Sections

Introduction

Strategic Information Support

Strategic Information Operations

Implications for India

US IW Organisations

Imperatives for the Indian Armed Forces

References

Introduction

With the raising of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), China has taken a very significant step forward towards operationalising its military doctrine of fighting and winning informationized wars. China’s informatization doctrine corresponds with the western notion of network centric warfare, and the concept of information warfare which the SSF gives life to is key to winning wars in a net-centric environment. Creation of the SSF demonstrates China’s firm conviction that the Information domain has emerged as a daunting new arena of military conflict, whose importance on the modern battlefield will continue to increase in times to come.

In the first part of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, and how its space assets have been reorganized. The next part looked at how key IW capabilities (cyber warfare, EW and psychological warfare) have been restructured under the SSF, and briefly reviewed the effect of this restructuring on the related functions of intelligence and information processing.

In this concluding part, we first discuss how the SSF will fulfil its twin objectives of providing strategic information support and executing strategic information operations. For the purpose of drawing comparisons, an overview of US DOD IW organisations is also given out. This analysis concludes by highlighting the implications of the creation of SSF on the Indian security scenario and the resulting imperatives which need to be urgently addressed by us.

Strategic Information Support

Strategic information support missions have sometimes been collectively referred to as raising an ‘information umbrella’ for the PLA [1]. These missions may be categorized into five primary areas, as follows: technical intelligence collection and management; strategic intelligence support to theatre commands; enabling PLA power projection; supporting strategic defense in the space and nuclear domains; and enabling joint operations. The space, cyber and EW capabilities available with the SSD and NSD all contribute towards the fulfilment of these missions [2].

Technical Intelligence Collection and Management

This is enabled by the vast optical, electronic intelligence and cyber exploit capabilities available with the SSF, which enables it to play a dominant role in achieving comprehensive domain awareness.

Providing Strategic Intelligence Support to Theatre Commands

While theatre commands possess captive Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRBs) with technical intelligence collection resources, these are focused on operational and tactical level intelligence, due to a limitation of their collection platforms (limited range drones, surveillance planes, short range radar, ground-based SIGINT platforms, etc). SSF can provide valuable support to the theatre commands by enhancing their battlefield awareness through intelligence gathered utilizing its extensive space-based resources, and developing target indicators (image, electronic and heat signatures, as well as cyber vulnerabilities) for specific weapon platforms, to be used for targeting by theatre forces in the kinetic, EW and cyber domains.

Enabling PLA Power Projection

PLA’s power projection in East and South China Seas as well as areas beyond the first island chain requires capabilities for long-range precision targeting, far seas naval deployments and strategic air operations, all of which are dependent on the SSF to support these operations, from initial detection, identification, and targeting, to guidance and battlefield damage assessment. Specifically for naval operations, the SSF will also provide to the PLAN what is termed as “battlefield environment support,” which includes battlespace-relevant survey, mapping, meteorological, oceanographic, and navigation information. Expansion of the Beidou navigation satellite constellation, now under the control of the SSF and expected to have global coverage by 2020, will provide vital navigation support across the military.

Supporting Strategic Defense in the Space and Nuclear Domains

Although the responsibilities for anti-satellite missile operations, ballistic missile defense, and space-based kinetic operations within the PLA are still not clear, the SSF’s capabilities for space surveillance would play a critical role in supporting these missions.

Enabling Joint Operations

The SSF’s role in strategic information support directly enables joint operations through integration of disparate units and systems from the PLA’s four services, by providing system-of-systems integration, technical interoperability, information-sharing, and intelligence-fusion among them.

Strategic Information Operations

IW Capabilities: Strategic Weapons

As per China’s strategic thinking, most notably its authoritative Science of Military Strategy, space, cyber, electronic and psychological weapons must be employed as strategic weapons to paralyze and sabotage the enemy’s operational and command system of systems in the initial stages of conflict, for which the SSF is the primary force.

