Sections

Introduction

Background

Techno-Nationalism and Indigenous Innovation

Civil Military Integration

National S&T Development Plans

References

Introduction

Over the decades, India’s defense science, technology and industrial (DSTI) sector, with the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in the lead, has by and large failed to deliver on the ground, barring a few notable successes. With the advent of highly sophisticated and disruptive military technologies such as AI & robotics, quantum, nano and hypersonic technologies on the 21st Century battlespace, the challenge of revitalising India’s defense industry is becoming an increasingly uphill task. The uninspiring performance of our DSTI sector has been a matter of much debate over the years, and despite honest efforts by the Government to energize it, there has been little discernible improvement.

This is the second in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D enterprise by first studying the defence innovation approaches of countries which are at the forefront of research in cutting edge military technologies. As the concluding article will reveal, this work adopts an introspective approach from the standpoint of the Defence Services, based on the conviction that the main impediments to bringing about the desired transformative change are to be found within the Services.

In the previous piece of this series, the defence R&D ecosystem of the US was reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This article (in two parts) carries out a similar review for China, our daunting next-door military adversary which is well on its way to match up to and maybe even surpass the technological supremacy of the US in the coming decades.

Background

China has always prioritised the development of what has been termed as its “strategic innovation system (SIS)”, described as a national network of organisations that pursue defence innovation for the development of its national security capabilities. Since the 1950s, a “techno-nationalist” approach has been adopted by the Chinese leadership for developing China’s SIS, with its intensity varying in tune with the external strategic environment [1].

The decade of the 1990s, however, spurred the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into changing gears, after having witnessed the dramatic demonstration of US military power during the Gulf War as well as the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Acknowledging the technological superiority of US forces, China set forth on a path to achieve technological parity with the advanced militaries by increasing defence budgets, acquiring new weapons and boosting the Chinese defence industry. A special focus was given to “indigenous innovation” through the promulgation and execution of various development plans. The first of these, the National Medium and Long Term Program (MLP) for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), was promulgated in 2006. Several other plans have been released thereafter, most notably the Made in China (MIC) 2025 Plan and the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AI Plan). All these plans emphasize the importance of dual-use technologies and civil-military integration (CMI). Funding for Chinese R&D too has been increased radically over the decades, with a high proportion of this budget dedicated to defence R&D.

As a result of the above measures, the Chinese DSTI base has made rapid advancements over the previous decade and a half, going a long way towards fulfilling the increasing operational requirements of the PLA. The PLA’s approach to modernisation is reflected in its “double construction” approach of “mechanisation” and “informatization”, the former aimed at upgrading existing and conventional weapons and introducing new ones, and the latter over a longer term geared towards ushering in a revolution in military affairs (RMA) powered by information and communication technologies [2].

China’s military-technological programs, in furtherance of its “indigenous innovation” and CMI strategies, are deeply integrated with its civilian S&T base, which in turn is linked to global commercial and scientific networks. The key aim is to leverage available global expertise for development of civil and military advanced technologies, thus reducing the time and costs associated with fundamental and advanced research and overcoming technological disadvantages. Various measures which have been adopted towards this end include exploitation of open sources, technology transfer and joint research, the return of Western-trained Chinese students, and industrial espionage.

With policy, plans and funding no longer a constraint, the primary hurdle in the development of China’s SIS seemed mired in bureaucratic and institutional weaknesses of organisations styled on the Russian approach to industrialisation. President Xi Jinping, in pursuance of the Chinese Dream, which is his vision of restoring China’s great power status, has been pushing military reforms in order to overcome these institutional weaknesses and promote military innovation [3].

The sections which follow provide an insight into the strategies, plans and structural reforms which have been evolved and vigorously implemented by China over the last decade towards achieving its stated goal of becoming the leading world military power by the mid-century.

Techno-Nationalism and Indigenous Innovation

Techno-nationalism and indigenous innovation are two themes which underlie the various plans and strategies which have been put in place by the CCP for giving a fillip to defence innovation [4].

Techno-Nationalism

This strategic principle advocates that a state-controlled and closed-door approach to technological and industrial development is the best way to safeguard national security, economic competiveness, and international status. Emphasis is placed on nurturing indigenous capabilities through the adoption of highly regulated protectionist regimes that encourages the one-way importation of advanced technologies and knowledge. The MLP is a leading example of a plan that is avowedly techno-nationalistic in nature.

Indigenous Innovation

Although this strategy is often referred to in Chinese development plans, there is not much clarity on what it implies. When the term first appeared in the MLP, it seemed to promote original innovation, re-assembling existing technologies in different ways to produce new breakthroughs, and the absorption and upgrading of imported technologies. This interpretation continues to be the best understanding of this term even today.

Civil-Military Integration (CMI)

The strategy of Civil-Military Integration (CMI) is at the very heart of China’s Defence R&D ecosystem. The ideological roots of this strategy can be traced back to Mao’s notion of “people’s warfare”, which advocated a “whole-of-society” approach to military mobilisation, with industrial policy formulated to fully support military modernisation [5].

