Sections

Introduction

Russia

Israel

References

Introduction

As per the authoritative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet on Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019, India was the second larger importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-2019, with a share of 9.2%, with 82% of its imports being from Russia (56%), Israel (14%) and France (12%). In absolute terms, the total imports were to the tune of US$ 16.7 billion (Rs 1.25 lakh crore). On the other hand, India’s share of international arms exports during the same period was only 0.2%. It is also worth noting that Israel was born as a nation in 1948 almost simultaneously with India and yet, despite its small size and a GDP eight times lesser than India [1], its share of international arms exports during the same period was the eight highest in the world at 3% (15 times that of India) [2]. Moreover, despite honest efforts by the Government to energize it over the years, there has been little discernible improvement. It is evident that a serious introspection is needed to examine the reasons behind this uninspiring performance by the Indian Defence Science, Technology and Industry (DSTI) sector.

This is the third in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem by first studying the defence innovation approaches of countries which are at the forefront of research in cutting edge military technologies. As the concluding article will reveal, this work adopts an introspective approach from the standpoint of the Defence Services, based on the conviction that some of the primary impediments to bringing about the desired transformative change are to be found within the Services.

In the previous two articles of this series, the defence innovation approaches of the US and China were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This article (in two parts) carries out a similar review for the three countries from which we import the major proportion of our military systems, namely, Russia, Israel and France.

Russia

Technology in Warfare: Should Doctrine drive Technology, or Vice-Versa?

Russian military strategists may be considered to belong to one of two camps based on their views on the importance of technology in warfare, which for the sake of discussion may be termed as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Camp and the Military-Technological Revolution (MTR) Camp. Those belonging to the MTR Camp are more techno-centric in their views and are proponents of radical technological innovation. Proponents of the RMA Camp, on the other hand, opine that while scientific-technological progress helps to outline the contours of the feasible, it is doctrinal conceptualisation of the changing character of future wars which must shape the thrust of defence innovation. This Camp believes that a technologically superior adversary can be outperformed by adopting an asymmetrical and more creative doctrine. The RMA view presently appears to the dominant one in Russian military thought [3].

Defence Innovation: A Russian Priority

The terms “modernization” and “innovation” gained prominence during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev’s, and have been given equal importance by President Vladimir Putin. The far reaching New Look military reforms of 2008 had the following main features: reduction of military districts from six to four; making the command structure flatter (district-army-division-regiment to district-army-brigade); and significant force reductions. In order to compensate for the reduced numerical strength, modernisation and innovation were a logical requirement flowing out of these reforms, with specific focus being given to C4ISR, unmanned aerial vehicles and modern weapon systems. The “Innovative Russia 2020” policy referred to defence related R&D as a decisive factor for national security, and the 2009-2020 development plan prioritised civil-military integration and development of dual-use technology.

In Russia, the political leadership, the military and the defence industry drive defence innovation, with the civil S&T sector playing a comparatively minor role. Several organs were established after the turn of the century for framing and implementing the national innovation policy, primary amongst which were the Government Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), the MoD’s Council on Scientific and Technical Policy, the Presidential Council for Economic Modernization and Innovative Development, and the Council for Science and Education. The two most significant bodies responsible for defence innovation are the VPK and the Foundation for Prospective Research (FPI), considered to be Russian version of DARPA and often referred to as the Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects [4, 5].

Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation (VPK)

Initially established way back in the 1950s as the Military Industrial Commission, the VPK was re-cast as the Military-Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation in 2006 [6], with the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin as its helm. It was again restructured in 2014 through a presidential decree, placing it under the leadership of the President. In this latest format, Dmitry Rogozin is the Deputy Chairman, with the Deputy Minister of Defence as the permanent secretary. The Commission coordinates between the Defence Ministry, the Armed Forces and the defense industry of Russia, in other words all the operations of the defense-industrial complex, and implements the defence innovation strategy [7].

Foundation for Prospective Research (FPI)

The need for establishing a DARPA-like establishment for the conduct of research of high-risk, prospective breakthrough military technologies was highlighted by President Medvedev in 2010, and as a result the FPI was established in October 2012. Its role is quite different from that of the S&T Council of the VPK, which focuses on currently needed defence products set out in the State Defence Order (SDO) and the State Armaments Program (SAP). The number of experts employed by the FPI is estimated to be anywhere between 100 and 350.

According to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, the FPI’s charter is to work towards establishing long term linkages between fundamental sciences, applied research and the defence industry and ensure a qualitative revolutionary leap forward in Russian innovation. According to Andrei Grigoriev, the director general of the FPI, the establishment’s job is to forecast emerging revolutionary technologies and coordinate research projects accordingly over a time horizon of 15-20 years, with the aim of carrying out development to the stage of producing demonstration prototypes. The achievements of the FPI so far are not very evident from literature available in the open domain, but going by Russia’s claimed breakthroughs in some high technology areas such as hypersonic weapons and autonomous systems, it is perhaps proving to be effective. At the same time, it has reportedly been criticised for being over-bureaucratised with several echelons of managers and a long chain of command, which does not compare favourably with the flat structure of DARPA and the high autonomy in functioning accorded to DARPA project managers [8].