These strategic weapons need to be employed as part of a complex set of information operations, with the relative importance of each changing across the broad spectrum of conflict. During the pre-crisis period, psychological warfare and EW play a dominant role, with EW being used as a coercive weapon as well as for information denial. Cyber warfare and precision strike are most effective as first strike weapons, with the former carrying a high opportunity cost in terms of blown access. Once overt hostilities commence, EW again takes on greater importance over cyber-attacks, with its stand-off characteristics and the ability to significantly diminish enemy information flows and command and control systems. Finally, during full-blown conflict phase, kinetic weapons become dominant and psychological warfare serves to weaken the enemy’s will to fight and shape diplomatic and political narratives on the domestic and international fronts.

Operational Advantages

The integration of all information warfare disciplines into the SSF provides several operational advantages: Firstly, it merges the exploit/ espionage and offense capabilities across cyber, electronic and (partly) space warfare in a single force, which provides the significant advantage of peacetime-wartime integration in the information domain. Next, integrating cyber espionage and offense has the advantage of optimally exploiting enemy cyber vulnerabilities for both types of operations, and also allowing the balancing of conflicting objectives between these two disciplines depending on the operational situation. Finally, integrating all the information operations capabilities at the strategic level allows unified operational planning amongst the services and theatre commands across all the disciplines, thus achieving the most potent effects.

The vast resource of information capabilities which the SSF is endowed with gives it the power and the responsibility for achieving “escalation dominance” and shaping adversary behaviour in the build-up to a full-scale conflict [3].

Implications for India

The above analysis indicates that raising of the SSF by China as part of a major restructuring of the PLA is expected to yield major benefits, with serious implications for India, as discussed below:-

• By creating the PLASSF, China has operationalized its several decades old concepts of INEW and Three Warfares, thus demonstrating its determination to adapt to the changing nature of warfare in the 21st Century, conceptualized as “intelligentized wars” in Chinese military thought. In doing so, China has exhibited a higher level of dynamism than the US, whose doctrines and operational concepts of NCW and IW/IO, dramatically validated during the Iraq wars, were in large part responsible for China to resort to re-structuring of the PLA. The integrated employment of IW resources through the PLASSF and related re-organized structures would give the PLA a significant edge vis-à-vis India in the information and cognitive domains across the spectrum of conflict.
• The integration of all space and information warfare resources under one umbrella also indicates that China considers space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum and cognitive domains as warfighting arenas in their own right, rather than supporting elements in the traditional land, sea and air domains. This is in line with their traditional military strategy, advocated by Sun Tzu, of winning without firing a single shot. Thus, India can expect intensified “grey zone” attacks by China in these domains to achieve their objectives, without escalating the war to the traditional kinetic-intensive physical domains.
• By splitting the Three Warfares related resources between the CMC-PWD and the SSF, China has sought to decouple the political dimensions of this concept from operational requirements, with the CMC-PWD serving to further the ideological agenda of the party and the SSF focusing on the military dimension. This re-structuring is expected to give a fillip to their psychological warfare expertise in the military context.
• The shifting of its intelligence capabilities, which were earlier almost entirely controlled by the Army dominated GSD, to the JSD-IB and SSF, both of which directly report to the CMC, China has ensured that competing requirements within the different services of the PLA are met with in a balanced manner. Although it is not explicitly stated in open domain literature, in all probability the Intelligence function has been optimized to ensure that there is no duplication of effort between the JCD-IB and the SSF with respect to cyber espionage, with SSF chartered for this function, while JCD-IB handles other traditional intelligence functions such as HUMINT, intelligence analysis, strategic electronic SIGINT, etc. This is likely translate into providing the PLA an additional edge over India in intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

US IW Organizations

At this point, it would be worthwhile to review the IW structures adopted by the United States, which pioneered the concepts and doctrine on IW, as a useful point of comparison with China as well as India. An insight on the IW Structures adopted by the United States DOD has been given out in an earlier post [4]. An overview of the same is diagrammatically depicted below:-

US DOD IW Organisations

In drawing a comparison of DOD IW structures with the IW organisational template adopted by the PLASSF, the following observations are relevant:-

