Sections

HR Philosophy and Cadre Management

Cyber Operations

Cognitive Operations

Summary

References

[This piece is in continuation to “A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part II)”, which covered proposals for IO/ CIO Organisation]

HR Philosophy and Cadre Management

Academic Nature and Complexity of IO Disciplines

The academic nature of the ITO/ CEMA and IPO/ Cognitive Operations disciplines are distinctly different from each other. A brief overview of these disciplines, including an idea of the complexities involved in the functions involved in these disciplines, is given out in succeeding paragraphs [1].

Information-Technical Operations (ITO). ITO/ CEMA capabilities (CO and EW) have their theoretical foundations in the ICT disciplines. The Defend sub-function in both cases (Computer Network Defence (CND) and Electronic Protect (EP)) requires the least expertise, followed by the Exploit and Attack sub-functions, in that order, which demand increasingly higher levels of expertise. In general, the CO function is an order of magnitude more complex than EW from the point of view of training. On the other hand, equipment sophistication in EW is much higher. Although both CO and EW entail knowledge of foundation ICT disciplines as a starting point, subsequent expertise development in these functions follow distinctly divergent paths. The degree of specialisation needed in both cases is very high, with Offensive CO (Computer Network Attack (CNA)) occupying the highest rung on the specialisation ladder.

Information-Psychological Operations (IPO)/ Cognitive Operations. In contrast to ITO, the IPO/ Cognitive Operations practitioner needs to have a grounding in the social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, political science, history, etc. The PI and SC functions require expertise in mass communication, journalism and public relations as well. Here again, all areas require special expertise well beyond the foundation courses in social sciences, which needs to be honed through specialist training, as well as ‘on the job’ exposures over extended periods in specific military environments.

Human Resource (HR) Management Models

Establishing highly specialist organisations mandates the implementation of HR management models specifically designed to support them, if these organisations are to effectively execute their charter. Given the current HR policies in place in our Armed Forces, evolving and implementing the right talent management models is perhaps a greater challenge as compared to creating optimally structured IO organisations. This may be attributed to several factors which include, in addition to their highly specialist nature, the embryonic state of almost all the IO disciplines, as also the fact that most of these disciplines are specific to a military environment.

In order to address this challenge, some of the measures which need to be adopted are as follows: conduct of specialist structured training courses of duration ranging from a few months to full-fledged under-graduate and post graduate courses; new recruitment policies to tap existing talent within the country; raising of new cadres or new specializations within existing cadres; managing profiles based on repeated tenures, wherever creation of dedicated cadres is not feasible; and, adopting attractive career progression models unconstrained by considerations such as “rounded” profiles, etc. Even at the highest levels of hierarchy, profiles of various hues are needed, varying from combat-oriented profiles for formation commanders, to those with a very high specialist orientation for commanders/ staff heading establishments and staff verticals such as a Cyber Command, DG(IW), etc.

Cyber Operations

Proposed guidelines for the HR philosophy which should be adopted for the cyber operations cadre are given out in succeeding sub-sections [2].

Cadre Options

One of the following three options are available for consideration: raise a separate Inter-Services Cyber Corps; raise service-specific Cyber Corps; or, raise sub-cadres within existing Service Line Directorates. Given that all three Services are already imparting some form of cyber training, together with the issues associated with joint endeavours, a Tri-Services Cyber Corps may not be the right approach. Further, keeping in view existing resource constraints, it is recommended that, to begin with, the last option be adopted, and possibly separate out into a Service-specific Cyber Corps in a later timeframe. In the case of the IA, the line directorate best placed for this purpose is the Corps of Signals for the following reasons: ICT is its core expertise; it is officially mandated to carry out Defensive CO; and it is the de facto go-to Corps for Offensive CO as well. Similar solutions may be identified in the IAF and IN.

Cadre Management

A permanent cadre for Offensive CO is required to be created through selections, based on aptitude, from within existing uniformed cadre already trained for Defensive CO, as well as by means of direct recruitment from expertise available within the country. The Territorial Army (TA) option should be considered only to meet surge capacity, once permanent cadre strength has been fully made up. In the case of officers, to begin with a specialist profile contingent upon requisite qualifications and repeated tenures should be considered as a career progression model, whereas for other ranks, induction into the cyber cadre should be on a permanent basis.