Overview of R&D in the Defense Sector

The defense sector plays a dominant role in the overall Russian R&D innovation ecosystem. It employs 50 percent of all researchers, receives about 35-40% of total R&D funding, accounts for 70 percent of all high-technology products, and around 42 percent of its production goes for into the civilian market. However, its following characteristics are not very conducive for innovative research: it is dominated by government organizations and receives funding on a non-competitive basis, has tight top-down controls in place and the research effort is fragmented and not effectively linked to the education system [9].

The Civil S&T Organs

Due to the largely dual-use nature of emerging disruptive military technologies, the R&D carried out by civil S&T establishments also has good potential for contributing towards military innovation. The following four bodies receive a major share of the state civil R&D budget: the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) with 50,000 scientists, around 400 institutes and spending a third of the civil research budget; the Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), responsible for Russia’s space program; the State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom), and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. A further three bodies, the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH), and the Foundation for Promotion of Small Enterprises and Technology (FASIE) share a smaller portion of the R&D budget through a competitive procedure. In addition, certain ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, have their own R&D budgets [10].

Defence R&D Budget

Official figures suggest that Russia’s military expenditures have ranged between $60 billion and $65 billion a year, or roughly 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP) [11]. However, the extent of defense spending may be greater (up to three times more [12]) if assessed on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than market exchange rates.

Russia’s long-term defense spending priorities are detailed in State Armament Plans (GPVs), which run in 10-year increments. GPV 2020, which ran from 2011 to 2020, focused on increasing the military’s overall share of modernized equipment to 70%. The newest plan, GPV 2027, calls for total spending of about $330 billion (in 2018 dollars) and 3%-4% of GDP from 2018 to 2027. Based on an analysis of 17 years of data from 2000 to 2016 by RAND Corporation, Military R&D has accounted for 5% of total spending of the defence budget on average [13]. Extrapolating from here, total Defence R&D budget may be as high as US$ 10 billion (5% of US$ 200 billion, on PPP-based calculations).

Israel

Israel’s approach to military innovation has been shaped by geopolitical drivers as well as its strategic culture. The approach has been uniquely successful, transforming a seven decades old small nation into one of the largest arms exporters in the world, comprising of some of the most technologically sophisticated military systems.

Israel has consistently ranked among the top 10 defense exporting countries globally. During 2015-2019, Israel was ranked eighth on the list of the highest arms exporting countries, with a share of 3% of the global arms market. During the same period, India was the single largest customer for Israeli defense equipment, accounting for 49% share of the Israeli defense exports [14].

Notable factors and features which have contributed to the success of the Israel Defence Industry are dwelt upon in succeeding paragraphs.

Defence Industry

The establishment of a formal Israeli defence industry followed the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In 1958, the military R&D units within the Ministry of Defence were organized as a separate unit called Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd (or the Armaments Development Authority), which over the last six decades has become Israel’s central organisation for defence systems production, technology and research.

Overall, the defence industrial sector in Israel contains around 150 firms, divided into three categories for the purposes of classification. The large state-owned or government controlled defence companies form the first group. These are Israel Aerospace Industries, Israeli Military Industries (now privatised) and Rafael. The second group contains medium-sized firms, all in the private sector, which relies on defence production for their viability but also have large-scale civilian production particularly in the production of telecommunication equipment. The third group are small and medium sized enterprises which produce a narrow range of products mainly geared to the defence sector.

Major organs which form the backbone of the Israeli defence industry are as follows: the Directorate of Defence R&D (Ministry of Defence); Rafael, also referred to as the Armaments Development Authority (government affiliate); Israel Aircraft Industries (state owned); and the Israel Military Industries (till recently state owned and now privatised and acquired by Elbit Systems) [15, 16, 17].