• Unlike the SSF, where strategic information warfare capabilities, ie, cyber warfare, EW and psychological operations, are all integrated under the NSD, in the case of United States these capabilities are placed under three different functional unified combatant commands, namely, Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) respectively.
• As per the Chinese model, space capabilities most relevant to information operations are also better integrated with IO capabilities, both being placed under the single umbrella of the SSF, whereas within the US DOD, Space Operations are the charter of the newly raised Space Command (USSPACECOM), which is another functional unified command directly under the DOD.
• The SSF represents integration of IO capabilities at the strategic level, raised as part of what are referred to as “above the neck” reforms which have been undertaken within the PLA. At this juncture, it is not very clear how such integration at the apex level would smoothly flow down to lower levels (“below the neck” reforms) [5]. In comparison, the organizations and procedures in place within the DOD appear to be better optimised for the capabilities of functional commands to be put to use either independently by these commands, or by the geographical combatant commands in support of multi-domain military operations.
• In the case of the SSF, there appears to be a determined effort towards achieving a strong synergy between cyber warfare and EW capabilities, in furtherance of the PLA doctrine of INEW. There is not much evidence of a similar attempt on the part of the US. One of the factors responsible for this is the fact that EW as a military capability was neglected by the US DOD for a couple of decades, and has received renewed focus only in recent years. There does exist a concept of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) which has evolved within the DOD, but this appears to have been adopted only by the US Army [6].

Imperatives for the Indian Armed Forces

Capability gaps in India vis-à-vis China are the primary concern of the Indian defence establishment. China has demonstrated greater agility as compared to India in carrying out re-structuring of the PLA in tune with the changing nature of warfare. The intense focus of China and the PLA on IW capabilities, covering concepts and doctrine, organisation and resources including HRD, all suggest an ever widening gap between the IW capabilities of India and China in the latter’s favour. Raising of the PLA SSF is an emphatic demonstration of this focus, and is a matter of great concern not only for India but also for the United States, China’s primary competitor in its race for becoming the dominant world power.

A review of IW structures in India as they exist today has been covered comprehensively in earlier posts [7, 8]. An overview of India’s primary IW capabilities has been diagrammatically depicted below.

IW Organizational Structures in India

A comprehensive comparison of the IW structures adopted by China, the United States and India is beyond the scope of this work. However, having analysed the concept and structure of the SSF, there are several useful lessons which may be drawn and imperatives which emerge from this analysis, as given out below.

IW Concepts and Doctrine

In the realm of IW, China enunciated the doctrines of INEW and Three Warfares at the turn of the century, and the SSF may be seen as a significant step forward towards operationalising these doctrines. The United States was first off the block in evolving IW concepts, and has been exploiting them effectively in various conflict scenarios. In comparison, the existing IW doctrines of the Indian Armed Forces are weakly structured, and need to be considerably refined, incorporated into our military strategy and operationalised.

Importance of the Information Domain

Creation of the SSF as a separate force is ample evidence of the fact that China truly believes the Information Domain to be a very significant dimension of warfare in 21st Century conflicts. The importance of the information domain has similarly been recognised by the United States, as evidenced by the cyber and psychological operations forces which exist within the DOD.

In our military strategic thought, on the other hand, the IW factor is still considered to be of subsidiary importance, with EW capabilities being dubbed as ‘force multipliers’ (a pseudonym for ‘marginal relevance’), and cyber and psychological capabilities considered to be of even lesser import. India would do well to understand and acknowledge the increasing impact of information domain capabilities in 21st Century warfare.

Information Domain Forces

Recognising the military significance of the information domain would need to be followed through with corresponding enhancement of information domain forces both in terms of numbers and quality. Some of the immediate steps which need to be taken are: raising of a full-fledged Cyber Command; creation of additional EW units with state-of-the-art equipment; nurturing the psychological warfare disciplines as a specialist expertise and raising adequate number of psychological operations units.

