the defence innovation approaches of countries which are at the forefront of research in cutting edge military technologies. In the previous three articles of this series, the R&D strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context [3, 4, 5].

This work adopts an introspective approach from the standpoint of the Armed Forces, based on the conviction that in order to achieve self-reliance in defence the role of our Defence Services in the R&D process needs to be critically reviewed. It advocates structural changes which deviate significantly from existing practices, premised on the following principles: firstly, the Armed Forces must act as a pivot for driving the defence innovation process, and be suitably empowered accordingly; and secondly, in order to perform this role effectively, they must make transformative changes internally for efficiently managing high technology projects, by creating specialist structures and grooming ‘soldier scientists’.

This article draws heavily from the analyses carried out in the previous three articles in this series, and is best read as a continuation to them.

Previous Studies and Policy Initiatives

Despite having a very large military-industrial enterprise, comprising of more than 50 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) laboratories, nine defence public sector units (DPSUs) and 41 Ordnance Factories (OFs) [6], the low self-reliance in defence has long been a matter of serious concern for the Government of India (GoI). Several Government sponsored studies have carried out analyses and recommended solutions to boost self-reliance in the defence sector, and some of the recommendations have been implemented. In addition, our defence procurement policy has undergone numerous changes, especially during the last two decades, aimed at boosting indigenous defence R&D. An overview of the recommendations of previous analyses and policy initiatives taken by the Government is given out in succeeding paragraphs.

Previous Studies

Major studies which have analysed the issue of self-reliance in defence include: the Group of Ministers (GoM) set up in 2001 by the Prime Minister to review national security post the Kargil Committee Report; the Kelkar Committee (2005) which looked at measures to re-vitalise the defence industry; the Sisodia Committee (2007) which looked at defence acquisition procedures; and the Rama Rao Committee (2008), which reviewed the functioning of DRDO [7].

Some of the noteworthy recommendations made by the above committees include: greater private sector participation, DRDO to focus on core technologies (GoM); corporatisation of the OFs (Kelkar Committee); restructuring of the acquisition wing of the MoD on the lines of the French DGA, involvement of Industry in the acquisition process as well as in QR formulation (Sisodia Committee); creation of a Defence Technology Commission (DTC), and a Board of Research for Advanced Defence Sciences (BRADS) on the lines of the US DARPA (Rama Rao Committee).

While some recommendations made by the above studies have been implemented, mostly involving incremental improvements, most of the transformative measures listed above have not been acted upon.

Policy Initiatives

The first version of the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP), the key policy document dealing with defence acquisitions, was issued in 2002, and since then the DPP has undergone several revisions (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013 & 2016) [8]. In March this year, the MoD released a draft Defence Production & Export Promotion Policy 2020 (DPEPP-2020), soliciting public comments [9]. The major thrust of changes made to the DPP over the years has been to incentivise the Indian Industry for indigenously meeting our defence needs. The “Make” procedure (Make-I & Make-II) is specifically designed to encourage indigenous R&D. It was first introduced in 2006, and subsequently modified several times to offer better incentives.

The latest policy measure, announced by the Government in Aug 2020 as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, places 101 major defence items on the negative list of imports with embargoes to be enforced over the next five years, and is being hailed by some as a major boost to the Indian defence industry [10].

Limited Results

The efforts made over the years to incentivise Indian industry to participate in defence manufacturing, however, have been far from successful, as is abundantly clear from India’s international arms import and export performance figures indicated above. The reasons for the same, therefore, need to be analysed.

Fresh Approach to Defence Innovation: Core Issues

A close scrutiny of the initiatives taken by the GoI so far to boost self-reliance in the defence sector shows that these are mostly restricted to policy changes for incentivising the Industry. There is not much evidence of efforts aimed at creating an environment which is conducive for the conduct of indigenous R&D.

The existing approach to defence R&D may be summarised as follows: ever since its establishment in 1958 the DRDO, notwithstanding an uninspiring track record, continues to be the mainstay for defence research; the private industry, despite being given increasingly attractive incentives to participate in defence manufacturing, has not yet entered the game with enthusiasm; another important stakeholder, the Academia, is envisaged only in a supporting role to the DRDO and Industry; the role of the Armed Forces is limited to floating requirements, monitoring progress with limited authority and carrying out trials, but they are not viewed as specialist participants in the R&D process; and the MoD controls the entire defence R&D ecosystem.

