DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Regulation of AI-Enabled Military Systems: A Risk-Based Approach – Part II
This is the second part of a two-part article which sketches out the contours of a risk-based approach to regulation of AI-enabled military systems. In the first part the proposed EU AI Act, which adopts a risk-based approach for civilian applications, was first reviewed. Thereafter, a risk-based approach for military systems was introduced, represented by a Risk Hierarchy with a five-level risk architecture. The rationale for arriving at the five levels of risk was also given out. This second part continues with the description of the risk-based approach by first categorizing weapon systems into ten classes, and then assigning them to the higher three levels of the Risk Hierarchy which correspond to weapon systems. An insight is then provided on how a differentiated risk-mitigation mechanism, to be linked to each of the five risk levels, may be worked out, and also how such a risk-based approach could help in reaching international consensus on regulation of AI-enabled military systems.
Regulation of AI-Enabled Military Systems: A Risk Based Approach – Part I
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based applications and systems pose significant risks, arising mainly as a result of the unique characteristics of machine learning technology. AI-enabled military systems, in particular, are of special concern because of the threat they pose to human lives. This has given rise to a host of legal, ethical and moral conundrums. At the same time, it is universally accepted that huge benefits could accrue to humankind, both on and off the battlefield, if the power of AI is leveraged in a responsible manner. This double-edged character of AI technologies points to the need for a carefully thought out mechanism for regulating the development of AI technologies. AI-triggered risks posed by different types of military systems may vary widely, and applying a common set of risk-mitigation strategies across all systems will likely be suboptimal. A risk-based approach has the potential of overcoming these disadvantages. This work attempts to sketch the contours of such an approach which could be adopted for the regulation of military systems. In this first part, the EU proposal for civilian applications, which adopts a risk based approach, is first discussed. Thereafter, a risk-based approach for military systems is introduced, and the rationale for a five-level risk architecture is given out.
Atmanirbharta in Defence Technologies: Armed Forces as Pivot
In this episode of Def Talks on YouTube, Aadi Achint discusses with Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar the all important issue of Atmanirbharta in defence technologies. The central concept proposed here is that the focus needs to shift from current efforts to improve the defence procurement process to optimising the defence R&D process, with the Armed Forces acting as the pivot as opposed to the DRDO. With the changing character of warfare as a backdrop, the conversation first prioritises the critical military technologies which need maximum attention on the modern battlespace. Thereafter, an overview is given of past initiatives taken by India to boost self-reliance in defence, with lack-lustre results. Major highlights of R&D practices followed by world leaders in defence technologies are then given out, with a view to drawing useful lessons. Thereafter, several suggestions are made for carrying out a transformative restructuring of the defence R&D ecosystem, with the Armed Forces at the helm of affairs. Finally, it is contended that if the proposed restructuring is to yield the desired results, the Armed Forces need to undergo an internal transformation aimed at ushering in a culture of specialisation.
India’s Space Programme: Organisations and Warfighting Potential
This is the second and concluding part of a talk on India’s Space Programme which was given virtually on 25 May 2021 at the United Services Institution of India to its faculty, as well as undergraduate and postgraduate students taking part in a summer internship programme at the Institution. The first part of the talk covered satellite applications, launch vehicles, extra-terrestrial exploration and future missions. This part gives an overview of the organisations which are in place to steer the space programme, discusses the important aspect of militarisation of space including capabilities of global space powers, briefly reviews India’s space security policy and military space assets and capabilities, and also touches upon the commercialisation of the space sector. The talk is of approximately 30 minutes duration (script is included).
India’s Space Programme: Spacecraft, Launchers and Exploration
This talk gives a comprehensive insight into India’s space programme, covering satellite applications, launch vehicles, extra-terrestrial exploration, organisations, commercialisation of the space sector and the militarisation of space. The talk was given virtually at the United Services Institution of India to the USI faculty, and undergraduate and postgraduate students taking part in a summer internship programme. It is presented in two parts: this first covers spacecraft, launchers, and exploration aspects while Part II focuses on organisations and the important aspect of the militarisation of space. Each part is of approximately 30 mins duration.
Ideation for Defence R&D in India: Transformative Approach with Armed Forces as Pivot – Part III
India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector has long been a matter of concern, deserving serious introspection. This series of four articles has been written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. The first three articles reviewed the military modernisation strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France. In this concluding article (in three parts), an approach is presented which advocates that the Armed Forces, suitably empowered, must act as a pivot for driving India’s defence innovation process. The first two parts of this piece covered previous studies on this subject, certain facets of our national innovation strategy, the need for strategic guidance and existing structural shortcomings. In this final part, several major structural changes to the existing R&D enterprise have been proposed. In addition, specific recommendations have been made on how the Armed Forces need to transform themselves for achieving proficiency in managing high technology projects.
Ideation for Defence R&D in India: Transformative Approach with Armed Forces as Pivot – Part II
India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector has long been a matter of concern, deserving serious introspection. This is the concluding article in a series written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. Having reviewed the military modernisation strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France in the previous three articles, this concluding article (in three parts) proposes an approach which is fundamentally different from existing practices, advocating that the Armed Forces must act as a pivot for driving the defence innovation process, and be suitably empowered accordingly; and in order to perform this role effectively, they must make transformative changes internally for efficiently managing high technology projects. Part I of this piece covered previous studies, certain core issues and our national innovation strategy. This part discusses the importance of technology, need for strategic guidance and existing structural shortcomings.
Ideation for Defence R&D in India: Transformative Approach with Armed Forces as Pivot – Part I
India was the second largest importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-19, and had a miniscule share of exports during the same period. India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector has long been a matter of concern, deserving serious introspection. This is the concluding article in a series written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. In the previous three articles of this series, the military modernisation strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. In this piece (covered in three parts), an approach is presented which is fundamentally different from existing practices, built upon the following principles: firstly, the Armed Forces must act as a pivot for driving the defence innovation process, and be suitably empowered accordingly; and secondly, in order to perform this role effectively, they must make transformative changes internally for efficiently managing high technology projects.
Ideation for Defence RD in India: Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part II
India was the second larger importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-2019 with a share of 9.2%, and 82% of its imports are from Russia, Israel and France. On the other hand, its share of arms exports is a meagre 0.2%. It is evident that a serious introspection is needed to examine the reasons behind this uninspiring performance by the Indian DSTI sector. This is the third in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence industrial complex. In the previous two articles of this series, the defence innovation approaches of the US and China were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This piece is in continuation to “Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part I”, and together they carry out a similar review for Russia, Israel and France, the three countries from which India imports most of its arms.
Ideation for Defence R&D in India: Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part I
India was the second larger importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-2019, with a share of 9.2%, with 82% of its imports being from Russia, Israel and France. On the other hand, India’s share of international arms exports during the same period was only 0.2%. In contrast Israel, despite a GDP eight times lesser than that of India, has a share of international arms exports during the same period which was the eight highest in the world at 3% (15 times that of India). It is evident that a serious introspection is needed to examine the reasons behind this uninspiring performance by the Indian DSTI sector. This is the third in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. In the previous two articles of this series, the defence innovation approaches of the US and China were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This article (in two parts) carries out a similar review for the three countries from which we import the major proportion of our military systems, namely, Russia, Israel and France.