Sections

Organising for CIO: Basic Considerations

Existing Indian IO/ CIO Structures

Proposed IO/ CIO Structures

References

[This piece is in continuation to “A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part I)”, which covered proposals for IO/ CIO Doctrine]

Organising for CIO: Basic Considerations

IO Capabilities are Exploited for CIO

Since CIO are essentially certain types of IO being executed in and through cyberspace for creating cognitive effects, it follows therefrom that the capability available for conduct of IO would be tasked to execute CIO as well.

It may also be noted that IO capabilities which have a mapping into CIO (please refer to the mapping diagram) are needed for operations other than CIO too. Thus, while CeTIO may be powered by CO, the scope of CO is not restricted to CeTIO alone, such as cyber-attacks on command and control systems, cyber espionage, etc. Similarly, while cognitive operations (PSYOP, PI and SC) conducted through cyberspace are termed as CIO, these cognitive operations are conducted outside of cyberspace as well. Finally, certain IO capabilities (EW, MILDEC) do not have a role to play in the execution of CIO.

The balance of this section will focus on organizational structures for integrated employment of IO, and thereafter elaborate in greater detail on the types of resources required for execution of CO, PSYOP and PI functions. Structures which may be needed specifically for the execution of CIO will also be discussed.

Apex Level Architecture for IO

Broadly speaking, operations in Infospace (often substituted by Cyberspace, an imprecise synonym) require a whole-of-government approach and are not restricted to the Armed Forces alone. Therefore, at the national level the charter for IO could be distributed amongst the Armed Forces and other government agencies. For instance, in Russia the FSB was mainly responsible for operations in Estonia and Georgia, but subsequently the centre of gravity for executing IO shifted to the GRU [1]. In the US, IO is primarily a military charter, with the DOD being responsible for CO, EW and PSYOP [2]; Public Diplomacy (PD), on the other hand, is to be conducted primarily by diplomats; the Department of Homeland Security too is responsible for defence of national cyberspace; and PA would need the involvement of the national broadcast media. Thus, nations evolve IO structures which best suit their requirements.

This work focuses on doctrine, organisation and training capabilities for IO/ CIO to be developed by the Indian Armed Forces. The following considerations dictate that IO/ CIO must be chartered to the MoD/ Armed Forces:-

• IO (including CIO) are operations in Infospace which need to be synergistically employed by the Armed Forces as part of multi-domain operations (MDO) in a five-dimensional battlespace [3].
• It has been argued elsewhere that offensive cyber operations (which power CeTIO) should primarily be the responsibility of the MoD/ Indian Armed Forces.
• As regards cognitive operations (which underpin CeSIO), PSYOP should be purely a military charter, as these operations can only be justified in conflict scenarios (not necessarily hot war). On the other hand, close coordination would be needed with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B Ministry) for PI, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) for SC (MD) and several other ministries for SC (CMO).
• EW and MILDEC, which do not map into CIO, are also essentially military activities.

IO Structures: ‘Command’ vs ‘Force’ Models

The US and China offer two different organisational models for the conduct of IO.

US ‘Command’ Model. At the apex level, the US DOD has organised the capabilities of CO, EW and PSYOP as different verticals under three separate functional unified combatant commands, namely, Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) respectively [4]. Function specific component commands within each Service are subordinate to the respective unified command. For instance, the Army Cyber Command is a component command under the USCYBERCOM. There is an ongoing thinking, at least in the US Army, that better integration is needed amongst the different IO verticals, and that an Army IW Command may be in the offing in the foreseeable future [5].

Chinese ‘Force’ Model. China, using a different model, raised the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in December 2015, which integrates all strategic IO as well as space capabilities under it. In addition, IO capabilities are available with each of the five re-structured regional commands as well [6]. However, details of these capabilities are not readily available in the open domain. Apart from being structurally better integrated, PLASSF also differs from the US model in that it is altogether a separate force on par with the PLA Army, PLAN and PLAAF, with a separate cadre.

Existing Indian IO/ CIO Structures

Joint Services IO Structures

The only IO organisation at the joint services level in India is the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA). Originally established as the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) and subsequently re-christened to Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA), the DCA has now been partly established as a tri-services organisation headquartered in Delhi. Approval was accorded in 2017 to upgrade DIARA to the DCA, which is a whittled down version of the Cyber Command proposed by the three Services as early as 2012. The DCA, once fully raised, is expected to have a decentralized structure, where the bulk of the Agency will be split into smaller teams embedded within operational forces in the tri-services commands, with its command centre in Delhi. It also aims at putting dedicated officers in major headquarters of the tri-services to deal with emerging cyber warfare issues [7].

At HQ IDS, IO comes under the charter of DCIDS (Ops & Trg).

