Sections

Introduction

Doctrines: Current Status

Proposed Doctrines: Conceptual Underpinnings

Enunciation of Doctrines

References

Introduction

Influence Operations as a term finds its roots in the notion of Influence which was intuitively defined by Robert Dahl in his seminal work The Concept of Power as follows: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do; and the objective of Influence Operation may be stated thus: shaping the behaviour and opinions of a target audience through the dissemination of information and conveying of messages. Cyber Influence Operations (CIO) as a concept is still evolving. Simply stated, these are Influence Operations conducted in and through Cyberspace. Over the last decade or so, CIO have garnered tremendous attention, because of the dramatic successes achieved by state and non-state actors in creating strategic effects through the employment of CIO. As a result, global players have taken noteworthy initiatives to come to grips with this new form of warfare in the Information Age.This series on CIO has endeavoured to study various facets of CIO, with the end objective of analysing its implications for India’s national security and recommending measures to be adopted by India for developing requisite capabilities in this area. The previous three articles threw light on the concepts, techniques and stratagems associated with CIO, and the doctrine, operational employment and capabilities of major global players, primarily Russia, US and China, and to some extent Pakistan.

This culminating article in the series (in three parts) reviews existing capability with the Indian Armed Forces for conducting CIO, and then outlines the way forward for developing doctrine (Part I), organisation (Part II), and most importantly, human resource (Part III) for fighting grey zone battles in the cognitive domain.

CIO are essentially a manifestation of Information Operations (IO) in cyberspace. Therefore, developing CIO expertise is largely contingent upon the capability to conduct IO. The approach adopted in this paper, therefore, is to first review and analyse existing and future IO doctrine, structures and capabilities, and then discuss aspects which are specific to the conduct of CIO.

It merits mention here that, in the absence of doctrine and formal definition of most terms in the Indian context, the scope and nuances of various concepts presented in this work are largely propositions, even though at times a definitive tone has been used.

Doctrines: Current Status

Joint Services Doctrines

The first Joint Doctrine on Information Warfare (IW) was issued in 2005. This was revised in 2010, which is the current version [1]. A Joint Doctrine on Perception Management and Psychological Operations (PM Doctrine) was also issued in 2010 and is available in the open domain [2]. The doctrine on IW being classified, its analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Separate doctrines on Psychological Operations (Psy Ops), Public Information (PI) or any other operation in the cognitive domain are not available. The following observations may be made on the PM Doctrine:-

• This doctrine considers PM as the parent discipline, encompassing all information and cognitive operations, as depicted below:-

• The Doctrine does not formally define the above terms but offers a paragraph worth of explanation for each of them.
• The explanation of the term PM given here is very close to the US DOD definition of this term, which was dropped from US DOD terminology around 2011 [3, 4].
• The inter-relationships between these five disciplines are not clearly enunciated and appear to be at variance with the conceptual treatment of these terms in the Joint and Indian Army (IA) IW doctrines. The subordination of IO to PM in concept is not found anywhere else in the literature. The limited explanation of what this entails, as given out by the Doctrine, raises more questions than answers.
• The Doctrine lacks rigour in the treatment of various concepts.

Indian Army (IA) Doctrines

The IA Doctrine on IW was initially issued in 2004. A revised doctrine was subsequently promulgated in 2010, which is the current version. This doctrine considers CO, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Psychological Warfare as the three primary components of IW. It does not make a distinction between technical and cognitive facets of IO [5].

CIO

There are no doctrines in existence today specifically dealing with CIO.

Proposed Doctrines: Conceptual Underpinnings

The Importance of Definitions

Wisdom begins with the definition of terms!
                                                                                                 ~ Socrates

Martin Libicki, the author of the seminal paper What is Information Warfare?, and whose concept of IW formed the basis for the original Joint and IA IW Doctrines, had the following to say on the importance of good definitions: “Clarifying the issues is more than academic quibbling. First, (if not defined properly) one aspect of IW, perhaps championed by a single constituency, assumes the role of an entire concept, thus becoming grossly inflated in importance. Second, too broad a definition makes it impossible to discover any common conceptual thread other than the obvious (that information warfare involves ‘information’ and ‘warfare’) where a tighter definition might reveal one [6].”

Definitions of not just IW but all core concepts are central to the way they unfold into an operational philosophy. Doctrinal thought, therefore, must be based on rigorously defined terminology, a characteristic which our doctrines often lack.