There are several core concerns associated with the above approach which lie at the heart of its limited success and which, if suitably addressed, could give the desired boost to self-reliance in defence. These are discussed below.

Creating Synergy amongst Stakeholders

A bird’s eye view of India’s military-industrial landscape shows that there is a lack of synergy amongst its major stakeholders, namely, the MoD, Defence Services, DRDO, Industry and Academia. For the desired level of synergy to manifest itself, a driving force is needed, endowed with three essential features: military domain knowledge, technological expertise and authority. The only two agencies which could conceivably be empowered with all the three elements are the MoD and the Services. Presently, the MoD enjoys full authority in the defence innovation process; however, it is a non-specialist organisation, far removed from operational requirements. The Services are well versed with operational requirements; however, the existing level of specialisation within the Armed Forces is inadequate; and the authority vested with them is extremely limited. Given this situation, it is felt that, with suitable policy and structural changes, the Armed Forces are best suited to act an effective pivot for driving the defence R&D process.

DRDO’s Accountability to the Armed Forces

The raison d’etre of the DRDO is to meet the operational needs of the Armed Forces through indigenous R&D. In the current organisational set-up, however, the DRDO is not accountable to the Armed Forces, being an independent department of the MoD which reports directly to the Raksha Mantri. This lack of accountability on the part of DRDO is perhaps a fundamental structural weakness which has stymied our indigenous efforts, despite a huge amount of public resource being allocated to it.

Tapping the Potential of Academia

There is enormous technological expertise in our premier academic institutions which lies largely untapped. Efforts made so far in this direction have been half-hearted and ineffective. A renewed and determined endeavour must be made to upgrade the role of Academia from that of being mere “consultants” to becoming mainstream players in developing defence technologies.

Specialisation within the Armed Forces

If the Armed Forces are to function as a pivot for driving indigenisation in defence R&D including exercising professional oversight over the DRDO, specialisation within the Services requires to be taken to the next level. The vast potential for indigenous R&D which exists within the private industry, premier academic institutions and the DRDO can be efficiently tapped only by specialists in uniform, both in the fields of military technologies as well as project management. Presently, the lack of adequate focus on specialisation is a critical drawback responsible for the stunted growth of our defence industry.

Broad Contours of the Approach

With the above core issues as guiding considerations, the approach to defence innovation proposed in this work involves several implementation aspects: the evolution of a national strategy for defence innovation, development of concepts and doctrines on modern warfare, reviewing existing organisational structures and creating new ones for promoting indigenous R&D, and most importantly, carrying out transformative reforms within the Armed Forces, with specialisation as a primary goal. All these aspects are discussed further in the sections which follow.

National Strategy for Defence Innovation

A comprehensive national strategy for defence innovation would encompass many facets. In this section, two of these facets which are directly relevant to this work are discussed: broad contours of an R&D model in which the Armed Forces play a pivotal role, and the importance of civil-military integration.

R&D Model: Armed Forces as Pivot

The need for creating much better synergy amongst the stakeholders (Government, Armed Forces, DRDO/ PSUs, Industry and Academia) has been highlighted above. Successful indigenisation of defence technologies requires the right blend of warfighting expertise and operational requirements on the one hand, and proficiency in current and future technologies on the other. In the Indian context, on the one hand there is an abject lack of military domain knowledge within the Industry, the Academia, and even the DRDO. On the other hand, while the Services have a fair number of technically qualified soldiers on their rolls, their poor management leaves this expertise largely unutilised. In short, the scientists do not understand warfare, and the soldiers in project management assignments do not understand technology well enough. Moreover, the interfaces between the Services and the Industry/ Academia/ DRDO are structurally unsuited for the desired quality of interaction [11].

The MoD, which is manned by “generalist” bureaucrats and enjoys almost complete authority over the defence R&D ecosystem, has neither the military nor the technological expertise to contribute fruitfully towards defence R&D process. Thus, their role is limited to exercising executive and financial control.