IO Structures at Individual Service Levels

The following IO establishments exist at the individual Service levels:-

• Staff Structures. In the Army, so far, the ADG MO (IW) was responsible for all aspects of cyber, EW and psychological warfare. The ADG Public Information (PI) is chartered to carry out the PI function. Approval of the MoD has now been granted for the creation of the posts of DG (IW) as well as DCOAS (Strategy), with the former reporting to the latter. The DG (IW) would have under him the existing ADG (IW) and the erstwhile ADG (PI) re-designated as ADG (Strategic Communication). This re-structuring is currently under implementation [8]. As regards field formations, specific IW related staff appointments exist at higher HQ, while at lower levels this function is carried out by the operations staff officers in addition to their normal duties. IO specific staff structures exist within the Air Force and Navy as well, although these are not as elaborate as in the Army.
• Cyber Establishments. The Army Cyber Group (ACG) is mandated to carry out all aspects of CO for the IA, less the implementation of defensive measures. Similar establishments exist within the AF and the Navy for providing cyber support to their respective Services.
• PSYOP Establishments. As of now, no PSYOP units/ establishments are in place.

CIO

There are no resources specifically dedicated to the conduct of CIO.

Proposed IO/ CIO Structures

Indian IW Command vis-à-vis Indian SSF

The Chinese ‘Force’ Model appears to have significant advantages over the US ‘Command’ Model, since it potentially allows a much higher synergy amongst various IO capabilities, which is very desirable. For instance, the INEW and CEMA doctrines envisage a synergetic employment of Cyber and EW capabilities for carrying out effective information attacks against adversary command and control systems. Similarly, effective CIO require a close coordination between Cyber and Cognitive Operations capabilities. Further, the ‘Force’ Model, with its captive cadre and HR policies, has a better potential to nurture the high levels of specialisation necessary for IO disciplines.

Notwithstanding the above advantages of the ‘Force’ model, a ‘Command’ model is recommended to be adopted by the Indian Armed Forces at this juncture, since resource constraints and existing mindsets are expected to render any initiative for raising a separate force, no matter how justified, seemingly indefensible.

Here it merits mention that, even in the case of the PLA SSF, a ‘bricks not clay’ approach was adopted, wherein instead of raising it from scratch, existing organisations and their component parts were renamed, re-subordinated and moved, and their command relationships redefined, although in future additional organisations may be added on as it evolves [9]. However, this approach too may not work in the Indian context, given the current level of jointness amongst the Services.

The views articulated in the sub-sections which follow have been developed upon proposals made in an earlier series, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces, and contextualized to the execution of CIO.

Joint Services Architecture

In view of the above considerations, the medium term (5-10 years) objective for the Indian Armed Forces must be to raise a full-fledged tri-services IO Command, which would coordinate the three main components of IO: CO, EW and Cognitive Operations. In such a plan, the three Services would field Group level establishments subordinate to the IO Command, which possess the capability to execute operations. Thus, in the realm of CO, while the Army already has an Army Cyber Group, existing cyber resources within the AF and Navy could also be re-structured as groups and/ or sub-groups. A dual-control structure is recommended, with part control being exercised through the technical channel (eg, ‘Cyber’ channel), and partly by the respective Service. Such a notional structure is depicted diagrammatically in the figure below.

 

The depicted architecture shows the dual-control structure only with respect to the cyber establishments. The specialist control would extend down to the lowest establishment/ unit. While respective Services would exert the second control channel at the Service HQ level, Command HQ and below this control would be exerted by the respective formation HQ. The nature of the dual-control structure would be dictated by operational requirements as well as the nature of IO capability. For example, in the case of cyber operations, the specialist control channel would carry greater weight, while for EW it is the formation control channel which would take precedence over the specialist one (the rationale for this distinction is beyond the scope of this work).

Integrated employment of IO would be the responsibility of IO staff at all levels. This is elaborated upon in the following sub-section.

Staff Structures

It is important that, at all levels, design of staff structures be premised on a clear separation of the ITO/ CEMA and IPO/ Cognitive Operations streams of IO. For instance, in the IA, ADG (IW) should be re-designated ADG (ITO)/ ADG (CEMA) and ADG (Strategic Communications) should be re-designated as ADG (IPO)/ ADG (Cognitive Operations). Merging of the two streams would take place at the level of DG (IW) (which should be re-designated as DG (IO)).

CIO should be the charter of ADG (Cognitive Operations), with CeTIO tasking being coordinated through ADG (CEMA). This is because CeTIO bank upon the cognitive effects of CO. Therefore, while CeTIO planning would be carried out by ADG (Cognitive Operations) as part of an overall CIO plan, actual execution of CeTIO would be carried out using CO assets.

Separate specialist staff appointments for CEMA and Cognitive Ops are recommended to be created down to Corps HQ. The charter for CIO would rest with the Cognitive Operations branches at all levels.

Capability Development: Phased Approach

Raising of a Cyber Command (of which the DCA is a truncated version) has been under consideration since 2012 and is recommended to be implemented at the earliest. Once the Cyber Command is in place, the final objective of raising the unified IO Command as per the structure discussed above could be undertaken.

