Sections

Introduction

Multiple Facets of China’s DSR Strategy

National Security Implications for India

References

Introduction

An important element of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), the Digital Silk Road (DSR) is a comprehensive response to the Third Offset Strategy of the United States (US) and aims to establish China as a global technological superpower. Although there is no official document which elaborates on the DSR concept, analysis of Chinese initiatives in this area indicates that there are four facets to their DSR strategy: establishing communication infrastructure in the BRI nations (satellite, cellular (5G) and optical fibre cable (OFC) based networks as well as data centres); developing disruptive technologies domestically (satellite, AI and quantum technologies); stimulate e-commerce through digital free-trade zones; and lastly, project ‘sharp power’ (carry out information warfare) by exploiting the vast data repositories generated through the first three initiatives. Originally conceived as a US $200 billion project for development of digital infrastructure, its scope is now being scaled up. As per one estimate, China has already invested $79 billion in DSR projects world-wide [1, 2].

Although projected by the Chinese Government as a global development project, the real objectives of the BRI and its components such as the DSR are essentially geopolitical in nature. The e-commerce aspect of the DSR strategy aims to increase the economic inter-dependence between China and participating states, and leverage these dependencies for achieving the status of an economic superpower. The DSR makes huge volumes of data overtly or covertly accessible to China, thus manoeuvring it into a position of information dominance. China’s promotion of cyber-sovereignty as the preferred model of cyber governance facilitates the furtherance of its authoritarian ideology among participating states. Indeed, the DSR is one of the most potent elements of China’s BRI in pursuit of its strategic objective of replacing the US as the dominant world power.

Although India has resisted the BRI in all global forums and has refused to participate in the physical infrastructure projects, it has unwittingly become a participant in the DSR initiative, thus exposing itself to the associated vulnerabilities. This work analysis the various features and pitfalls of China’s DSR and its national security implications for India.

Multiple Facets of China’s DSR Strategy

Information Dominance

In the context of the DSR, China’s involvement in development of 5G based cellular networks have been the subject of much discussion, primarily because of the related security concerns (please see section on 5G security which follows) but also because the establishment of 5G networks has geopolitical implications as well [3]. However, there are two other facets of DSR infrastructure which deserve equal attention: OFC projects and data centres. China’s private industry has already made great progress in establishing itself as a major player in the laying of undersea and terrestrial OFC, which possess the potential of carrying enormous amounts of data. Chinese technology corporations, with Huawei and ZTE in the lead, have undertaken huge OFC projects in several countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

From the security standpoint, these OFC arteries are amenable to interception. Thus, on the one hand, this provides China access to the valuable resource of other nations’ data, overtly or through covert means, raising security and privacy concerns. On the other, it enables China to protect its own data from being exploited by other major strategic competitor nations such as the US. Notably, Chinese policies require foreign corporations to maintain user data in China, as per a policy known as data localization. Similar spin-offs in terms of access to big data of other nations would result from China’s huge investments in establishment of data centres both domestically as well as in BRI countries. These initiatives are at the heart of the DSR initiative, providing significant strategic advantages to China in the years to come [4].

Assassin’s Mace as a Spin-Off from DSR

The elusive “assassin’s mace” term is widely understood to denote those technologies which offer asymmetric advantages to a military confronting a superior power. Although China aims to surpass the US in military technology over the next few decades, at this juncture the primary “assassin’s mace” technologies, or disruptive military technologies, which China is focusing on include satellite systems, AI and quantum technologies. All of these are dual-use in character, with the potential to enhance China’s economic as well as military power. Although research in these technologies by China is being conducted domestically, by its military institutions and technology corporations such as Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba and iFlytek, the potential effects of successful technology breakthroughs will become manifest in and through BRI participants in the coming years. Hence, R&D in such advanced technologies should be seen as an important component of the DSR [5]. China’s has invested heavily and continues to make impressive progress in AI, quantum, nano, hypersonic and other niche technologies [6, 7].