Under the circumstances, it is felt that the Armed Forces are best placed to act as a pivot for steering the defence R&D process. However, moving the defence R&D centre of gravity from the MoD to the Defence Services involves a major change in policy, which would need to be accepted as a national strategy. Thereafter, for enabling the Armed Forces to take on this responsibility, two requirements must be met: sufficient executive and financial powers must be delegated to them; and more importantly, they would need to undergo extensive internal transformation. These facets are elaborated upon in subsequent sections.

Civil Military Integration and Dual Use Technologies

The increasing sophistication of weapon systems and as well as enormous costs associated with the development of these systems is forcing even the most advanced nations to adopt the concept of Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in some form or the other [12]. The central idea is to overcome the “guns versus butter” dilemma, to the extent feasible, by managing the economy in a manner such that investments in the military industry has spin-offs in the civil domain and vice versa. Thus, closeting off R&D in military technologies on grounds of security is no longer affordable as a general strategy, although development of specific military systems would still need to be kept under wraps, as would be the case with certain types of military specific research. The simultaneous digitisation and “intelligisation” of the battlefield as well as society has expanded the spectrum of dual-use technologies, and increased the chances of success for a good CMI strategy.

An effective CMI strategy would need to ensure perfect coordination between military and civilian R&D capabilities by building efficient interfaces for technology exchange across the civil-military divide under government oversight. It would involve putting organisations and processes in place for creative and timely identification of potential military applications for technology breakthroughs occurring in the civilian domain, as also working out how technologies being developed for weapon systems might yield spin-offs for the economy through civilian applications.

China has perhaps demonstrated the maximum determination in making its CMI strategy a success. At the same time, other top arms producing countries including US, Russia and France have all focused on exploitation of dual-use technologies and coordinating the efforts of their military and civil R&D capabilities. These mechanisms include government oversight bodies, creation of defence innovation units, and building long term strategic relationships between the defence ministries/ departments and the private industry/ academic institutions.

India, so far, has not yet evolved a CMI strategy, much less operationalised it. This is a non-trivial exercise, which would need to address the “guns versus butter” dilemma as applicable in the Indian context, and needs to be undertaken as a national priority.

[Continued in “Transformative Approach with Indian Armed Forces as Pivot – Part II”]

References

(1)     Peter D Wezeman et al, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019, SIPRI Fact Sheet, Mar 2020, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/fs_2003_at_2019_0.pdf.

(2)     List of Countries by GDP (nominal), Wikipedia, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal).

(3)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – The United States Approach to Defence Innovation (Section: Noteworthy Features of the US Defence R&D Enterprise), Future Wars, 21 Jul 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rnd-in-india-the-us-approach-to-defence-innovation/.

(4)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part II (Section: Noteworthy Features of the Chinese Defence R&D Enterprise), Future Wars, 04 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-chinas-approach-to-defence-innovation-part-ii/.

(5)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part II (Section: Noteworthy Features Relevant to the Indian Context), 18 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-defence-innovation-approaches-of-russia-israel-and-france-part-ii/.

(6)     Laxman Kumar Behra, Indian Defence Industry: Issues of Self-Reliance, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 21 July 2013, pp. 09, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://idsa.in/monograph/IndianDefenceIndustry.

(7)     Laxman Kumar Behra, Indian Defence Industry: Issues of Self-Reliance …, pp. 57-70.

(8)     Defence Procurement Procedure 2016, Capital Procurement, GoI, Ministry of Defence, 28 Mar 2016, pp. ix, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/UVDPP201611119.pdf.

(9)     Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy – 2020, MoD (DDP), Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://www.ddpmod.gov.in/dpepp.

(10)   Rajat Pandit, India Announces Progressive Arms Embargo List in a bid to Boost Domestic Defence Production, The Times of India, 10 Aug 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/mod-introduces-import-embargo-on-101-items-in-big-push-to-atmanirbhar-bharat-initiative/articleshow/77441502.cms.

(11)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part III: Defence R&D – Services at the Fulcrum (Section: Effective Defence R&D Model), Future Wars, 12 May 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/disruptive-military-technologies-an-overview-part-iii/.

(12)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Ideation for Defence R&D in India – China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part I (Section: Civil-Military Integration), Future Wars, 28 Jul 2020, Accessed 12 Sep 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/ideation-for-defence-rd-in-india-chinas-approach-to-defence-innovation-part-i/.