Sections

Introduction

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare

Three Warfares and Psychological Operations

Intelligence

Information and Communications

References

Introduction

The Strategic Support Forces (SSF) serves to integrate the Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under a single organisation. In doing so it also effectively operationalises its two well-known hybrid warfare concepts, namely, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) and Three Warfares (comprising of psychological, media and legal warfare). This work studies the concept underlying the reorganisation of the PLA’s space and IW capabilities under the SSF and the payoffs in terms of enhancement of its combat capability, compares SSF’s organisation with the IW structures of the United States and India, and makes noteworthy recommendations aimed at synergising our own IW capabilities.

In the first part of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been reorganized. In this part, a look is taken at how the IW capabilities (cyber warfare, EW and psychological warfare) have been restructured under the SSF. It also briefly reviews the closely related intelligence and information processing functions, and how the raising of the SSF has affected them.

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare

SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD) which, perhaps because of its nomenclature, is often referred to as the “cyber operations force,” has in fact been empowered with capabilities for carrying out information operations in a wider sense, encompassing cyber warfare, EW and potentially, psychological warfare missions as well.

Cyber Operations

NSD has largely been metamorphosed from the General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) Third Department, which was largely responsible for the PLA’s cyber exploit/ espionage missions. However, in its restructured form, it has also been made responsible for cyber-attack missions [1], which earlier were handled by GSD’s Fourth Department. Such an integration between cyber exploit and attack missions reflects the felt operational need for close coordination between these two missions as well as the commonality of expertise required for carrying them out. In all likelihood all the 12 Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRBs), which were known to be responsible for cyber exploit/ espionage [2], as well as signal intelligence (SIGINT) missions, have been transferred to the NSD for carrying out cyber operations. It is also expected that elements integral to the GSD’s Fourth Department, which were trained for carrying out cyber-attack missions, have also been transferred to the NSD, perhaps by integrating these into the TRBs. In addition, the 56th, 57th and 58th Research Institutes (RIs), which are known to possess the R&D and weaponization expertise for cyber as well as SIGINT missions, have also been placed under the NSD. Lastly, the PLA Information Engineering University has been moved to the NSD for enabling the necessary cadre development. The charter for cyber defense [3], on the other hand, remains primarily with the Joint Staff Department – Information and Communications Bureau (JSD-ICB) [4].

Organisation of Network Systems Department

EW Operations

China’s strategic EW mission was earlier the well-defined charter of GSD’s Fourth Department [5]. Post re-structuring, this departmental headquarter has been re-constituted to raise the new Joint Staff Department – Network Electronic Bureau (JSD-NEB), which would likely exert control over all INEW missions across the Chinese military, including the SSF, theatre commands and the services. However, it is expected that the electronic attack/ counter-measure (EA/ ECM) brigades, detachments and stations under control of the former Fourth Department, have been moved to the NSD for carrying out strategic EA missions. As stated above, the 12 TRBs placed under the NSD possess the capability to carry out ES missions. The GSD’s 54th RI, responsible for R&D on EA and CNA, has been transferred to the SSF. Of the military academic institutions related to EW, the Luoyang Foreign Language Institute has been moved to the NSD while the Fourth Department’s PLA Electrical Engineering Institute has been placed under the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) for human resource development on EW. The responsibility for electronic protect (EP)/ electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) is expected to lie with the JSD-ICB, as is the case with respect to cyber defence.

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW)

As stated earlier, INEW is one of the Chinese warfighting concepts which the SSF operationalizes at the strategic level, by integrating cyber and EW capabilities within the NSD. At the apex level, the INEW concept is taken forward by JSD-NEB across the SSF, theatre commands and the services at strategic, operational and tactical levels, which it is expected to do by issuing operational guidance, de-conflicting areas of responsibility and establishing rules of engagement. In furtherance of this concept, a Joint Network-Electronic Counter-measures dadui [6] at the national level and Network-Electronic Counter-measures dui at theatre level are also expected to be established, with suitable elements placed under them to carry out INEW missions. Thus, a force-wide structure exists for carrying out INEW missions, wherein the SSF provides the fulcrum at the national strategic level.

While it is clear that, within the SSF, the NSD is the sole player for carrying out integrated cyber and EW operations, the same cannot be so clearly stated for the third major component of information operations, namely, psychological operations. This important component of information operations is dealt with in the following section [7].

Three Warfares and Psychological Operations

In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) adopted the PLA information warfare concept of the Three Warfares. Based on literature available on the subject, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has described the three components of this concept as follows [8]:-

• Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
• Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests.
• Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be used to thwart an opponent’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. It is also used to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military.