The de-compartmentalization of China’s civil and military resource and innovation bases is frequently portrayed as a policy initiative of Xi Xinping. However, this policy should be seen as a maturing of measures taken over several decades. During the revolutionary era, efforts had been made to intensify the level of collaboration between the defence sector and civilian economy through what one analyst termed as a “strategic innovation system,” comprising of organisations focused on dual-use civil-military activities. Thereafter, during Deng’s reform era, Civil Military Integration (CMI) calcified into a core theoretical concept, typified by the “863 Program,” which canalized civil-military research cooperation into specific areas such as biotechnology and IT. This concept metamorphosed into the more expansive concept of “civil-military fusion,” the first authoritative reference of which is fund in Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th Party Conference in 2007, which urged the country to “take a path of military-civil fusion with Chinese characteristics.” Xi Xinping has given further impetus to this concept, which is already yielding rich benefits in carrying out R&D in the emerging disruptive military technologies, and will continue to do so in the coming decades [8].
By blurring the distinction between state-run and private enterprises, the CMI concept has effectively rendered a military flavour to the entire DSR initiative.

Regional Hegemony through Economic Interdependence

China recognizes the importance of economic interdependence with other nations towards promoting its rise as an economic superpower. The DSR possesses tremendous potential to stimulate enhanced economic engagement with the BRI nations through e-commerce, and in the process give a boost to the internationalization of the Chinese currency. For instance, Chinese firm Alibaba has entered into a partnership with Malaysia to develop a digital free trade zone involving a logistics centre, an e-commerce platform and a digital payment and finance service. Similar initiatives have been undertaken by China in India, Thailand and other countries. In other words, China is using opportunities being provided for digital commerce under the aegis of the DSR for furthering its objective of becoming a regional hegemon [9].

Exporting Digital Authoritarianism via the DSR

International norms for cyber governance are still evolving. In becoming a dominant player for creating digital infrastructure and applications through the medium of DSR, China is manoeuvring itself into a vantage position for shaping international norms in cyberspace. As opposed to the concept of an open Internet being championed by democratic nations, China promotes cyber-sovereignty as the preferred model for cyber governance. This is in tune with its own ideology of an authoritarian regime and also sits in well with other authoritarian regimes, especially in developing countries. This difference in approach to cyber governance, together with the power of AI and other advanced technologies to further an ideology of political illiberalism and undermine human rights, has the potential to accentuate the ideological struggle between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism, giving China an edge in the global great power competition unfolding in the 21st Century.

Another dimension of exporting Chinese ideology is by projecting its “sharp power”, described as “the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes, a type of hard power,” and using it as a means of undermining adversaries without direct confrontation by drawing on the tremendous data resources made available to it under the umbrella of the DSR [10].

Security Concerns Associated with Chinese Dominance in 5G Technology

China has already emerged as a world leader in 5G technology, providing sophisticated and competitive solutions for 5G networking requirements around the globe. Given the huge potential for commercial and military applications in 5G cyberspace, this gives rise to serious security concerns. These concerns emanate largely from the software intensive nature of 5G technology, because of which it may not be possible to guard against deliberate or inadvertent security loop holes, even if stringent security procedures are put in place, especially as regular software updates are an essential feature during the life-cycle of any software product. When this is viewed against the backdrop of the strict state control that technology corporations are subjected to by the Chinese authoritarian regime, the chances of national security getting jeopardized are significant, and therefore this concern needs to be suitably addressed [11].

The US has actively campaigned for countries to avoid using Chinese corporations for developing their 5G networks. Analysts routinely highlight China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires Chinese corporations and citizens to support the work of Chinese intelligence agencies, as an insurmountable hurdle in the way of adopting Chinese systems and components in networks. There is growing evidence that the CCP is increasing its influence and control over the private tech sector in China, as every major Chinese technology company, including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, iFlytek and Xiaomi, among many others, has established a CCP branch or committee.

