Sections

Introduction

Concept

Organisation

Space Operations

References

Introduction

The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created as part of the reforms which were initiated by the PLA in 2015 [1]. These reforms brought in noteworthy changes in the warfighting methods and organizational structure of the PLA, which are also reflected in the concept and character of the SSF. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities, earlier controlled by the General Staff Department (GSD), General Armament Department (GAD) and General Political Department (GPD) of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century.

The creation of the SSF is expected to considerably enhance the combat potential of the PLA as a result of increased synergy amongst its space and Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. The organizational model adopted by the SSF achieves the objective of effectively operationalizing its IW concepts, and at the same time highlights the importance of IW in Chinese strategic thought, leading to the raising of a separate force on the same pedestal as the PLA Rocket Force. In recent years, major world players, notably the United States and Russia, have also recognised IW as a potent new form of warfare, and evolved their organisations accordingly. In contrast, a similar agility towards developing doctrines and carrying out transformative restructuring has so far not been adequately demonstrated by the Indian Armed Forces. Existing and proposed IW structures in the Indian context have been discussed at length in recent posts.

This work analyses the concept, organisation and operational capabilities of the SSF. It goes on to compare the IW structures of China, United States and India, leading to some noteworthy conclusions and recommendations.

In this first part of a three part series, an insight is given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been re-organized.

Concept

One of the key Chinese warfighting concepts which the SSF operationalizes at the strategic level is Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) [2]. If one attempts a co-relationship between Chinese and US (as also Indian) doctrine on multi-dimensional warfare, the term “informationized wars” finds a parallel in “network centric warfare (NCW)” [3], while the term “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW)” would broadly correspond to “information warfare/ operations (IW/ IO)” less the latter’s psychological warfare component. The psychological warfare paradigm is captured within the Chinese “Three Warfares” concept (which has two other components, namely, Legal Warfare and Public Opinion Warfare) [4].

Prior to the PLA’s reorganization, space, cyber, and EW units were organized according to mission type, ie, disciplines of reconnaissance, attack, or defense, rather than their warfighting domain. By re-organising space, cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities at the strategic level under a single jurisdiction, the SSF possesses the capability of efficiently fulfilling the two important roles of providing “strategic information support” and carrying out “strategic information operations”. Such a re-organisation also implies that space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are being treated as warfighting domains in their own right, rather than supporting elements in the traditional land, sea and air domains [5].

The CMC re-structuring is based on the following principle: the party leads, the services build and the forces fight [6]. Under this paradigm, the CMC now oversees a dual command structure where services are responsible for force construction, while the five theater commands are responsible for conventional joint operations in their respective regions. However, the SSF and Rocket Force fall outside this bifurcated arrangement, maintaining responsibility for their respective force construction as well as strategic operations.

The SSF has so far been created using a “bricks, not clay approach” wherein, instead of raising it from scratch, existing organisations and their component parts have been renamed, re-subordinated and moved, and their command relationships redefined. However, in the future, raising additional organisations in support of its role can very well be expected.

The integration of space, cyber and EW capabilities under one service may be contrasted favourably with the corresponding organizations in the US, where these three capabilities are chartered to three separate unified combatant commands, namely, the Space Command, the Cyber Command and the Strategic Command.

It is to be noted that cyber and EW responsibilities are also shared by the Network-Electronics Bureau (NEB), which is part of the Joint Staff Department (JSD) of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition, there are cyber and EW elements placed under the theatre commands as well. Finally, cyber defence of networks is not entirely with the SSF, with responsibility for this being shared with the Information and Communication Bureau, which too is part of the JSD (JSD-ICB). This Bureau also handles the “Intelligence” function for strategic decision making, which notably is not within the ambit of the SSF. The exact division of responsibilities between the JSD and SSF to fulfil the cyber and EW missions is not yet very clear.

The installation, operation and maintenance of networks, which are the enablers of informationized wars/ NCW, are also not within the charter of the SSF. Further, certain aerospace capabilities may not have been shifted to the SSF, most notably the ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, which continues to be retained by the Rocket Force. Finally, while some aspects of psychological warfare have evidently been shifted to the SSF, the other two components of “Three Warfares”, ie, legal warfare and public opinion warfare, fall outside the SSF’s charter.

The creation of the SSF reflects the evolution of Chinese military thought which considers information to be a strategic resource in warfare. However, the unification of information operations under the SSF has the potential to inhibit the development of space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities necessary for carrying out operations at the tactical level.

Finally, it may be stated that the SSF is still a work in progress, which is slated to be completed by 2020. Further refinements to its current structure may be expected by next year, and even thereafter.