Effect of Restructuring

In the pre-reform era, the responsibility for the conduct of Three Warfares, also termed broadly as political warfare, was entrusted to the General Political Department (GPD). Within the GPD, political warfare at the strategic level was handled by the GPD’s Liaison Department, while at the operational level the execution of this concept was carried out by the 311 Base along with its six subordinate regiments, all of which were placed under the command of the GPD.

Subsequent to the re-structuring, the GPD has taken the form of the new CMC Political Work Department, while the 311 Base has been shifted to the SSF. Within the SSF, although the location of the 311 Base is as yet not confirmed, it is expected to be either under the SSF Political Work Department or, more likely, under the NSD. Such a re-structuring was presumably aimed at achieving the following effects [9]:-

• Since the PLA is inherently a party army and not a national one, one of its imperatives is to ensure ideological loyalty amongst its cadre and propagate party ideals. This aspect will now fall within the purview of the new CMC-PWD, while the operational effects of Three Warfares across the entire spectrum of conflict would be the responsibility of the SSF, thus achieving a decoupling between party and military requirements.
• The close integration of all elements of information operations (cyber, EW and psychological warfare) under the SSF, and if 311 Base has indeed been allocated to the NSD, within the NSD, will enable a much more effective and synergized information warfare campaign, closely aligned with all the other operational forces, than was possible under the siloed structures existing in the pre-reform era.

Influence Operations

In furtherance of its Three Warfares concept, in recent years China has accelerated its influence operations around the world [10]. While the CCP has established barriers to external political influence at home, at the same time it is exploiting the vulnerabilities of the openness of democratic systems abroad. For this, it is targeting the media outlets, think tanks and university ties. China’s state-run newspaper, China Daily, has struck deals with at least 30 foreign newspapers including prominent ones such as the Washington Post and UK Telegraph. Similarly, the China Global Television Network (CGTN) has regularly hosts foreign journalists from top media houses abroad. The Confucius Institutes, set up in many countries under China’s Ministry of Education, including three in India, are an important part of China’s influence operations [11]. Chinese social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China, with Chinese state-run accounts such as People’s Daily, Xinhua and CGTN being highly active content generators, especially on Facebook and Instagram [12]. China’s influence operations in India target its decision making bodies, and its attempts to build lucrative relationships with Indian political leaders require serious attention [13]. The Digital Silk Road is also being leveraged, including through coercive economic measures, to project Chinese ‘sharp power’, which denotes a more aggressive approach to shape opinion and policies in other countries as compared to ‘soft power’.

Intelligence

The primary motivation behind the creation of the SSF was to synergize the employment of space, cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities for effectively carrying out information operations, with the larger objective of winning local wars under informatized conditions. However, due to the symbiotic relationship between these capabilities on the one hand and the Intelligence function on the other, the creation of the PLASSF also fundamentally changed how the Intelligence mission is organized within the PLA. By consolidating most of the technical intelligence collection capabilities within the SSF, an organisation which directly reports to the CMC, the CMC tightened its control over military operations. However, this re-structuring also dismantled China’s all-source intelligence capability, which resided within the erstwhile GSD [14].

Intelligence is the result of analysis based on data/ information derived through the employment of the following capabilities: HUMINT (covert and overt), open source intelligence (OSINT), aerospace and ground based ISR (including UAVs), cyber exploit/ espionage/ CNE and electronic support (ES)/ SIGINT. In the re-structured organisation, HUMINT and OSINT resources appear to be chartered to the Intelligence Bureau under the JSD (JSD-IB), while space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum based capabilities, which are also referred to as “technical reconnaissance,” at the strategic level are all consolidated within the SSF. In addition, the theatre commands and service headquarters continue to retain their own Intelligence bureaus and TRBs. This structure appears to maintain the earlier arrangement of intelligence flow, whereby all military intelligence flows upwards through the JSD.

Thus the new JSD controls fewer intelligence capabilities than its predecessor the GSD, and therefore is left with a much more constrained role. In addition to HUMINT assets, the JSD-IB probably also includes analytic bureaus and think-tanks, including the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies [15]. With the establishment of a separate ground force headquarters and re-structuring the JSD (former GSD) as a CMC organ, the Intelligence function, earlier dominated by the Army, can now be optimally balanced by the JSD to better address competing requirements within the PLA [16].

Information and Communications

The terms “information” and “intelligence” are more often than not used interchangeably, leading to ambiguity and confusion about the concept/ strategy being discussed. For the purpose of this discussion, the term “information” will be used to refer to information about own forces, while “intelligence” unambiguously denotes information about the adversary. Intelligence is obtained through overt and covert human assets, ISR, cyber and EW capabilities. Information about own forces is already available at source; the problem here is sharing and analysing it efficiently through networking and information applications for effective command and control.