Huawei, one of the biggest makers of 5G equipment with the most advanced technology, was founded in 1987 by a former officer of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and still has close ties to the Chinese government. Use of Huawei in American networks was effectively banned in Aug 2018 through provisions in its Defence Authorisation Act [12], and confirmed through a presidential executive order in May 2019 [13]. Experts, including the directors of the CIA, the FBI and the NSA, have testified before the US Congress stating they believe that Huawei could conduct “undetected espionage” if its equipment was used in US networks using backdoors in its software [14]. Australia and Japan had effectively banned Huawei as well as ZTE from participating in its telecom contracts in 2018. The UK Government, in Jul 2019, asked the country’s National Cyber Security Council to consider giving guidance to UK telecom operators on companies posing security risks to UK networks, with Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE cited as examples. There is a growing demand in political circles to remove all Huawei equipment from UK’s networks, and the deadline of 2025 is being considered seriously [15].

Belt and Road Space Information Corridor

The Belt and Road Space Information Corridor, also referred to as the Space Silk Road, is another dimension of the BRI which is closely related to the DSR.

As per a Chinese White Paper of December 2016, one of the key areas for future international cooperation is construction of this Space Information Corridor. Another document, jointly issued by State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry (SASTIND) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), indicates that this ambitious vision will unfold over the next decade, with a focus on Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and North Africa, and extending into Oceania, Central and Eastern Europe, and other parts of Africa [16].

One of the key elements of the Space Information Corridor is the Beidou satellite navigation system. Upwards of 30 BRI nations, including Pakistan, Laos, Brunei, and Thailand, have linked up to the BeiDou system. As more nations become dependent on the BeiDou system, China’s influence with these nations will grow because they will be reliant on Chinese systems for sustained economic growth [17].

In addition to the Beidou satellite navigation system, Beijing’s plans for the Corridor include remote-sensing satellites, weather satellites, communications satellites, data-relay satellites, ground stations, data centres, and other ground application systems. China has identified a number of applications that it expects the Space Information Corridor to support. These applications include agriculture, disaster relief, port operations, telemedicine, transportation, financial services, and urban planning, among others. As is evident, the Space Information Corridor is essentially an extension of the DSR in the space domain.

As is the case with other aspects of the DSR and the BRI more generally, China’s Space Information Corridor seeks to expand its economic and political influence on the international stage at the expense of the US.

National Security Implications for India

The ongoing military standoff in Ladakh, on a much bigger scale as compared to Doklam, is clearly a watershed moment in India’s strategic relationship with China, and any pretence of a trust-based approach can now be shelved for the foreseeable future. The implications of China’s DSR, as also its Space Information Corridor, on our national security landscape must therefore be reviewed and re-assessed accordingly.

Chinese 5G Technology: No Longer an Option

A ministry of home affairs-led committee, with members from the department of telecommunications, IB and National Security Council Secretariat, will soon take a call on whether Chinese vendors like Huawei and ZTE would be allowed to participate in the 5G trials. Presently, out of the four main telecom operators, Reliance Jio does not use either Huawei or ZTE equipment in its 3G/ 4G networks, while 30-40% equipment used by Bharti Airtel, Vodafone and BSNL are from these companies. If Huawei and ZTE are kept out of 5G trials, procurement cost for all players other than Reliance Jio would increase by 20-25% [18].

The Indian Armed Forces own and manage their own networks, which include some secure cellular networks as well. Implementation of 5G technology in such networks in the foreseeable future is a distinct possibility. When this happens, technology being used by national telecom operators is likely to permeate into defence networks too in some form or the other.

Keeping in view the security issues associated with 5G technology particularly in the context of Chinese vendors, together with the increasingly expansionist and aggressively adversarial attitude demonstrated by China towards India, use of Chinese 5G technology in India’s national telecom networks is no longer a viable option, whatever be the economic burden which may have to be borne as a result.