‘Technical’ vis-à-vis ‘Cognitive’ IO

A previous article in this series on CIO brought out that the emerging notion of CIO lies at the confluence of the nebulous concepts of Cyber Operations (CO) and Influence Operations, and is essentially a manifestation of IO in cyberspace.

The author argues elsewhere that Indian doctrines should classify various functions of IO into the following two streams: Information-Technical Operations (ITO) and Information-Psychological Operations (IPO). This recommendation is based on reasoning from first principles and finds perfect resonance with the IO doctrines of US, Russia and China. In this series, the terms ITO and IPO are used synonymously with the terms Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities (CEMA) [7] and Cognitive Operations respectively.

Disambiguation of Key Terms

A disambiguation between the terms Information Warfare (IW) and Information Operations (IO) can be found in an earlier post. In this work, these terms will be used synonymously, with IO being the preferred term. The terms Public Affairs (PA) and Public Information (PI) will also be taken to be synonyms; since Indian doctrine uses PI, this will be the preferred term in this work. The term Strategic Communication (SC) will be used to denote a specific set of operations, as elaborated upon in the following sub-section.

It is also worth bringing attention to the fact that, in this work, the letter ‘I’ in various acronyms stands sometimes for ‘Information’ and at other times for ‘Influence’. Since both terms are central to this discussion, due care needs is to be taken while interpreting the acronyms. Also, the acronym IO stands for Information Operations, not Influence Operations, and the acronym CO stands for Cyberspace Operations and not Cognitive Operations.

ITO/ CEMA

The ITO/ CEMA functions, namely, CO and EW, have been discussed adequately in the series on IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces, particularly in Part II. IPO/ Cognitive Operations require further elaboration, which follows.

Cognitive Operations

Cognitive Operations comprise a basket of distinct capabilities, which may be effectively captured into four disciplines, namely, Psychological Operations (PSYOP/ Psy Ops), Public Affairs/ Public Information (PA/ PI), Military Deception (MILDEC) and Strategic Communication (SC).

In the discussion which follows, a broad distinction is made between inform and influence activities. Inform activities are truth-based and unbiased; thus, selected information, even though truthful, would be beyond its ambit; as says an old proverb, “A half-truth is as good as a whole lie!”. In contrast, an information influence activity could resort to the use of selected information (and thus be biased), misinformation or even lies.

The scope of each of the four Cognitive Operations disciplines, as conceptualised in this work, is briefly explained below.

PSYOP. The term PSYOP, as an abbreviation for psychological operations, reflects the 2006 US DOD definition [8], which is as follows: planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviour of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Because of the negative connotations of the term, the DOD replaced PSYOP with the term Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in the 2012/ 2014 IO Doctrine [9], which continues to be the official terminology even today. It is noteworthy that the 2012 definition of MISO is identical to the PSYOP definition except that, significantly, the word ‘truthful’ was dropped. In practical usage within DOD circles, however, PSYOP is still the preferred term. A narrower conception, relevant to combat scenarios, describes these operations as those which are meant to target the adversary’s combat forces with the objective of inducing fear and reluctance or refusal to fight [10]. In its broadest usage in the literature, this term is used to refer to all hues of cognitive operations. Indian doctrine prefers the abbreviation Psy Ops, and its definition is very similar to the MISO definition. This work uses the term PSYOP and implies the MISO definition.

PI. These are actions aimed at informing foreign (hostile, neutral and friendly) as well as domestic audiences, and increasingly world opinion, with the objective of diminishing support for the adversary regime and generating support for own objectives [11]. The PI function mostly executes its missions through media of all types.

MILDEC. MILDEC may be characterized as actions executed during military campaigns to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission [12]. In another view of a similar notion, camouflage, deception and subterfuge are the means to create a false understanding on the part of an adversary of the physical, electronic or cognitive environments [13].

SC. The only formal definition of SC apparently exists only in a now superseded US DOD dictionary [14], as follows: SC is a whole of government approach focused upon effectively communicating national strategy, by understanding and engaging key audiences using coordinated programs and themes, synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. This work uses the term SC, but in a different sense, as explained below:-