Organisation

The SSF comprises of two operational departments, namely, the Space Systems Department (SSD) and the Network Systems Department (NSD). The former controls nearly every aspect of PLA space operations, including space launch and support; telemetry, tracking, and control; information support; and space warfare, while the latter is responsible for cyber, electronic and psychological warfare. In addition, amongst its first-level departments, the SSF has a standard four-department administrative structure that includes the SSF Staff Department, Equipment Department, Political Work Department, and a Logistics Department. Administratively, the SSF operates in a manner similar to the PLA Second Artillery Force (re-organized now as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)), which was organizationally a hybrid between a force and a service, with its strategic capabilities directly under the control of the CMC [7].

Strategic Support Force: First Level Departments

The SSD and the NSD function mostly independently, and although the Staff Department serves as the operational headquarters of the SSF, all three departments have the same grade. Such an arrangement is possibly adopted to enable the SSD and NSD to independently prioritize and develop their cadre, capabilities, training programs and other force needs, and at the same time allow the CMC to integrate their missions whenever such a need arises.

Strategic Support Force: SSD and NSD Missions

Under the respective departments, the SSF appears to be organized as “bases”, many of which existed as part of the pre-reform structure. For instance, five of the former GAD “test bases” responsible for space operations have been transferred to the SSF, as is also the case with the 311 Base, China’s “Three Warfares” base known to have the exclusive mandate for psychological operations, which was earlier under the GPD. A new base, called the “SSF 35th Base”, is also learnt to have been created for space operations such as survey, mapping and navigation missions as well as management of the Beidou satellites [8].

Organisational structures with respect to space, cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities are elaborated upon further in the following sections, which dwell on these capabilities in some detail.

Space Operations

Space operations comprise of multiple facets and capabilities, as follows: space launch and support, telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC), information support through space based ISR, communications, positioning and navigation, and space attack & defense. The responsibility and corresponding capabilities for almost all of these functions, most of which were with the erstwhile GAD, have now been transferred to the SSD, barring a few exceptions [9].

Space launch and support units such as the satellite launch centers at Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang and Wenchang, as well as TTC centers such as the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Centre, the Xi’an Satellite Control Centre and the China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department, have been transferred from the erstwhile GAD to the SSF. C4ISR assets such as the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau, responsible for operation and control of remote sensing, optical and electronic intelligence satellites, the Satellite Main Station responsible for management of all facets of communication satellites and the Satellite Positioning Main Station, responsible management of the Beidou navigation satellite constellation, have all been transferred from the GSD to the SSD.

It is also pertinent to highlight here those space-related responsibilities which have not been transferred to the SSF. Although the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau has been re-allocated from the GSD Second Department to the SSF, the Department per se, which was responsible for the Intelligence function, now exists as the new Joint Intelligence Bureau under the JSD. Similarly, while management of communication satellites is now the charter of the SSF, the erstwhile GSD Informatization Department’s responsibilities for providing information and communications support will now be carried out by the JSD-ICB, using the Information Support Base which has now been transferred to it from the Informatization Department. Finally, the charter for manned space missions has been allocated to the CMC Equipment Development Division, perhaps to avoid the perception that this space capability is being militarized.

At this juncture it is not clear as to which organisations are responsible for space attack and defence capabilities. These include anti-satellite research, development, testing, and operations, ballistic missile defence (BMD) as also the experimental co-orbital attack capabilities. The former two are more likely to have been assigned to the PLARF or, alternatively, to the PLAAF, while the co-orbital attack capability likely falls under the ambit of the SSF [10].

Over the last two decades, the PLAAF has been positioning itself as best place for carrying out integrated air and space operations, while the Second Artillery Force has also been a contender for taking over the charter for space operations. The raising of the SSF has laid to rest these lingering bureaucratic disputes.

Conclusion

The above discussion shows that the SSF is the result of considerable re-organisation of erstwhile space and IW capabilities, primarily with a view to operationalising the two well-known Chinese concepts of INEW and Three Warfares. While the SSF has six departments directly under it, its operational capabilities are concentrated in two of these, namely the SSD and NSD. A look has also been taken at how space operations are handled by the SSD.

The next part describes how the three primary IW components, namely, cyber, EW and psychological warfare, are coherently organised within the NSD.

References

(1)     Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, John F. Corbett, Jr., The PLA’s New Organisational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part I), Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 3, 08 Feb 2016, pp. 6.

(2)     Col Deepak Sharma, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare: China’s New Concept of Information Warfare, Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA, New Delhi, Vol IV, No 2, Apr 2010.

(3)     David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 1999, pp. 89.

(4)     Elsa B Kania, The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares, Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 13, 22 Aug 2016 2016, pp. 10-14.

(5)     John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, Washington, National Defence University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, No 13, Oct 2018, pp. 11-12.

(6)     Ibid., 13.

(7)     Ibid., 13.

(8)     Ibid., 17.

(9)     Ibid., 20.

(10)   Ibid., 22.