Training

Structured training for Defensive CO is already being carried out by the three Services. Extensive training for Offensive CO, right up to post-graduate level, should be carried out at respective premier training institutions within the three Services (eg, Military College of Telecommunication Engineering for the Army). Efforts should be made to sponsor specialist post-graduate courses in CO at leading educational institutions within the Country.

Cognitive Operations

As discussed above, IPO/ Cognitive Operations comprise of PSYOP, PI, MILDEC and SC functions. An overall alignment and synergy are desirable amongst these four functions. In order to develop Cognitive Operations to the desired degree of maturity, considerable efforts will need to be devoted for developing expertise in the four disciplines, all of which happen to be in very nascent stages [3].

Specialisation an Imperative

Formal training in cognitive disciplines has so far not been undertaken by the Armed Forces with the desired degree of seriousness. As an exception, PI has received some attention, with short capsules on media management being provided in some of the command-oriented courses at different levels of service. Commanders and staff tenanting IPO assignments on a one-off tenure carry out their responsibilities by leveraging their general military experience, and on the strength of limited institutional knowledge which might exist within their establishments. This ad hoc approach to cognitive disciplines leaves much to be desired, especially in today’s information intensive world. It is vital, therefore, that suitable steps be initiated for developing these disciplines to a degree of professional maturity and train a specialist cadre for executing the various flavours of IPO.

Cadre Management and Training

Although trained manpower for the IPO disciplines is needed by all the three Services, the numbers required are small. Also, IPO specialists are presently not available with any of the Services. Given this status, it would be prudent to establish a tri-Service line directorate under HQ IDS for managing a new IPO cadre. A suitably structured tri-Service training institute should also be established as a centre of excellence for these disciplines. As a first step in this direction, a separate wing could be set-up at the Army War College. Broad recommendations for creating a trained cadre in the four cognitive disciplines are given out in succeeding paragraphs.

PSYOP

PSYOP demands staff as well as ground resources for executing operational tasks. Specialist training needs to be imparted for all personnel involved in PSYOP tasks. To begin with, cadre management at officer level could be based on providing repeated tenures, after suitable specialist structured training has been imparted. For lower ranks, creation of a PSYOP cadre within each Service is desirable. The Cognitive Operations Unit recommended to be raised (please see Section on Proposed IO/ CIO Structures in Part II) would primarily (maybe even exclusively) be manned by this PSYOP cadre. The strength of the cadre and the nature of training to be imparted will emerge once concepts and doctrine in PSYOP have been developed.

PI

The Defence PRO needs to be re-moulded in order to handle the challenges of the Information Age in conformity with the operational needs of the Armed Forces. For this to happen, this resource should be placed under HQ IDS, at least for operational deployment and training. Additional cadre may be recruited if needed. With respect to the Indian Army, the ADG (Cognitive Operations) should carry out its tasks through PI Cells (re-cast PRO) at each formation HQ, down to the Corps HQ in the initial phase. From considerations of maintaining credibility, these cells must carry out only ‘truth projection’ and be sufficiently shielding from the PSYOP function.

MILDEC

MILDEC must necessarily be a function of the Operations staff at any HQ, since planning for military deception is closely linked to actual operational plans. Officers specially trained in this discipline need to be posted to various HQ. Raising of specialist units may not be necessary for carrying out MILDEC tasks.

SC

As discussed in the section on Proposed Doctrines: Conceptual Underpinnings, in this work the scope of SC is restricted to Military Diplomacy (MD) and Civil Military Operations (CMO), and execution of SC tasks would require close coordination with several government ministries and agencies. At this juncture, the only viable recommendation that may be made for nurturing SC as a specialist discipline is to develop a joint services doctrine for it.

CIO

A previous article in this series has brought out that CIO are fast developing into a potent weapon within the overall ambit of IO. The spectrum of tools, techniques and stratagems listed out in the article clearly suggest that specialist training on CIO needs to be imparted. Officers trained on CIO should be posted to Cognitive Operations branches at HQ IDS, Service HQ and selected geographical commands.

Summary

Several doctrinal precepts and proposals for developing IO/ CIO capabilities have been discussed in the preceding sections from the perspective of the Indian Armed Forces. These are summarised in succeeding paragraphs.