The 1991 Gulf War convinced Chinese strategists that modern warfare has transitioned from the mechanised warfighting methodologies of the industrial age to informationized warfare of the information age, and established the imperative of military modernisation through technology development. The CCP’s 19th Party Congress Report stated, “We must keep it firm in our minds that technology is the core combat capability, encourage innovations in major technologies, and conduct innovations independently.” At the same time, it became evident that the resource commitment needed to reach and maintain technological parity with other major military powers was too enormous to be met through the defence budget alone. Thus, effective CMI was seen to be the only feasible solution for carrying out the requisite military modernisation [6].

In its earlier version, the CMI strategy was envisaged as a two-pronged approach: in the first step, revitalise the defence sector by encouraging it to produce consumer goods; and in the second step, leverage commercial dual-use technologies acquired as a consequence of commercial ventures, including through foreign partnerships, to “spin-off” onto military applications. This approach had limited success for various reasons [7].

The CMI strategy was subsequently upgraded to a much higher degree of convergence between military and civil R&D capabilities, requiring not only the development of dual-use technologies but also active promotion of joint civil-military technology cooperation. In President Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the CMI strategy was referred to as “military-civilian fusion with Chinese characteristics”, signifying a more comprehensive approach to a tightly constructed dual-use economy. In 2016, President Xi Jinping elevated CMI into a national-level strategy, which is seen to be a reflection of his aggressive political agenda to bind the defence sector and civilian economy together, outcompete the West in science and technology, and build a preeminent military power.

President Xi’s vision of military-civil fusion aims to fulfil three strategic objectives: facilitate transfers between the defense and civilian sectors to improve the sophistication of China’s military technology, particularly in sectors critical to informationized warfare; create cohesion in Chinese industry and academia working with and in support of military objectives, so that the entire system can be effectively mobilized to support the military in the future; and drive technological innovation and economic growth. The CMI strategy lays special emphasis on the harnessing of emerging dual-use technologies such as AI, machine learning, big data, and unmanned systems to facilitate what PLA writings refer to as “intelligentized” warfare [8].

In 2017, China established a Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, chaired by President Xi, to centralize government control and oversight of CMI and to break down organizational barriers. The Commission has issued guidance on public outsourcing of defense contracts, and regulations to align technology standards in order to improve cooperation on joint projects.

While the launch of the Commission is an important step for the management of CMI reforms, several management challenges still persist, including having to deal with a large number of institutions with diverse interests, and lack of coordination between national and local actors. Nevertheless, now that it is led by a higher authority, a more effective push for inter-agency coordination is feasible [9].

National S&T Development Plans

Over the last few decades, China’s most important S&T development plans which focus on the development of dual-use technologies and military modernisation are the “863” Program, the National Medium to Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), the Made in China 2025 Plan, the Internet Plus Plan and the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. These are briefly reviewed in succeeding paragraphs [10].

The “863” Program

The highly successful National High Technology Program (“863”), launched in March 1986, focused on development of seven strategic dual-use technologies: laser technology, space, biotechnology, information technology, automation & manufacturing technology, energy, and advanced materials. It was subsequently expanded in the 1990s in size and scope, particularly to cover important emerging technologies such as supercomputers.

The National Medium to Long-term Plan (MLP) for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)

China’s “indigenous innovation” strategy is embedded primarily in the MLP, which is a very ambitious S&T Plan with total funding estimated at US $75 billion. The MLP was conceived by a leadership that saw the first two decades of the twenty-first century as a strategic opportunity to catch up with the world’s leading advanced economic and technological powers. The drafting of the Plan took three years, and thousands of scientists, engineers, academics, economists and military experts examined a large number of issue areas deemed vital to China’s S&T competitiveness.

Two major debates took place during the drafting of the MLP over its fundamental orientation. The first argument revolved around the inter se importance of indigenous innovation vis-a-vis technology imports. A second polarizing issue was whether the focus should be on the implementation of megaprojects in which the state played a central organizing role, or the emphasis should be on a more decentralized, bottom-up, market-driven process. These debates were settled in favour of indigenous development and a “megaprojects” approach respectively.

Promulgated in 2006, the MLP focused on 16 National Megaprojects (including three classified military projects) in areas such as electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, aerospace, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, clean energy, and oil & gas exploration. The MLP was characterized by a renewed emphasis on the techno-nationalist approach, but with a distinctly commercial nature that was markedly different from earlier approaches which were military-dominated.

Another fundamental principle of the MLP is the centrality of national security in the development of a world-class independent S&T capability. Consequently, defense and civil-military dual-use priorities are of utmost importance. The MLP seeks to blur the classical distinction between civilian and military technologies and points out that S&T development should benefit both civilian and defense needs at the same time.

The Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus Plans

The Made in China 2025 (MIC) and the Internet Plus plans, released in 2015 and covering the period up to 2025 and beyond, may together be considered as China’s response to global manufacturing trends represented by “Industry 4.0”, or the fourth industrial revolution after steam, electric power and computer revolutions. This revolution is powered by the following nine emerging technologies: autonomous robots, simulation, horizontal and vertical integration, the Internet of Things (IoT), cybersecurity, cloud computing, additive manufacturing, augmented reality, and big data and analytics.