The term “Informatization”, used in the context of Chinese military reforms, actually refers to utilization of all information (own and enemy) effectively and efficiently in order to achieve increased combat potential. This concept is analogous to the US and Indian concepts of network centric warfare (NCW), which is essentially a command & control concept. Here, it is important to note that the means of gathering “enemy” information is not within the ambit of NCW. On the other hand, the INEW concept, when operationalized, translates to information operations (less influence/ psychological operations), ie, a fight for information – obtaining enemy information, denying him the effective use of his own information and protecting own information – all aimed towards achieving information superiority. Psychological/ cognitive operations, which are actions taken to achieve “mind superiority” in the Chinese context, are a subset of the Three Warfares concept, as has already been referred to earlier.

As its name suggests, in the pre-reform era the GSD’s Informatization Department was responsible for provision of communications, networking, information systems and support for warfighting command & control. Post reform, these responsibilities have been entrusted to the new JCB-ICB, with the PLA’s Information Assurance Base also placed under it. The Information Assurance Base has been responsible for management of information and communication systems as well as the PLA’s integrated command platform, information assurance (confidentiality, integrity and availability of information) and strategic information support. All these responsibilities now rest with the JSD-ICB except for strategic information support, which has now been shifted to the SSF [17].

Further, the research and development institutes of the erstwhile Informatized Department appear to have been transferred to the CMC Equipment Development Department, instead of the JSD-ICB. These include the 61st RI, which supported the erstwhile Science and Technology Bureau, and the 63rd RI, which focused on electromagnetic spectrum technology and anti-jamming research. As far as space related communication infrastructure is concerned, while the SSF may have primary control over communication satellites and critical ground-based satellite infrastructure, regional communications ground stations are likely to be controlled by the JSD-ICB, together with a nation-wide network of communication nodes and signal regiments which are responsible for all forms of terrestrial communication systems.

Conclusion

This piece has reviewed how the PLA’s IW capabilities have been re-organised to achieve better synergistic effects by organising them under the single umbrella of the SSF, and mostly concentrated within the NSD. The Intelligence function, which is largely dependent on cyber and EW capabilities, has also been suitably re-structured to achieve a better balance within the PLA. Organisations handling information processing and communications too have undergone transformation to better align with the PLA’s strategic doctrine of fighting informationized wars.

The concluding part of this three part series first discusses how the reorganised SSF empowers PLA’s strategic information operations. Finally, it draws a comparison amongst IW structures adopted by the PLA, the US DOD and India, and gives out some notable recommendations which flow out of this analysis.

References

(1)     Cyber-attack is formally referred to as Computer Network Attack (CNA) in US/ Indian terminology.

(2)     Cyber exploit/ espionage is formally termed as Computer Network Exploit (CNE) in US/ Indian terminology.

(3)     Cyber defence is formally referred to as Computer Network Defence (CND) in US/ Indian terminology.

(4)     John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, Washington, National Defence University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, No 13, Oct 2018, pp. 23-25.

(5)     Strategic EW comprises of strategic Electronic Attack (EA) such as satellite jamming and strategic Electronic Support (ES) (in Indian terminology, a combination of Signal Intelligence (SI) and strategic Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)).

(6)     “dadui” – a large military group/ unit.

(7)      John Castello, China’s Strategic Support Force…, pp. 25-28.

(8)     Office of the Secretary of Defense (DoD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, 16 August 2011, Accessed 29 Nov 2019, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf, pp. 26.

(9)     John Castello, China’s Strategic Support Force…, pp. 28-29.

(10)   Daniel Wagner, China Is Waging a Silent Media War for Global Influence, 19 Sep 2019, The National Interest, Accessed 01 Feb 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-waging-silent-media-war-global-influence-81906.

(11)   Kanchana Ramanujam, From Human Wave to Info Wave: China’s Propaganda Warfare, 03 Jul 2019, CLAWS, Accessed 01 Feb 2020, https://www.claws.in/from-human-wave-to-info-wave-chinas-propaganda-warfare/.

(12)   Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion, Insikt Group, 06 Mar 2019, Accessed 01 Feb 2020, https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/.

(13)   Jyotsna Mehra, Chinese Sharp Power: Is Beijing influencing public opinion in India?, 13 Nov 2019, Observer Research Foundation, Accessed 01 Feb 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinese-sharp-power-is-beijing-influencing-public-opinion-in-india-57779/.

(14)   China Reorients Strategic Military Intelligence, IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review (Abstract), 2017, Accessed 29 Nov 2019, https://www.janes.com/images/assets/484/68484/China_reorients_strategic_military _intelligence_edit.pdf, 1.

(15)   Ibid., 4.

(16)   John Castello, China’s Strategic Support Force…,31.

(17)   Elsa Kania and John Costello, China’s Quest for Informatization Drives PLA Reforms, The Diplomat, Accessed 29 Nov 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-quest-for-informatization-drives-pla-reforms/, 04 Mar 2017.