Organizational Coherence in IW Structures

This work has highlighted how the creation of the SSF has achieved not only the integration of attack/ exploit/ defend capabilities under one organization, but also a high level of synergy amongst the cyber warfare, EW and psychological capabilities, at least at the strategic level. Indeed, the level of synergy as reflected in the structure of the SSF apparently surpasses the integrative effects achieved so far by the United States.

A quick look at our own IW structures as they exist today clearly lack any such organizational coherence (the figure above is only indicative of the non-coherent nature of our IW structures). This lack of coherence further compounds the severe disadvantage we suffer due to inadequate availability of IW forces, as brought out above. Re-structuring of our IW organisations is therefore an urgent operational imperative. Two earlier write-ups have made several recommendations in this area [9, 10].

IW Capability Development

The art and science of warfare in the traditional domains of land, sea and air have evolved over centuries, nay millennia. Information too has always played a key role in warfare, as is amply clear from the writings of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and others. However, IW as a new form of warfighting has an entirely different flavour, and the world is struggling to come to terms with it. Development of capability in the highly specialised disciplines of IW is not an easy task. As an example, although the US Cyber Command was raised in 2010, it took eight years for it to reach its full operational strength of a little over 6000 personnel [11]. In the case of the SSF, however, apparently the restructuring exercise did not involve the recruiting of additional personnel, although it is safe to assume that additional capability is gradually being added by the PLA to boost up its IW forces both in terms of numbers and degree of expertise.

Against this backdrop, even if India takes swift action to re-structure and raise IW organizations on priority, the greatest hurdle which is likely to be faced is the training of IW forces in a time-bound fashion. Therefore, HRD policies for creation of an adequately trained IW cadre across a spectrum of IW disciplines therefore needs to be evolved and implemented on a war footing.

Conclusion

China has demonstrated much greater agility vis-à-vis India in carrying out transformative re-structuring of the PLA in tune with the changing nature of warfare. Special emphasis has been accorded by China to its IW capability development, by translating its concepts of “informatized wars”, INEW and “Three Warfares” into actual military combat potential by raising the SSF, which is a potent force for employment of space, cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities in an integrated fashion. 

The intense focus of China and the PLA on IW capabilities, covering concepts and doctrine, organisation and resources including HRD, all suggest an ever widening gap between India and China’s IW capabilities in the latter’s favour. This is a matter of great concern which needs to be urgently addressed. Towards this end, specific recommendations have been made in related posts which have been referenced in the text. In the light of a fast changing security paradigm vis-à-vis an aggressive China as evidenced by recent events, the time to act is now.

References

(1)     John Costello, The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service, Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 3, 08 Feb 2016, pp. 15.

(2)     Ibid., 36-39.

(3)     Ibid., 40-41.

(4)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part III: Organizational Structures in Other Defence Forces, Future Wars Website, Accessed 21 Jun 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/iw-structures-for-the-indian-armed-forces-part-iii/.

(5)     John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, China Strategic Perspectives 13, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington, Accessed 23 Jun 2020, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf, pp. 11-12.

(6)     Army Cyber Electromagnetic Activities FM 3-38, Feb 2014, US Department of the Army, Washington DC.

(7)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Parts I-IV, Future Wars Website, Accessed 21 Jun 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/iw-structures-for-the-indian-armed-forces-part-i/.

(8)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part I-III, Future Wars Website, Accessed 21 Jun 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/cyberspace-governance-in-india-transform-or-perish-part-i/.

(9)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV: Existing and Proposed Organizational Structures, Future Wars Website, Accessed 21 Jun 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/iw-structures-for-the-indian-armed-forces-part-iv/.

(10)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish Part III – Transformative Restructuring, Future Wars Website, Accessed 21 Jun 2020, https://futurewars.rspanwar.net/cyberspace-governance-in-india-transform-or-perish-part-iii/.

(11)   DOD Training: U.S. Cyber Command and Services Should Take Actions to Maintain a Trained Cyber Mission Force, Report to the House of Representatives, United States GAO, Mar 2019.