• The US Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept [15] elaborates on SC as follows: SC essentially means sharing meaning (ie, communicating) in support of national objectives (ie, strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting and applies not only to information, but also physical communication – action that conveys meaning.
• The following facets of the US conceptualization of SC deserve attention: it is a whole of government approach, is pitched at the strategic level, and covers actions (not just information) that convey meaning.
• A thorough analysis of the scope of SC, as applicable in the Indian context, is clearly warranted. For the purpose of this work, SC implies two types of cognitive operations which are not covered within the ambit of PSYOP, PI or MILDEC, namely, Military Diplomacy (MD) and Civil Military Operations (CMO).
• MD. One way to define MD is as follows: Military communication and relationship building with foreign publics and military audiences for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy objective [16]. It comprises of actions such as creating bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials, appointment of defense attachés, bilateral defense cooperation agreements, training activities for foreign military and civilian defense personnel, exchanges between military personnel, and providing military support and aid with material and equipment [17].
• CMO. These may be defined as activities carried out to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to achieve desired objectives [18]. CMO is more applicable for expeditionary forces, and hence Indian doctrine does not have a formal concept of CMO. However, the Sadbhavna initiatives undertaken by the IA in J&K as well as in the Eastern Theatre find resonance with the concept of CMO. CMO would cover the ‘actions that convey meaning’ facet of SC.
• A concept of SC which covers only MD and CMO is restrictive as compared to the original notion. Alternatively, instead of SC, MD and CMO could be included as separate functions. The idea behind both these approaches is to include all inform and influence activities under the umbrella term Cognitive Operations which are distinct from its other three components, namely, PSYOP, PI and MILDEC. In this work the term SC is used to imply a combination of MD and CMO.

While each of the above cognitive functions is relevant to the Indian context, their definitions need to be refined/ modified further after due deliberation, and doctrine for each developed accordingly. This work advocates that use of the terms Perception Management and Psychological Operations as umbrella terms instead of Cognitive Operations should be avoided, mainly due of their negative overtones, but also because their literal meanings do not adequately cover the scope of all Cognitive Operations envisaged to be conducted by the Indian Armed Forces. On the other hand, the term Cognitive Operations appears to be a good choice, since all disciplines clubbed under it (PSYOP, PI, MILDEC, and SC) are those information operations which are intended to have effects in the cognitive domain.

A comparison of the above four cognitive functions of IO, capturing their features across certain key parameters, is tabulated as under:-

CIO

CIO being a manifestation of IO in cyberspace, the distinction between Technical and Cognitive facets of IO translate into a similar distinction within CIO, namely, Cyber-enabled Technical Influence Operations (CeTIO) and Cyber-enabled Social Influence Operations (CeSIO). Making such a distinction facilitates the understanding and implementation of operational, organisational and training issues related to CIO, as will be evident in the sections which follow.

It is important to note here that both CeTIO and CeSIO are essentially Cognitive Operations. CeTIO are the employment of CO (a Technical IO) with the intention of creating cognitive effects. CeSIO, on the other hand, uses Cognitive IO techniques (PSYOP, PI, SC) through the medium of cyberspace (messages, social media platforms, etc) without resorting to any intrusive CO, ie, no Technical IO capabilities are employed for the conduct of CeSIO. At times, however, there may be a need to carry out an integrated employment of CO and CeSIO for achieving certain types of cognitive effects. A fuller account of the notion of CIO and its components has been given out in an earlier article in this series.

The conceptual structure of IO and how it powers CIO in cyberspace may therefore be depicted as under:-

The operational employment of various tools and techniques in the arsenal of CIO, which may be grouped under either CeTIO or CeSIO categories depending on the IO capability which underpin them, must also be dealt with in the CIO doctrine. A detailed treatment of CIO techniques and stratagems is available in an earlier article in this series. Each of the CIO tools, techniques and stratagems is essentially rooted in one of the base IO capabilities enumerated above.

Not all IO Contribute Towards CIO

In this series, CIO have been theorized as the manifestation of IO in cyberspace. The tools, techniques and stratagems discussed earlier on in this series capture the scope of CIO in enough detail. Given this conceptualization, there are two sub-functions of IO which do not map into CIO, namely, EW and MILDEC, for the following reasons:-

• EW operates in the electromagnetic (EM) domain, and therefore by definition it cannot play out in cyberspace. Here it is assumed that definitionally, Cyberspace/ Cyber Domain and EM Domain are distinct and disjoint sub-domains of the parent Information Domain. This issue is discussed at some length in an earlier post.
• MILDEC, as defined above, is a cognitive operation undertaken during actual military operations, and as such does not resonate with the flavour of CIO as discussed here.