Data & AI enabled Sharp Power: Need for Countermeasures

As brought out above, one of the most valuable resources which China gets access to as a spin-off from the DSR is vast amounts of data: from data centres, OFC networks, e-commerce platforms, payment portals, social media platforms, and a host of other Internet applications. Given China’s reputation of being a defaulter with regard to ethical behaviour in general and data privacy norms in particular, compounded by its adversarial relationship with India, it can safely be assumed that any data accessible to China would be covertly mined by it and used against India. With the raising of the Special Support Force, one of the chief usages of this data would undoubtedly be application of ‘sharp power’ and conduct of psychological operations against India across the spectrum of conflict.

Data is of prime importance for the development of AI powered systems, including military ones. As an example, data gleaned from e-commerce platforms using AI tools could be utilised for mapping our financial institutions and other critical infrastructure, for subsequently targeting them using sophisticated cyber-attacks, again powered by AI. Similarly, AI tools could be used to profile our political and military leadership (a stark example being Cambridge Analytica!), who could then be subjected to psychological operations attacks. Ready availability of a huge reservoir of data would enable China to proceed faster towards its declared objective of achieving AI supremacy.

The banning of 59 Chinese applications by India in the aftermath of the Ladakh standoff is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. However, this initiative needs to be taken forward by thoroughly analysing and reviewing every digital platform which could facilitate China to mine Indian data, and its leakage plugged through suitable remedial measures.

DSR spawned Strategic Alliances: Pushback an Imperative

Quite apart from exploiting data for projecting ‘sharp power’, the DSR would provide China with critical leverages over participating countries, by having control over its communication networks, navigation systems (if adopted) and commercial and financial nerve centres. Thus, participating states would have no option but to stand with China in any strategic alignment. In the context of India’s neighbourhood, leaving aside China’s all-weather ally Pakistan, these leverages would be especially relevant with respect to Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

India has rightly stayed away from participation in the BRI physical infrastructure projects, citing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through POK as its primary rationale for doing so. In view of the changed threat perception, a strong push-back is required against the DSR initiative as well. The previous two sections have suggested that India must do everything possible to prevent Chinese ingress into our communication infrastructure as well as any cyberspace application from which mass pilferage of data could take place. In addition, e-commerce and payment portals with Chinese investments must also be eased out at the earliest. Finally, India needs to diplomatically engage and influence its friendly neighbours to also follow suit on similar lines.

Disruptive Military Technologies: Specialisation is the Key

The DSR is the result of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), which have manifested themselves in the form of OFC, 5G, data centres, e-commerce platforms and payment portals, etc. ICT technologies are dual-use in nature, and have simultaneously triggered an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA), creating in the process fresh warfighting domains, namely space, cyberspace and electromagnetic (EM) domains. Two other technologies of note which are expected to usher in the next RMA over the next decade and which are closely related to the DSR are the AI and Quantum technologies. As brought out above, China aims to become a technological and military superpower on the back of these technologies, and will leverage its R&D partnerships with BRI participants to achieve this objective.

While China has already forged ahead on all the above technologies, India has taken only limited research initiatives in these areas. Given its strengths in the software segment and its entrepreneurship skills, and with the right backing from the Government, India has the potential of becoming a significant player in the development of these niche technologies.

As regards military applications of these disruptive technologies, the defence R&D model needs to be given a complete relook. A much higher synergy is desirable amongst the Industry, Academia, DRDO and Government, with the Defence Services at the fulcrum. The Services must graduate beyond churning out of QRs and be fully participative in the R&D process. For this to happen, their project management organisations require to undergo transformative restructuring based on a culture of specialisation. Also, the DRDO must be made directly accountable to the Services [19].