• Directorate of Defense R&D. Part of the Ministry of Defence, this directorate is responsible for all functions related to defence R&D, including creation of infrastructure for advanced scientific and technical knowhow, sponsoring advanced R&D and fostering relationships with academic R&D institutions, amongst others. It is jointly run by the MoD and the IDF and is composed of specialized professional offices.
• Rafael (Armaments Development Authority). Rafael is a MoD affiliate, and Israel’s largest firm engaging in R&D for armaments and sophisticated combat platforms required by the IDF. It develops some of the world’s most advanced armaments and technologies. Established as a state owned enterprise about five decades ago as part of the MoD, it was incorporated in the early part of this century as a limited company to improve efficiency. Almost 10% of its revenue is reinvested into research. Manufacture of basic subsystems and components is contracted out to civilian industries. It contributes significantly towards commercial spin-offs from military R&D, and has formed partnerships with civilian companies to develop commercial applications based on its advanced technology over which it has patent rights. Of Rafael’s employees, one-third are university trained, 50% are technicians and practical engineers, and the rest are administrative workers.
• Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). Established in 1953 as Bedek Aviation Company, a governmental institute for aviation, IAI started out as an all-purpose service and supplies provider, specializing in air defense solutions. In the decades since, the Company has grown to become a world leader in both the defense and commercial markets, developing, producing and delivering state-of-the-art technologies and systems across a range of domains, including air, land, sea, space, cyber, homeland security and ISR. Since 1968 the IAI has been a limited-liability state-owned enterprise, with the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Transportation, and Industry and Trade represented on its board.
• Israel Military Industries (IMI) Systems Ltd. Established in 1933 as Israel Military Industries Ltd, and wholly owned by the State of Israel, IMI Systems Ltd was till recently a preferred supplier of the IDF. With a worldwide presence and strong partnerships and collaborations with defense and governmental organizations, IMI Systems conducted large-scale defense projects. The nation-wide Company employed 3200 employees in its various business areas. In Dec 2018, IMI Systems was privatised and acquired by Elbit Systems and renamed as Elbit Land. Elbit Systems is Israel’s largest defense company. In 2019, it was ranked 28th by SIPRI amongst the Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world, and is a key part of Israel’s hi-tech and ground-breaking defense technology sector [18].

Defence R&D Budget

Israel’s expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP is the highest in the world (4.58%), out of which roughly 30% goes towards military R&D. By comparison, only 17% of US R&D is for the military [19]. Further, Israel’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is also one of the highest in the world. Its military expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure is also one of the highest, varying between 13-15% [20]. However, there has been a steady decline over the years in the Israeli defense budget, which stands at about US$17.6 billion in 2019.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security and UNESCO Institute of Statistics (Compiled by Index Mundi) [21, 22]

Existential Threat: Asymmetric Qualitative Edge

One of the primary drivers of defence innovation in Israel has been its pledge for survival against a perceived existential threat. Ever since its birth as a nation in 1948, Israel has been embroiled in military conflicts more than any other country. It sees itself as a nation of a few surrounded by enemies with greater numerical strengths, greater resources and larger militaries, the only viable counter to which lies in achieving an asymmetrical qualitative edge in military technology over its adversaries [23].

Military Strategy: “Improvisational” rather than “Conceptual”

Much before the term “defence innovation” came into usage, Israel strategic thought referred to a notion of “qualitative military edge (QME)”, which essentially represented a harmonic synthesis of three factors: technology; high educational qualification and motivation of its soldiers; and creative operational strategies. At the same time, Israeli military culture has always been better characterised as being “improvisational”, with almost an aversion to transformative or revolutionary changes in doctrines, organisations and operational concepts. The IDF has believed in smart weapons rather than smart concepts, and reacted to failures through quantitative-technological upgrades rather than qualitative-conceptual modifications. It prefers to adopt a “problem solving” over an “intellectual” approach to operations, and Israelis are best thought of as “doers rather than talkers”. However, in recent years there has been an attempt to give higher importance to evolution of doctrine and transformation of organisational structures [24].

Working Ethos

A number of societal-cultural traits of Israelis create an environment immensely suited for innovation. These include a lack of distance in superior subordinate relations; an attitude of practicality, assertiveness and audacity in execution; a focus on essentials and a tendency to simplify everything; lean and simple organizational structures of the military and defense industrial bureaucracies; egalitarian social norms leading to casualness of behaviour and scant importance to hierarchy; and encouragement to subordinates to question their superiors and come up with innovative solutions [25, 26].

Cadre of ‘Soldier Scientists’

The political and defence leadership has created an ecosystem in which a high level of synergy is achieved amongst education, science, technology, military, and economic factors. A very noteworthy feature of this ecosystem is that the state very deliberately identifies the brightest of its scientifically and technologically-oriented youth from its educational system and recruits them for compulsory military service. Israeli universities and high schools, well supported by the government, ensure a solid scientific-academic foundation for training this youth. The number of researchers per million in Israel in the highest in the world (approx. 8000, as compared to 4000 in the US, 3000 in Russia, 1200 in China and 200 in India) [27].

A shining example of talent management for military innovation by the IDF is the Talpiot Program, which is an elite IDF training program, in place since 1979, for recruits who have demonstrated outstanding academic ability in the sciences and leadership potential. Graduates pursue double higher education while they serve in the army, and they use their expertise to further IDF research and development in technological leadership positions. It is a 40 months program comprising of academic graduate courses in computer science, physics and mathematics together with field training in all the branches of the IDF. At its culmination, the cadets are commissioned into the IDF to be integrated in R&D establishments or the Israel Military Industries, or even in various combat positions if they so choose, for a period of six years. Such a cadre of ‘soldier scientists’ plays a vital role in the defence innovation system in conjunction with the civil R&D community [28, 29].