This partial correspondence of IO to CIO in cyberspace is also evident in the diagrammatic depiction of the mapping given above.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations may be expected to play a fundamental role while arriving at doctrinal precepts of IO/ CIO in liberal democracies. Depending on the nature of the IO/ CIO, ethical considerations would restrict their employment to specific target audiences and certain phases of conflict. Some examples given below illustrate this point:-

• In most cases, the target audience (TA) would be foreign populations (hostile, neutral or friendly). However, certain CIO techniques, such as propagation of Positive Narratives using PI, or perhaps White Propaganda, may be directed towards domestic audiences as well.
• CeTIO, which essentially involve low, medium or high-level cyber-attacks, may not be overtly employed by nations against even potential adversaries in peace-time settings. On the other hand, their use when hostilities are imminent or ongoing would be acceptable as a declared policy. In addition, a classified doctrine could lay down the contours for employment of covert CeTIO in no war no peace scenarios as well.
• Broadly speaking, use of CIO techniques/ stratagems which are rooted in CO, PSYOP and MILDEC would be subject to restrictions, while those which are underpinned by PA and SC could be justifiably directed towards all audiences and across the entire spectrum of conflict.
• There is a view that IO/ CIO capabilities such as PSYOP and MILDEC should be organizationally separated from PI and SC, because of the “black content” (untruths/ deceit element) involved in the former. The counterview is that separating out the two types of capabilities poses the risk of losing consistency of messaging and in the process reduce their synergistic effect.

Enunciation of Doctrines

The previous section gives out a conceptual basis for CIO, which may be used as guiding principles for evolving Indian doctrinal thought on IO/ CIO. This section argues that the CIO are essentially the domain of the Indian Armed Forces and lists the doctrines which need to be issued on priority.

Armed Forces as Pivot

At the outset, it may be stated that no CIO doctrine appears to have been enunciated by any nation so far, and CIO remains a nebulous concept at this juncture. Notwithstanding this, due to the increasing employment of CIO by nations in recent years for achieving strategic effects, it is an imperative for India to formalize an approach in this area and develop capabilities accordingly.

Given the characteristics of CIO discussed in the series up to this point, it is fairly evident that any structural model for conduct of CIO would involve the use of non-military resources to some extent (news media for PA, non-state actors for troll armies, etc). Notwithstanding this, the overriding consideration while arriving at such a model is that CIO be considered as an essential component of an overarching Armed Forces strategy for multi-domain operations (MDO) across the entire spectrum of conflict. Moreover, the author has argued elsewhere that the Armed Forces must have the sole charter for the defence of our national cyberspace, and particularly for the conduct of offensive cyber operations. Since CIO play out in cyberspace and need intrusive CO for achieving their full potential, the Armed Forces are the logical choice to act as a pivot for operationalizing this concept, with issuance of doctrines as a first step.

Doctrines to be Issued

A doctrine on CIO would be meaningless in the absence of relevant doctrines on IO. The following doctrines, therefore, are recommended to be enunciated on priority at joint and individual service levels: IO (upgraded doctrine), CO, Cognitive Operations and CIO. In a subsequent phase, separate doctrines on PSYOP, PI and SC are also recommended to be issued.

[Continued in “A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part II)”]

References

(1)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Existing IW Structures), Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(2)      Joint Doctrine for Perception Management (PM) and Psychological Operations (Psy Ops), HQ IDS, 25 Mar 2010, pp. 2-3, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(3)     Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US DOD, 12 Apr 2001 (22 Mar 2007), pp. 407, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(4)     CI Glossary – Terms & Definitions of Interest for DoD CI Professionals, US DIA, 09 Jun 2014, pp. 253, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(5)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section Existing IW Structures), …., Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(6)     Martin Libicki, What is Information Warfare? US National Defence University ACIS Paper 3, Aug 1995, Chapter 1 pp. 3, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(7)     FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, US Department of the Army, Feb 2014, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(8)     Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, US DOD, 13 Feb 2006, pp. II-1, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(9)     Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, US DOD, 27 Nov 2012 (20 Nov 2014), pp. II-9, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(10)   Peter Nicholson, Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain, Security Challenges Vol 2 No 1, 2006, pp. 140, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(11)   Joint Publication 3-61: Public Affairs, US DOD, 17 Nov 2015 (19 Aug 2016), Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(12)   Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US DOD, 08 Nov 2010 (15 Feb 2016), pp. 152, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(13)   Peter Nicholson, Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain, …, pp. 140, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(14)   Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, …, US DOD, 12 Apr 2001 (22 Mar 2007), pp. 551, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(15)   Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept (Executive Summary), US DOD, 07 Oct 2009, pp. (ii), Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(16)   Matthew Wallin, Military Public Diplomacy: How the Military Influences Foreign Audiences, American Security Project, Feb 2015, pp. 02, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(17)   Göran Swistek, The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy, Connections , Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 2012), pp. 82, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(18)   Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, …., pp. II-7, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.