The following features characterise both plans: a mix of old and new policy initiatives, innovation driven by market principles rather than government intervention, and adoption of a “megaproject” approach.

The MIC Plan spells out a three-phase strategy for China to achieve its stated goal of becoming a world-leading manufacturer by 2049, the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, which is as follows: basic industrialisation by 2025 through innovation and manufacturing efficiency; become competitive with developed manufacturing powers by 2035; and become a world leading manufacturer by 2049.

The MIC Plan has identified the following 10 strategic industries to be focused on: new generation information technology, high-grade machine tooling and robotics; aerospace equipment; marine engineering equipment and high-tech ships; advanced rail transportation equipment; new-energy automobiles; electric power equipment; agricultural equipment; new materials; and biomedicine and high-tech medical devices.

One of the primary goals of the Plan is to reduce reliance on imported technology and nurture a fully indigenous defence sector by developing proprietary dual-use technologies aimed at modernising its military. Based on past experience, apprehensions have been expressed by countries which currently lead the world in advanced military technologies that China might resort to stealing sensitive intellectual property in pursuit of its stated goals. As a result, of late Chinese leaders have softened their rhetoric on the MIC Plan [11].

New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan

In July 2017, the State Council of China released the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AI Plan). This Plan outlines China’s strategy to build a domestic AI industry worth nearly US$150 billion over the next few years and to become the leading AI power by 2030. China’s focus on AI, in addition to other technologies, is also seen to be its response to the Third Offset Strategy of the US. As per Chinese military thought, autonomous military systems and human-machine teaming on the battlefield of the future will graduate to a level where the pace of combat operations will reach a “singularity”, beyond which human decision-making will no longer be able to cope with the battle situation, and decision-making will increasingly be taken over by AI powered intelligent machines [12].

The AI Plan lays down its strategic goals in a three-step process, briefly summarised here: by 2020, bring up expertise in overall technology and application of AI on par with the advanced level of the world; by 2025, achieve a major breakthrough in AI basic theory, make AI the main driving force of China’s industrial and economic transformation, and achieve positive progress in the construction of an AI society; by 2030, be a world leader in AI theory, technology and application, and become a major AI innovation centre of the world.

The AI Plan also aims to strengthen AI in the field of military-civilian integration by improving coordination between scientific research institutes, universities, enterprises and military units, promoting AI technology in “military-civilian two-way transformation”, and encourage embedding of AI technology in defence products and applications [13].

In pursuance of the AI Plan, the Central Military Commission (CMC) Science and Technology Commission has launched well-funded plans focused on cutting edge technologies, with AI being prominent amongst them. The PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force are all pursuing their own service-specific AI projects through their captive research institutes and partnerships. The Academy of Military Science (AMS) and the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) are the premier PLA institutions which are pioneering military initiatives in AI. The main stakeholders in AI R&D within China’s military industrial complex are the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) [14].

[Continued in “China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part II”]

References

(1)     Brian Hart, CSR 2019: Organizational Reform as a Key Driver of Chinese Military Science and Technology Innovation, 29 Oct 2019, The SAIS China Studies Review, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://saiscsr.org/2019/10/29/csr-2019-organizational-reform-as-a-key-driver-of-chinese-military-science-and-technology-innovation/.

(2)     Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger, Strategic Contours of China’s Arms Transfers, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (SPRING 2020), pp. 91-116, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-1/Raska.pdf.

(3)     Lindsay Maizland, China’s Modernizing Military, 05 Feb 2020, Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military.

(4)     Tai Ming Cheung et al, Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense Development, 28 Jul 2016, University of California Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/research/planning-innovation-understanding-chinas-plans-technological-energy-industrial-and-defense, pp. 155-158.

(5)     Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials and New Energy, 2019 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 3-Section 2, Nov 2019, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2019-annual-report-congress, pp. 208.

(6)     Brian Lafferty, Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Chapter 16, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf, pp. 627-660.

(7)     Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials and New Energy…, pp. 208-209.

(8)     Ibid., pp. 210.

(9)     Brian Lafferty, Civil-Military Integration and PLA Reforms …, pp. 642-647.

(10)   Tai Ming Cheung et al, Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense Development, …, pp. 27-55.

(11)   Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, US DOD Annual Report to Congress, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf, pp. 100.

(12)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies: Part I: Classification, AI & Robotics and Quantum Technologies, 28 Apr 2020, Future Wars, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/disruptive-military-technologies-an-overview-part-i/.

(13)   New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, 08 Jul 2017, Notice of the China State Council, Foundation for Law & International Affairs, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://flia.org/notice-state-council-issuing-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan/, pp. 5-6.

(14)   Elsa Kania and John Costello, Quantum Leap (Part 2): China’s Advances in Quantum Information Science, 21 Dec 2016, China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume 16, Issue 19, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/quantum-leap-part-2-strategic-implications-quantum-technologies/, pp. 25-26.