Even after shedding their uniform, these soldier scientists successfully utilise their unique combination of military ethos and entrepreneurial spirit as part of the defence industries, drawing upon their military resilience, a network of trusted contacts and first-hand knowledge of military requirements [30].

[Continued in “Approach to Defence Innovation: Russia, Israel and France – Part II“]

References

(1)     List of Countries by GDP (nominal), Wikipedia, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal).

(2)     Peter D Wezeman et al, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019, SIPRI Fact Sheet, Mar 2020, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/fs_2003_at_2019_0.pdf.

(3)     Dmitry Adamsky, Defense Innovation in Russia: The Current State and Prospects for Revival, IGCC Defense Innovation Briefs, Jan 2014, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0s99052x.

(4)     Vasily Kashin, The State of Defense Innovation in Russia: Prospects for Revival? IGCC Defense Innovation Briefs, Jan 2014, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4g46d0z3.

(5)     Vasily Kashin, Russian Perspectives on the Third Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Russian-Chinese Defense Technological Cooperation, SITC Research Briefs, Series 9 (2017-11), 28 Feb 2017, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2dh5c1nh.

(6)     Military-Industrial Commission of Russia, Wikipedia, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-Industrial_Commission_of_Russia#:~:text=It%20coordinates%20between%20the%20Defence,body%20with%20a%20similar%20name.
(7)     Military Industrial Commission – History, Global Security, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/vpk-history.htm.

(8)     Dmitry Adamsky, Defense Innovation in Russia: The Current State and Prospects for Revival …

(9)     Ibid.

(10)   Ibid.

(11)   Andrew S Bowen, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, CRS Report, 30 Jun 2020, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11589.pdf.

(12)   Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly, Why Russian Military Expenditure is Much Higher than Commonly Understood (as is China’s), War on the Rocks, 16 Dec 2019, Accessed 10 Aug 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-is-much-higher-than-commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/#:~:text=This%20is%20partially%20due%20to,robust%20expansion%20of%20military%20spending.

(13)   Andrew S Bowen, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, CRS Report …

(14)   Peter D Wezeman et al, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019 ….

(15)   Israel Cabinet Ministries: Ministry of Defense, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-ministry-of-defense.

(16)   IAI and the Security of Israel, IAI Website, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.iai.co.il/about/history/

(17)   Seth J Frantzman, Israel’s Revolutionary Defense Industry, 23 May 2019, The Jerusalem Post, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israels-revolutionary-defense-industry-590370.

(18)   Dr Aude Fleurant et al, The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2018, SIPRI Fact Sheets, Dec 2019, pp. 9, Accessed 17 Aug 2020, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/1912_fs_top_100_2018.pdf.

(19)   Yaakov Katz, Why Israel has the most Technologically Advanced Military on Earth, 29 Jan 2017, New York Post, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://nypost.com/2017/01/29/why-israel-has-the-most-technologically-advanced-military-on-earth/.

(20)   Vishakh K. Valiathan, Defence R&D in Israel – An Overview, ISSSP Jul 2016, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, http://isssp.in/defence-research-and-development-rd-in-israel-an-overview/#:~:text=Israel%20is%20among%20the%20world’s,part%20in%20the%20development%20process.

(21)   Israel – Military Expenditure (% of GDP), Index Mundi, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/israel/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.

(22)   Israel – Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP), Index Mundi, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/israel/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS.

(23)   Dmitri Adamsky, The Israeli Approach to Defence Innovation, SITC Research Brief, May 2018, UC San Diego IGCC, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t07267h.

(24)   Richard A Bitzinger, Military-Technological Innovation in Small States: The Cases of Israel and Singapore, SITC Research Brief, May 2018, UC San Diego IGCC, Accessed 18 Aug 2018, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7vp2x155,

(25)   Dmitri Adamsky, The Israeli Approach to Defence Innovation …

(26)   Richard A Bitzinger, Military-Technological Innovation in Small States: The Cases of Israel and Singapore …

(27)   Researchers in R&D (per million people), World Bank: World Development Indicators, Compiled by Index Mundi, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6/compare#country=cn:in:il:ru:us.

(28)   Dmitri Adamsky, The Israeli Approach to Defence Innovation …

(29)   Talpiot Program, Wikipedia, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talpiot_program.

(30)   High-tech’s Israeli Military Connection, Automotive News Europe, 19 Jan 2019, Accessed 18 Aug 2020, https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/high-techs-israeli-military-connection.