As of now, no PSYOP units/ establishments are in existence, and cognitive operations are being undertaken by non-specialist staff officers posted at various headquarters, thereby resulting in ineffective execution. The only formal structure which exists in support of cognitive operations is the ADG (PI), with the limited charter of media operations. The previous three articles in this series have brought out the increasing strategic importance of developing cognitive operations capabilities, although the focus here has been on their manifestation as CIO through cyberspace. Therefore, there is an urgent need to raise separate field establishments for conduct of these specialist operations.

As a first step, it is recommended that a tri-Service Cognitive Operations Unit be raised, manned by personnel trained in the different cognitive disciplines (PSYOP, PI, MILDEC, SC, CIO). There are several reasons why a tri-Service structure is being proposed here (in contrast to the Cyber vertical), as under:-

• Firstly, since there are no Service specific structures in existence, there would be no need for any (disruptive) reorganization.
• Secondly, since specialist expertise in Cognitive Operations is to be built up from scratch (please see section on HR Policies), it would be more economical to create a common tri-Service establishment catering for all the cognitive disciplines.
• Finally, execution of cognitive operations arguably requires a higher degree of coordination amongst the three Services as compared to CEMA.

In subsequent phases, additional cognitive operations units/ formations may be created on need basis. All these would be amalgamated into the IO Command as and when it comes up. In a similar manner, existing and future EW formations/ units/ establishments would also be subordinated to the IO Command.

Analysis of a proposed structure for a tri-Service Cognitive Operations Unit is beyond the scope of this work. However, a notional organizational structure for the Cyber Command is briefly discussed below.

Cyber Command Architecture

As stated above, the DCA needs to be upgraded to a full-fledged tri-Services Cyber Command at the earliest, primarily for building requisite capability for conducting offensive cyber operations including active defence. As part of this Command, in addition to a Command HQ, cyber units should be raised and deployed down to tactical levels, along with intermediate subordinate Cyber HQ as felt necessary. While at places these Cyber HQ may be inter-Services in structure, Service purity should be maintained at unit level, much like the model which has been adopted by the Signal Intelligence Directorate (SI Directorate).

Cyber units should be of two broad flavours: cyber execution units and cyber R&D units, with each of R&D units focusing in a different area of expertise in support of the execution units. Command & control structures should be put in place in line with the philosophy of ‘centralized control, decentralized execution’, in order to address the disadvantages of deploying offensive cyber resources at multiple echelons. Finally, suitable linkages should be established with EW organisations at all levels for achieving the desired synergy for conduct of CEMA.

A proposed architecture for HQ Cyber Command is depicted below. As and when an IO Command comes up, this HQ would get absorbed into the ‘Cyber Operations’ box of HQ IO Command depicted above. Execution units, under the command of Service HQ and various formations, would be subordinate to the HQ in both scenarios [10].

 

Organising for CIO

In has been brought out above that CIO would be planned and coordinated by Cognitive Operations staff at all HQ (down to Corps HQ in the case of Army). There may be no requirement of creating separate establishments purely for the conduct of CIO. Since CIO requires both Cyber as well as Cognitive Operations expertise, the integrated employment of CeSIO and CeTIO may be carried out through the following mechanisms:-

• Planning and coordination would be carried out by Cognitive Operations staff, with CeTIO tasks being channeled through CEMA staff.
• Task-based CIO teams may be created on need basis by drawing trained personnel from the cyber and cognitive operations units.
• At times, in order to leverage the advantage of plausible deniability, the services of non-state actors may also need to be tapped and coordinated by the Cognitive Operations staff.

As CIO capabilities mature over time, separate units/ establishments dedicated purely to CIO may need to be raised.

[Continued in “A Call to Action for the Indian Armed Forces (Part III)”]

References

(1)     Bilyana Lilly and Joe Cheravitch, The Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces, 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict/ 2020, NATO CCDCOE Publications, Tallinn, pp. 139-146, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(2)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyber Influence Operations: A Battle of Wits and Bits – Strategies and Capabilities of Major Players (Part I) (Section: United States: Pioneers in IO), Future Wars, 18 Nov 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(3)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, 21st Century Warfare: From “Battlefield” to “Battlespace” (Section: Warfighting Domains: Five-Dimensional Construct), Future Wars, 18 Nov 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(4)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part III: Implications and Imperatives for India (Section: US IW Organisations), Future Wars, 23 Jun 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(5)     Kimberly Underwood, Army Cyber To Become an Information Warfare Command, Signal, 14 Mar 2019, Accessed 23 Dec 2020.

(6)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I: Concept, Organisation and Space Operations (Section: Organisation), Future Wars, 09 Jun 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(7)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Existing IW Structures), Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.

(8)     Snehesh Alex Philip, Why Army wants a new Deputy Chief and Director General at its Headquarters, The Print, 04 Dec 2020, Accessed 23 Dec 2020.

(9)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I: Concept, Organisation and Space Operations (Section: Concept), Future Wars, 09 Jun 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020

(10)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organisational Structures (Section: Proposed IW Structures), Future Wars, 21 Apr 2020, Accessed 22 Dec 2020.