Doctrine

CIO are the manifestation of IO in cyberspace. Hence, CIO doctrine in largely contingent upon the conceptualization of IO functions which underpin these operations. In the absence of adequate military literature on both IO/ CIO, there is a need to issue doctrines on IO, CO, Cognitive Operations and CIO. In a subsequent phase, separate doctrines on PSYOP, PI and SC are also recommended to be issued. While evolving this literature, it is important to make a distinction between the technical and cognitive facets of IO, as this has a major bearing on organisation and training. The importance of adhering to rigour while arriving at definitions of key terms has also been emphasized.

Although powered by IO, it is important to treat CIO as a distinct function. IO are better conceptualized as part of multi-domain operations (MDO) aimed at achieving the desired effects in full-fledged state-level conflicts. CIO, on the other hand are a potent means for achieving strategic effects in grey zone conflicts conducted below the kinetic threshold, resulting in blurring the lines between peace and war. Furthermore, the target audience for CIO are entire populations, foreign (hostile, neutral and friendly) as well as domestic. Given these unique characteristics, CIO need to be developed and operationalized as a special subset of IO. For conceptual clarity, a mapping from IO to CIO has been given out.

Organisation

Although a force-based model is felt to be more suited for operations in the information and cognitive domains, this work has proposed that a roadmap should be evolved with the objective of raising a Joint Services IO Command. In the first phase, the DCA should be upgraded on priority to a Cyber Command, and a tri-Service Cognitive Operations Unit should be raised. Staff structures have been proposed at the tri-Service as well as individual Service HQ, guided by the principle that technical and cognitive facets of IO/ CIO are fundamentally different from each other. The contours of a dual-control structure for IO/ CIO resources has also been given out. Finally, an evolutionary approach has been outlined for graduating to a full-fledged IO Command in a subsequent phase.

Training and Cadre Management

It has been highlighted that the technical and cognitive facets of IO/ CIO are grounded in ICT disciplines and social sciences respectively. Therefore, it is essential to create separate HR policies for recruitment, training and cadre management for these two distinctly different IO streams.

It has been proposed that while the responsibility for cyber training may be entrusted to respective Services, in the case of cognitive disciplines the training could be carried out jointly, since numbers in the initial phases are likely to be small.

The importance of evolving HR policies which are conducive for nurturing specialisation, for both technical as well as cognitive streams, has been emphasized. Towards this end, ownership of these two types of cadres needs to be given to specified line directorates. In the case of CO, out of the three options of having either a tri-Services line directorate, a new line directorate within each Service or a separate cadre within an existing line directorate, the last option has been recommended at this juncture. As an example, in the case of the Army the Corps of Signals has been suggested as the most suitable candidate for this purpose. For cognitive disciplines, while certain proposals have been mooted (placing the PRO under HQ IDS, creating a PSYOP cadre for lower ranks within each service) it is considered premature to make any concrete proposals at this juncture due to lack of adequate doctrinal clarity.

Conclusion

This four-article series on CIO has discussed conceptual and operational aspects of CIO and highlighted their emerging importance in 21st Century conflicts, with the objective of charting out a way forward for the Indian Armed Forces to gear up for this new form of warfare.

The first article attempted to disambiguate the cauldron of concepts and terminologies which surround the nascent notion of CIO and analyzed their relationship with IO and Influence Operations. The second article took a step further and dwelt on the multiple dimensions along which different flavours of CIO might unfold, the large variety of techniques which are available for conduct of CeSIO and CeTIO, and the manner in which these techniques may be synergistically employed to execute a multitude of influence stratagems in cyberspace. The next article provided insights into the CIO capabilities of Russia, US and China as part of their overall influence strategies under the three sub-heads of doctrines, operations and organizational structures.

This culminating article has first reviewed the capabilities which are currently existing with the Indian Armed Forces for conducting IO/ CIO, and then outlined the way forward for developing doctrine, organisation, and most importantly, human resource in order to harness their full potential.

The increasing importance of information and cognitive components of hybrid warfare in the 21st Century battlespace is not lost on the Indian military hierarchy. However, our strategists have yet to come to grips with this increasingly potent form of warfare, which requires professional acumen with characteristics vastly different from operational art orchestrated in the physical domain. This series is a call to action for the Indian Armed Forces to change tack and take determined steps for developing requisite capabilities for fighting grey zone battles in the cognitive domain.

References

(1)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part II: Convergence and Integrated Deployment (Section: Academic Nature and Complexity of IO Disciplines), Future Wars, 07 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(2)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Proposed IW Structures), Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(3)     Ibid.