Space Information Corridor: Strengthening our Defence Space Segment

With a 35-satellite constellation of Beidou navigation system together with a plethora of remote-sensing, weather and communications satellites in orbit, China continues to develop a very strong space segment as part of the Space Information Corridor, much of which has commercial as well as military usage. China is also known to possess a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, based on direct ascent, co-orbital, laser, electronic jamming, high power microwave (HPM) and EMP technologies [20].

Presently India’s space as well as ASAT capabilities are well below those of China. At the same time, India’s expertise in space technologies and progress made by it in the space segment are commendable. Leveraging this expertise, India’s needs to give much higher priority to augmenting its meagre military assets in space, and also focus on development of the full range of ASAT capabilities.

Conclusion

China’s BRI was announced by President Xi Jingping in 2013, while the DSR was given official cognizance through a Government white paper in 2015. The multiple facets of the DSR were initially not known with clarity, and it is only over the last few years that their critical relevance to China’s geopolitical ambitions has been realised by analysts and policy makers. This work has analysed the DSR with specific reference to its impact on India’s national security.

The above analysis takes the view that the ongoing military standoff in Ladakh, when seen against the backdrop of China’s aggressive and expansionist stance on many fronts, has brought about a lasting change in India’s relationship with China, one which is essentially adversarial in nature. Accordingly, several recommendations have been made here for countering China’s strategic moves made under a seemingly benign DSR initiative, but which seriously impinge on our national security.

While India has been wise enough to shun the BRI per se, it has been unwittingly drawn into participating in the DSR ventures. This work advocates that the time has come to reverse this process at the earliest.

References

(1)     Sheridan Prasso, China’s Digital Silk Road Is Looking More Like an Iron Curtain, Bloomberg Business Week, 10 Jan 2019, Accessed 09 Dec 2020.

(2)     Matteo Giovannini, The Digital Silk Road’s Growing Strategic Role during the Epidemic, CGTN, 10 Jun 2020, Accessed 09 Dec 2020.

(3)     James Lewis, How Will 5G Shape Innovation and Security: A Primer, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec 2018, pp. 12, Accessed 09 Dec 2020.

(4)     Clayton Cheney, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition and Exporting Political Illiberalism, Pacific Forum, Issues and Insights, Vol 19 WP8, July 2019, pp. 4-5.

(5)     Ibid., 6-8.

(6)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part I: Classification, AI & Robotics and Quantum Technologies, Future Wars, 28 Apr 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(7)     Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part II: Nano and Hypersonic Weapon Technologies, Future Wars, 06 May 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(8)     Toby Warden, A Revolutionary Evolution: Civil-Military Integration in China, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 01 Oct 2019, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(9)     Clayton Cheney, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition…, pp. 8-9.

(10)   Ibid., pp. 9-11.

(11)   Emily Taylor, Who’s Afraid of Huawei? Understanding the 5G Security Concerns, Chatham House, 09 Sep 2019, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(12)   Jacob Kastrenakis, Trump signs bill banning government use of Huawei and ZTE tech, The Verge, 13 Aug 2018, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(13)   Colin Lecher, White House cracks down on Huawei equipment sales with executive order, The Verge, 15 May 2019, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(14)   Marguerite Reardon, 5G will change the world. China wants to lead the way, CNET, 10 Jul 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(15)   Joe O’Halloran, UK mobile operators warn removing Huawei tech would cost ‘low billions’ and take five years, Computer Weekly, 10 Jul 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(16)   Nadege Rolland Ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report No 80, Sep 2019, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(17)   Clayton Cheney, China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition…, pp. 6.

(18)   Kiran Rathee, India’s 5G trial conditions may trip China; Huawei, ZTE may find difficult to meet these IB demands, The Financial Express, 08 Jul 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(19)   Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, Disruptive Military Technologies – Part III: Defence R&D – Services at the Fulcrum, Future Wars, 12 May 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.

(20)   Todd Harrison et al, Space Threat Assessment 2020, CSIS, Mar 2020, Accessed 10 Dec 2020.